

Quine and Davidson on Language, Thought and Reality

Quine and Davidson are among the leading thinkers of the twentieth century. Their influence on contemporary philosophy is second to none, and their impact is also strongly felt in disciplines such as linguistics and psychology. This is the first book devoted to both of them, but also the first to question some of their basic assumptions. Hans-Johann Glock critically scrutinizes their ideas on ontology, analyticity, apriority and necessity, truth, meaning and interpretation, thought and language, and shows that their attempts to accommodate meaning and thought within a naturalistic framework, either by impugning intensional notions as unclear and non-factual or by extracting them from physical facts, are ultimately unsuccessful. His discussion includes interesting comparisons of Quine and Davidson with other philosophers, particularly Wittgenstein. Glock also offers detailed accounts of central issues in contemporary analytic philosophy, such as whether philosophy is continuous with science, whether truth is a feature of sentences or propositions, whether meaning and reference are indeterminate, whether language requires conventions, and whether animals are capable of having beliefs and desires.

HANS-JOHANN GLOCK is Reader in Philosophy at the University of Reading. He is the author of A Wittgenstein Dictionary (1996), which has been translated into German, French, Portuguese and Polish. He is editor of The Rise of Analytic Philosophy (1997), Wittgenstein: a Critical Reader (2001), and Strawson and Kant (2003), and co-editor (with Robert L. Arrington) of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (1991), and Wittgenstein and Quine (1996).



> Quine and Davidson on Language, Thought and Reality

HANS-JOHANN GLOCK

University of Reading





PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge, CB2 2RU, UK
40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA
477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia
Ruiz de Alarcón 13, 28014 Madrid, Spain
Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa

http://www.cambridge.org

© Hans-Johann Glock 2003

This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2003 Reprinted 2004

Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge

Typefaces Lexicon No. 2 9/13 pt. and Lexicon No. 1 System LATEX 2. [TB]

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 0 521 82180 o hardback



Für Gabi



It is the profession of philosophers to question platitudes that others accept without thinking twice. A dangerous profession, since philosophers are more easily discredited than platitudes, but a useful one. For when a good philosopher challenges a platitude, it usually turns out that the platitude was essentially right; but the philosopher has noticed trouble that one who did not think twice could not have met. In the end, the challenge is answered and the platitude survives, more often than not. But the philosopher has done the adherents of the platitude a service: he has made them think twice.

(DAVID LEWIS 1969: 1)



Contents

Acknowledgements page xi List of abbreviations xiii

Introduction 1

- 1 Logical pragmatism 13
- 1 The impact of logical positivism 13
- 2 The legacy of American pragmatism 18
- 3 Quine's naturalism 23
- 4 Davidson on reason's place in nature 30
- 5 A philosophical anthropology 36
- 2 Ontology 40
- 1 Ontological commitment and ontological parsimony 41
- 2 Intensions and criteria of identity 47
- 3 Ontology and singular terms 52
- 4 Ontology and quantification 56
- 5 Ontological deflationism 60
- 6 Linguistic frameworks and logical paraphrase 63
- 3 Analyticity, apriority and necessity 71
- 1 The circularity charge 72
- 2 Holism and truth by virtue of meaning 77
- 3 A linguistic account of analyticity 81
- 4 Holism and the a priori 86
- 5 The deep need for the convention 92
- 6 Modal logic and essentialism 95
- 4 Truth 102
- 1 The legacy of Tarski 102

[ix]



x Contents

- 2 Has Tarski defined truth? 110
- 3 Unbearable truth-bearers 118
- 4 Epistemic and correspondence theories 126
- 5 Deflationism and minimalism 131
- 5 Meaning and truth 137
- 1 Quine on reference, meaning and use 137
- 2 Davidson's truth-conditional theory of meaning 142
- 3 Meaning and truth-conditions 151
- 4 The immanence of meaning 154
- 5 The notion of a truth-condition 155
- 6 The individuation problem 156
- 7 Truth-conditional semantics and natural languages 157
- 6 Radical translation and radical interpretation 166
- 1 Translation runs amok 170
- 2 Quine's closet hermeneutics 175
- 3 On safari with Davidson 182
- 4 Charity is not enough 194
- 7 Indeterminacies 200
- 1 Does radical translation start at home? 201
- 2 Unsuccessful objections to indeterminacy 207
- 3 Scrutinizing reference I: gavagai 214
- 4 Scrutinizing reference II: proxy functions 219
- 5 Indeterminacy and underdetermination 224
- 8 Meaning and understanding 233
- 1 The extensionality problem 234
- 2 The privations of modesty 239
- 3 Psychological modesty 244
- 4 Language, norms and conventions 250
- 5 Thought, causation, and first-person authority 259
- 9 Thought and language 268
- 1 The intensional nature of thought 270
- 2 Animals, thoughts and concepts 274
- 3 The holistic nature of thought 281
- 4 Belief and the concept of belief 286

References 294 Index 301



Acknowledgements

In writing this book, I have incurred many debts. I am grateful for permission to use material from the following articles of mine: 'Necessity and Normativity', in H. Sluga and D. Stern (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein* (Cambridge University Press), 198–225; 'On Safari with Wittgenstein, Quine and Davidson', in R. L. Arrington and H. J. Glock (eds.), *Wittgenstein and Quine* (London: Routledge, 1996), 144–72; 'Truth without People?', *Philosophy* 72 (1997), 85–104; 'Animals, Thoughts and Concepts', *Synthese* 123 (2000), 35–64; 'Does Ontology Exist?', *Philosophy* 77 (2002), 235–60.

As always, I owe thanks to my colleagues and graduate students at Reading for their forbearance and support. I am especially indebted to Javier Kalhat for his assistance at the final stages. Hilary Gaskin of CUP has been very patient and efficient throughout. Two anonymous readers for the Press improved the book through their fair and constructive reports. Over the years, I have learnt more than I can say from the meetings of the St John's College discussion group at Oxford. Maria Alvarez, Bob Arrington, Jonathan Dancy, Kathrin Glüer, Anthony Kenny, John Preston, Bede Rundle, Stuart Shanker, Ralph Stoecker and Peter Strawson have greatly improved my philosophical understanding through conversations and comments on material contained in this book. Peter Strawson's philosophy of language has also been a general source of inspiration to me.

I am grateful to the participants of a graduate seminar on Davidson at Queen's University (Ontario) in 1997, that I conducted jointly with David Bakhurst. David was an exemplary host, and has been an esteemed philosophical companion ever since my first baffling encounters with the writings of Quine and Davidson at Oxford in 1983. He also commented on parts of the final draft.

[xi]



xii Acknowledgements

The bulk of this book was written at the University of Bielefeld between 1998 and 2000. I am very grateful to the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for awarding me a research fellowship. I am also indebted to my host Eike von Savigny, for his immensely generous support over the years, and for constantly keeping me on my toes philosophically speaking. Ansgar Beckermann honoured and helped me by devoting a Ph.D. seminar to my drafts, as well as through his astute and informative comments. Christian Nimtz is not just a flesh-and-blood encyclopaedia of analytic philosophy. He was also brave enough to confront my obtuseness in dealing with computers and my obstinacy in resisting the allure of naturalism. My discussions of formal semantics have benefited greatly from his suggestions.

Back at Reading, I was privileged to run a seminar on truth together with Wolfgang Künne. I have profited immeasurably from his writings, from our conversations, and from his exacting scrutiny of several chapters, which saved me from many a blunder. For many years now, my friend John Hyman has tried his best to bring out the best in me, not least by reading most of the chapters, sometimes in several versions. I wish I could have done justice to his probing questions, his acute criticisms and his ingenious proposals. As things stand, I can only thank him. I would not even know how to thank Peter Hacker. He set me on the thorny but rewarding path of analytic philosophy. His intellectual and moral support have been unstinting, and his comments on virtually the whole of the book have been invaluable.

My greatest debt, finally, is to Gabi, Sonja and Helen. They had to put up with yet another ordeal, not to mention many journeys, and still managed to comfort and inspire me through their love, kindness and good humour.



Abbreviations

Works by Quine

Books

FLPV From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980; 1. edn. 1953). MLMethods of Logic (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966; 1. edn. 1952). Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia OR University Press, 1969). Philosophy of Logic (Englewood Cliffs/N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970). PLPTPursuit of Truth (Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992; 1. edn. 1990). Quiddities: An Intermittently Philosophical Dictionary (London: 0 Penguin, 1987). RR The Roots of Reference (La Salle: Open Court, 1974). Selected Logic Papers (New York: Random House, 1966). SLP From Stimulus to Science (Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard University SS Press, 1995). TML The Time of My Life: An Autobiography (Cambridge/Mass.: MIT Press, TT Theories and Things (Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard University Press, WB The Web of Belief, with J. S. Ullian (New York: Random House,

Word and Object (Cambridge/Mass.: MIT Press, 1960).

University Press, 1976; 1. edn. 1966).

Ways of Paradox and Other Essays (Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard

[xiii]

WO WP 1970).



xiv List of abbreviations

Other items

- CBG 'Comments', in Barrett and Gibson (eds.), 1990.
- EEW 'On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World', *Erkenntnis* 9 (1975), 313–28.
- ER 'Events and Reification', in LePore and McLaughlin (eds.), 1985, 162–71.
- FM 'Facts of the Matter', in R. W. Shahan and C. Swoyer (eds.), Essays on the Philosophy of W. V. Quine (Hassocks: Harvester, 1979), 155–69.
- IPO 'In Praise of Observation Sentences', *Journal of Philosophy* 90 (1993), 107–16.
- ITA 'Indeterminacy of Translation Again', *Journal of Philosophy* 84 (1987), 5–10.
- LAP 'Let Me Accentuate the Positive', in A. Malachowski (ed.), Reading Rorty (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 117–19.
- LoC 'Lectures on Carnap (Harvard University, November 1934)', in Creath (ed.), 1990, 47–103.
- MR 'Methodological Reflections on Current Linguistic Theory', in G. Harman and D. Davidson (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1972), 442–54.
- MVD 'Mind and Verbal Dispositions', in Guttenplan (ed.), 1975, 83–95.
- N 'Naturalism or Living Within One's Means', *Dialectica* 49 (1995), 251–61.
- NNK 'The Nature of Natural Knowledge', in Guttenplan (ed.), 1975, 67–81.
- PLSP 'W. V. Quine: Perspectives on Logic, Science and Philosophy: Interview with B. Edminster and M. O'Shea', *Harvard Review of Philosophy* 4 (1994), 47–57.
- PPE 'The Pragmatists' Place in Empiricism', in R. J. Mulvaney and P. J. Zeltner (eds.), *Pragmatism* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1981), 23–39.
- PPLT 'Philosophical Progress in Language Theory', *Metaphilosophy* 1 (1970), 1–19.
- PTF 'Progress on Two Fronts', Journal of Philosophy 43 (1996), 159–63.
- RDH 'Replies', in Davidson and Hintikka (eds.), 1969.
- RHS 'Replies to Critics', in Hahn and Schilpp (eds.), 1986.
- RI 'Responses', Inquiry 37 (1994), 495–505.
- RIT 'On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation', *Journal of Philosophy* 67 (1970), 178–83.
- RLS 'Reactions', in Leonardi and Santambrogio (eds.), 1995, 345–61.



List of abbreviations

ΧV

SAO	'Semantics and Abstract Objects', Proceedings of the American
	Academy of Arts and Sciences 80 (1951), 90–6.
SN	'Structure and Nature', Journal of Philosophy 89 (1992), 5–9.
TI	'Three Indeterminacies', in R. Barrett and R. Gibson (eds.), 1990,
	1–16.
WPO	'Whither Physical Objects', in R. S. Cohen et al. (eds.), Essays in
	Memory of Imre Lakatos (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1976), 497–504.
WWD	'Where Do We Disagree?', in Hahn (ed.), 1999, 73–9.

Works by Davidson

Books

- EAE Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford University Press, 1980).ITI Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford University Press, 1984).
- SIO Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Oxford University Press, 2001).

Other items

- COT 'The Conditions of Thought', in J. Brandl and W. L. Gombocz (eds.), *The Mind of Donald Davidson. Grazer Philosophische Studien* 36 (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1989), 193–200.
- CT 'The Centrality of Truth', in J. Peregrin (ed.), *Truth and its Nature* (*if any*) (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999), 105–15.
- DD 'Davidson, Donald', in Guttenplan (ed.), 1994, 231-6.
- EX Expressing Evaluations, The Lindley Lecture (monograph), University of Kansas Press, 1984.
- FDT 'The Folly of Trying to Define Truth', *Journal of Philosophy* 93 (1996), 263–78.
- IA 'Intellectual Autobiography', in Hahn (ed.), 1999, 3–79.
- LL 'Locating Literary Language', in R. W. Dasenbrock (ed.), *Literary Theory after Davidson* (University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), 295–308.
- MTE 'Meaning, Truth and Evidence', in Barrett and Gibson (eds.), 1990, 68–79.
- NDE 'A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs', in LePore (ed.), 1986, 433–46.
- PAV 'Post-Analytic Visions', in G. Borradori (ed.), *The American Philosopher* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 40–54.
- PCT 'Pursuit of the Concept of Truth', in Leonardi and Santambrogio (eds.), 1995, 7–21.



xvi List of abbreviations

- PEA 'Problems in the Explanation of Action', in P. Pettit, R. Sylvan and J. Norman (eds.), *Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honour of J. J. C. Smart* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), 35–49.
- QVT 'What is Quine's View of Truth?', *Inquiry* 37 (1994), 437–40.
- RD 'Replies', in Stoecker (ed.), 1993.
- RH 'Replies to Critics', in Hahn (ed.), 1999.
- RI 'Representation and Interpretation', in M. Said et al. (eds.), *Modelling the Mind* (Oxford University Press, 1990), 13–26.
- RQE 'Reply to Quine on Events', in Lepore and McLaughlin (eds.), 1985, 172-6.
- 'The Social Aspect of Language', in B. McGuinness and G. Oliveri (eds.), *The Philosophy of Michael Dummett* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), 1–16.
- SCT 'The Structure and Content of Truth', *Journal of Philosophy* 87 (1990), 279–328.
- STL 'Seeing Through Language', in Preston (ed.), 1997, 15–27.
- UT 'Towards a Unified Theory of Meaning and Action', *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 11 (1980), 1–12.