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Common or Divided Security?

German and Norwegian Perspectives on Euro-Atlantic Security

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Introduction

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Setting the Scene

Twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War, Euro-Atlantic security is under pressure. Because of major geopolitical shifts and domestic disorder, the European nations and their American allies will have to rethink how to design common security. Failure to animate the European Union (EU) and to reinvigorate the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as efficient tools for peace and security might lead the West back to the spectre of divided security, to fragmentation and renationalisation. This book addresses the main challenges to Western security from the perspective of two European allies: Germany and Norway.

After the end of the Cold War, European and transatlantic security has gone through two transformative phases. The first one started around 1990, with the dissolution of the Soviet empire and the end of bipolarity that had divided Europe for more than 40 years. Faced with colossal transitional challenges, the Western response was reactive and characterised by much chaotic improvisation, but NATO and the EU played crucial roles in bringing former East European countries into the Western economic and security communities, most importantly by welcoming them as members. Both organisations failed to forestall appalling atrocities and mass murders when Yugoslavia fell apart, but in the end they contributed significantly albeit differently to quelling the fires in the Balkans.

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of crises in the European neighbourhood were strong incentives for trying to reformulate polices and rebuild institutions. French and German plans for a pan-European organisation quickly proved unrealistic. The roles of NATO and the EU, and the relationship between them, were open for debate. Since the Soviet threat had gone, politicians and scholars alike questioned the raison d'être of NATO unless it was prepared to undertake new missions, in particular outside its traditional area of responsibility (out-of-area). In spite of the disbelievers, NATO remained the main framework for Western security. Most countries also began to restructure their armed forces to make them more usable for expeditionary operations on short notice, but the result was unimpressive if we look at Europe as a whole.

The EU decided early on to strengthen its voice in international affairs. By the end of the 1990s it had also raised its ambitions regarding security and defence, which was embodied in the establishment of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999 and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 10 years later. Washington saluted the European ambition to act, but warned that further integration should not lead to decoupling from the Alliance, duplication of structures, or discrimination of non-EU members.[1] European countries that were not member of both organisations were challenged with finding their place in the new framework.[2]

While regional instability and wars dominated the first phase of post-Cold War transformation, asymmetric global threats and risks were at the forefront of the second. Terrorism was the overriding concern, but the spread of weapons of mass destruction also remained an important issue, and among new threats the management of cyber space climbed up the priority lists. The terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001 initiated this phase. NATO acted in solidarity, and the assaults led to the Alliance's biggest joint out-of-area operation. The subsequent long war in Afghanistan contributed to transforming the military in most European countries. At the same time, the so-called "war on terror" strained transatlantic cooperation severely, in particular the American intervention in Iraq in 2003. Divisions over the intervention led to one of the biggest transatlantic crises ever, a crisis which also divided the European camp. France and Germany sided with Russia in a diplomatic initiative against Washington, and US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld infamously spoke of new and old Europe pointing at the support from Eastern European allies.[3] In the end, as so many times before, the transatlantic crisis of the mid-2000s rather proved the strength and durability of the Euro-Atlantic security framework.[4] It did not, however, lead to a clarification of the most important issues, i.e. the relationship between NATO and EU, and the burden-sharing between the United States and its European allies. There was no

1 Madeleine K. Albright, US Secretary of State, "The Right Balance Will Secure NATO's Future", *Financial Times*, 7 December 1998.

2 See Sunniva Tofte, "Non-EU NATO Members and the Issue of Discrimination", in Joylon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler (eds.), *Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2003).

3 Tuomas Forsberg and Graeme P. Herd, *Divided West: European Security and the Transatlantic Relationship*, (London: Chatham House 2006); David M. Andrews (ed.), *The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005).

4 Geir Lundestad (ed.), *Just Another Major Crisis? The United States and Europe Since 2000*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008).

common European understanding and framework to deal with military intervention, developing capabilities, and cutting costs.

This book is being written at a time when we are beginning to see the contours of a third transformative phase of European and transatlantic defence and security. The Afghan military operation will be reduced substantially, but asymmetric threats and risks remain a key challenge. Equally important, some traditional and emerging great powers will increasingly shape international relations in a multipolar system. Among the emerging great powers, the rise of China stands out, and it might become a superpower in tandem with the United States. Regional powers such as India, Brazil and South Africa will also leave strong footprints in international politics, and Russia remains a global power player and works hard to regain influence in the Eurasian region. The west stood helpless in the face of Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and was unable to find effective countermeasures as Moscow moved on to destabilise Eastern Ukraine. The crisis was a reminder that Russia under the leadership of Vladimir Putin does not accept further western enlargement and is willing to challenge NATO and the EU in areas not covered by security guarantees.

The geopolitical shift impacts Europe's position and security in several ways. Most importantly, the Western world, and Europe in particular, is in relative decline, losing influence vis-à-vis the emerging great powers and Asia on the rise.[5] Furthermore, the emergence of a new international (dis)order might weaken multilateralism and global governance in important areas such as trade, climate, terrorism and non-proliferation, and it might make it even more difficult to manage political, military and humanitarian crises in unstable and failed states.

As these fundamental geostrategic shifts unfold, the European Union and NATO are haunted by profound institutional and economic problems. Since 2008, the financial crisis has further aggravated the situation. Having this disarray in mind, it is hard to imagine a European and transatlantic renaissance.

US policy and strategy for facing global and regional challenges remains crucial to European security. Whilst the Americans, even in the future, will have to

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5 The question whether the decline of the West and the emergence of a new international order is actually taking place if the decline is relative, and if it concerns the entire West or either Europe or the United States alone is subject to vivid debate on both sides of the Atlantic. For some contributions, see Charles A. Kupchan, "The Decline of the West: Why America Must Prepare for the End of Dominance" *The Atlantic*, 20 March 2012. http://www.theatlantic.com; Robert Kappel, *The Decline of Europe and the US: Shifts in the World Economy and in Global Politics*, GIGA Focus 1/2011; Josef Joffe, *The Myth of America's Decline: Politics, Economics, and a Half Century of False Prophecies* (New York: Liveright 2014).

focus much attention on conflicts in and threats emanating from what the George W. Bush Administration coined the Greater Middle East, stretching from North Africa to India, the rebalancing towards the Asia Pacific will increasingly draw resources, both economically and militarily. Although accompanied by assurances that European security remains a priority, it is hard to imagine that the US commitments to Europe will stretch beyond light footprints.

Against this background, decision makers and security experts seem to agree that America's European allies will have to assume more responsibility for their own security. They must avoid further deterioration in defence investments and capacities, and they will have to contribute more towards burden-sharing in NATO. Little seems to indicate, though, that European governments are ready to back rhetoric with substantial initiatives.[6] In the eyes of many European politicians, the crisis of the day is not imminent security threats, but the social and economic burdens of their constituencies. The argument that the West should spend more on defence has modest support. NATO's strategic concepts have defined joint challenges facing the West and tried to frame the Alliance's role in global security, but the result has not been convincing. The Alliance struggles with different perceptions, conflicting interests, shortage of resources and an inability to fundamentally reform the armed forces. The situation for the EU is even more depressing. In 2003, the EU agreed on its own security strategy. The document is often cited as a manifestation of Europe's ambition to play a role on the global stage. However, it does not have the authority to serve as guidance to national strategies and has not been updated since. Instead, each European country continues to produce its own strategies and white papers. The multitude of strategies testifies to the limited will to work for a common European strategy and joint solutions.[7]

Germany and Norway

Studies of the Euro-Atlantic security system tend to focus on the "big three" – Britain, France and Germany – and their relationship with the United States.[8]

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6 In the debate on Western decline, security experts see a "strategic decline", meaning the decrease in defence investments among Western countries compared to rapid growth in defence spending in some of the emerging powers. See Francois Heisbourg, "The West is accelerating its strategic decline" *Financial Times*, 4 September 2013.

7 Nick Witney and Olivier De France, *Europe's Strategic Cacophony*, ECFR Policy Brief, April 2013. www.ecfr.eu.

8 Stefan Lehne, *The Big Three in EU Foreign Policy*, Carnegie Endowment, July 2012.

Others take a distinctive small state perspective, often highlighting bilateral or sub-regional cooperation.[9] Rarely are the views of big and smaller allies combined. However, coalition building within NATO or the EU necessitates a continued exchange between big and smaller allies. Initiatives for reform are often launched by groups of states based on shared interests or geographic proximity. While major powers can act as lead or framework nations, smaller allies can exercise considerable influence through well placed initiatives and key contributions.[10]

This book analyses the state of European and transatlantic security from the perspective of Germany and Norway, who both belong to the area broadly defined as Northern Europe. The chapters in the book highlight differences and similarities of the two countries in their perceptions of threats and challenges, their role in the institutional framework, and their willingness to use military power and to adapt their armed forces to such a use. Germany is a great power in a European, and even in a broader, context. It is often accused, however, of downplaying its influence, especially in the field of security.[11] Norway, by contrast, often seems to punch above its weight. Most would regard Norway as a small power. The size of its population (5 million) justifies such a view. But there are reasons today for seeing Norway as a medium-sized power, since it has become very rich and its position in NATO has never been stronger.[12] That being said, from a security perspective, particularly compared to Russia in the North, a characterisation of Norway as a small power is still valid.

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9 Andrew Cottey (ed.), *Subregional cooperation in the new Europe: building security, prosperity and solidarity from the Barents to the Black Sea* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999); Alyson J. K. Bailes et al. (eds.), *The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006).

10 According to the ECFR Sweden emerged in 2011 as one of the most frequent leaders in European foreign policy, particularly on multilateral issues and crisis management whereas there was a "drop in the leadership by the big three". ECFR, European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2013. www.ecfr.eu.

11 For different takes on this discussion see Eric Gujer, *No more Hypocrisy. Germany is a great power*, Körber Policy Paper No.1, 2007, and Hans Kundnani, "*Germany as a Geo-Economic Power*" The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2011 34:3 pp. 31–45.

12 Norway ranks 23rd in terms of gross national income in the world and 10–11th in terms of national defence budget in NATO and Europe. Its vast maritime areas contain significant resources, in particular fish and petroleum. When it comes to global engagement, Norway is among the most active and the most committed countries, underlined by a strong contribution to the UN system, with a total of around 1 billion USD. Norway is among the top five contributors to the different UN organisations.

Different geopolitical positions and historical experiences have had a strong impact on how the two countries developed in the second half of the 20th century, leading them to view European security quite differently. Germany's foreign and security policy has been strongly influenced by the historical burden of the Nazi crimes and the defeat in World War II, but also by its resurgence to international status and power as a divided country under the American security umbrella. These experiences have established an aversion to the use of military force and a preference for multilateralism as the most significant characteristics. Germany's way back into the society of democratic nations went through binding multilateral cooperation with its transatlantic allies and Western European neighbours (*Westbindung*). After the failed initiative for German rearmament in the framework of a European Defence Community in 1954, NATO has been the preferred structure for Germany's defence and security policy. At the same time, Germany was a driving force behind a more independent European foreign and security policy, even including the long-term goal of a European army. Gradually regaining sovereignty as an international actor, West Germany started in the 1960s to intensify its relations with Eastern Europe as well. At the same time, the Bonn government started to play a bigger role on the global scene. The early 1970s saw both parts of Germany recognising each other, paving the way for membership in the United Nations and for a comprehensive pan-European security agreement, enshrined in the Helsinki Treaty of 1975. With the end of the Cold War, reunification and full sovereignty, two key objectives in German foreign and security policy, were finally achieved.

Which role Germany should assume in Europe remained an issue both for Germans and their neighbours, however. In his address on 4 October 1990, the day after reunification, Chancellor Helmut Kohl pledged that Germany should take more responsibility for international security whilst at the same time assuring partners and allies that his country would stand by its European and transatlantic commitments.[13] In the following years, Germany gradually normalised its participation in international military operations. At the same time, both pacifism and multilateralism remained dominant features in Germany's security outlook.

Norway is a small, but influential player at Europe's northern periphery. Under the impression of the Second World War, Norway abandoned its policy of nonalignment and neutrality. The idea of a Scandinavian defence pact was rejected, and Norway opted instead for a US security guaranty, and became a founding member

13 German Government, *Regierungserklärung des Bundeskanzlers Dr. Helmut Kohl vor dem gesamtdeutschen Bundestag am 4. Oktober 1990*, Bulletin der Bundesregierung No. 118, 5 October 1990, pp. 1240–1248.

of NATO. Ever since, Norway has prioritised transatlantic security cooperation. National defence efforts and calls for Alliance commitment were focused on the High North, i.e. the European parts of the Arctic, including Northern Russia. Similar to its Nordic neighbours and Britain, Norway kept a distance to European integration. Only when these partners saw the need for accession in the early 1960s, did Norwegian governments follow suit. However, whereas Denmark and Britain joined in 1973, and Sweden and Finland in 1994, membership was rejected by the Norwegian people in popular referendums. To avoid isolation, Norwegian governments have urged for close affiliations with the European Union through an "active European policy". Such an activist stance is seen as particularly important in the field of foreign and security policy, areas in which the EU has strengthened its common positions over the years but which are not covered by the comprehensive trade agreements that make Norway the most integrated outsider.

Germany and Norway also share similarities: the strong attachment to the United States, the special relationship with Russia, the responsibility for security and stability in the wider area of Northern Europe as well as a strong commitment to international solidarity and humanitarian aid open the way for close cooperation based on mutual understanding. Geographic proximity and corresponding political cultures have contributed to overcoming resentments resulting from five years of German occupation during World War II – a difficult process that took longer than in other countries. Six decades of partnership in NATO have created many bonds between politicians, officials and officers, with the joint responsibility in Northern Afghanistan adding an operational dimension. Germany has also been one of Norway's main supporters inside the European Union, facilitating access and providing support in negotiations.[14] In addition, a comprehensive web of bilateral relations has developed on all levels. Defence cooperation started in the 1950s and has increased ever since. Joint training on Norwegian soil remained difficult for several decades, due to war memories and Soviet objections, but today the two armed forces exercise and work on numerous tasks in the Baltic and North Atlantic.

Where to go from here?

European and transatlantic security cooperation has always been complex and torn between dividing perceptions and interests. The number of "crises" has been endless. However, deep below the daily toil, common threats and ties have bound

14 Robin M. Allers, *Besondere Beziehungen. Deutschland, Norwegen und Europa in der Ära Brandt 1966–1974*, (Bonn: Dietz 2009).

the nations together. While much changed after 1990, one can still argue that the states have a shared and fundamental interest in maintaining and even deepening their security and defence cooperation. They all face many of the same challenges, notably regional instability and crises that might strike Europe, proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as terrorist and cyber-attacks. Most European nations find it in their interest to contribute to international military operations in one way or the other. They all grapple with the difficult task of reorganising their armed forces to meet the myriad threats and risks. To all of them, modern defence is so expensive and national economies so strained that deeper cooperation is the only alternative.

An underlying theme in these debates is the question whether strengthening the existing framework – more Europe, more NATO – is the best and only way to ensure deeper and more effective cooperation. Alternatively, a more flexible framework could emerge that takes into account the divergence of strategic cultures and interests among Western countries, as well as the different preferences for closer or looser affiliation, the many op-outs, opt-ins and caveats. However, such a development could, at worst, weaken the Alliance's cohesion and lead to renationalisation and divided security.

The Chapters

In this book, the challenges to European and transatlantic security are analysed from the perspectives of a major and a smaller European state. Comparing their perspectives on European security policy at the beginning of the 21st century allows the reader to grasp similarities and differences which might explain progress, stagnation or even potential regression in European and transatlantic security.

The first part of the book traces the historical lines, helping us to make sense of where we stand today. Helga Haftendorn and Rolf Tamnes provide a broad survey over the most important themes and trends in German and Norwegian security over the last decades, from the end of the Second World War to interventions in Afghanistan in 2001 and Libya in 2011.

Helga Haftendorn (Freie Universität Berlin) looks at the evolution of Germany into one of the most powerful states of Europe. While having increased its weight in Europe and globally, it remains safely embedded in the multilateral structures established during the Cold War. Given its size and influence, the benevolent hegemon is likely to provoke mistrust. According to Haftendorn, Germany's dilemma is to be "accused of two crimes simultaneously: leading too much and forcing its partners to follow its lead; and not leading enough and delaying joint decisions." Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's talk of a "German way" and the Merkel government's decision

to abstain from a vote in the UN Security Council that united all its major partners, contributes to the perception of the Berlin Republic as an unreliable security partner.

Rolf Tamnes (Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, IFS) emphasises that while Norway, at the Northern European periphery, had to adapt to major international changes during and after the end of the Cold War, the main parameters defining the country's foreign and security policy have changed surprisingly little. The High North continues to be an arena for security challenges and many opportunities, and the preference for NATO and a strong relationship with the United States remain the paramount objectives of Norway's security policy. Cooperation with its Nordic neighbours and affiliation with the European Union come second to the American security connection. At the same time, helped by its enormous wealth as an oil and gas producer and driven by a long tradition of international engagement, Norway contributes above average in peace negotiations, development aid, and peacekeeping. The country has also punched above its weight as a contributor to military operations in Afghanistan and Libya.

The second part of the book singles out four challenges to Western security: Cyber security and antiterrorism are serious concerns in all countries and claim global attention. That is also true for nuclear disarmament and the changing conditions of the Arctic; the first issue is of particular importance to Germany, the second to Norway.

Annegret Bendiek (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP) compares European counter-terrorism policies with the strategies and instruments of the United States. Her analysis of the legal framework and its political interpretation on both sides of the Atlantic uncovers big differences in the most basic assessments of counter-terrorism. While the United States sees itself at war with al-Qaeda and considers military means as a necessary instrument to combat terrorism, the EU prefers police measures that are more human rights sensitive. Cooperation is made even more difficult by the EU's failure to appear as a unified actor. Revelations over the spying practices of US agencies have brought these differences high on the political agenda. However, the way this scandal has been handled has shown that the transatlantic partnership is of strategic importance for both sides and without any realistic alternative. As Bendiek shows, a great deal of pragmatism and the acceptance of grey areas is needed in the fight against terrorism, but this pragmatic cooperation should be accompanied by a broad political and social debate about the fundamental principles of human rights and the rule of law.

Kristin Hemmer Mørkestøl (Norwegian Ministry of Defence) analyses the implications of cyber threats for international security. There is a growing awareness of cyber attacks as a threat to national security. Both national governments and international organisations such as NATO and the EU are trying to develop effective

countermeasures, e.g. by strengthening and restructuring the organisational framework dealing with information technology. Cyber has become more than a buzzword and has led to the introduction of measures at the national and international level. Mørkestøl takes a closer look at the way Norway has responded to the challenges of cyber security and compares these measures to the efforts made by NATO. Although the plethora of initiatives indicates that cyber security is becoming a game changer, Mørkestøl concludes that "Western countries and international organisations have yet to fully appreciate the potential threat to national and international security".

Nuclear disarmament and the growing importance of the Arctic are two examples of security challenges that are particularly important for specific countries. Nuclear weapons play such a role for Germany. As a precondition to its reintegration in the Western security community after World War II, in 1954, Germany declined to ever own and develop such weapons. Being the main battlefield of the Cold War, however, West Germany was among the key areas where nuclear weapons were stationed in NATO Europe. Nuclear weapons remain a major issue in international security. The reduction of superpower stockpiles and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons technology continue to be contentious issues among states. Debates about deterrence and disarmament also continue to cause friction among Western allies, between the United States and Europe but also among European allies. Michael Paul (SWP) discusses Germany's 2009 initiative to remove tactical nuclear weapons from its soil. The German initiative was inspired by President Barack Obama's vision of a nuclear free world but failed to take into account the concerns of certain allies – especially the new members from Eastern Europe – who are eager to maintain a credible nuclear deterrence. Paradoxically Germany, which is often accused of lacking leadership in foreign and security policy, made a move that was "both too early and too ambitious".

In most national and multinational security strategies, the Arctic is mentioned among the non-traditional and emerging challenges that require special attention. During the Cold War, the North was of great strategic importance to both superpowers. Today, the melting polar ice offers opportunities for the energy and transport market, but increasing activity brings safety and security challenges with it. While the concrete impact of these challenges remains remote to most actors, this is not the case for Norway and Russia, two Arctic countries with major interests in the region. Geir Flikke (University of Oslo) compares the Arctic strategies of Norway and Russia through the concept of milieu goals emphasising cooperation and possession goals pursuing self-interest. He sees Norway as predominantly, if not only, a champion of milieu goals, whereas Russia traditionally leans towards possession goals. Acknowledging the complex nature of Arctic affairs, however, Moscow has increasingly taken milieu goals into account and follows a cooperative path.

The third part of the book contrasts German and Norwegian perspectives on the two main institutional pillars of the Euro-Atlantic security framework – NATO and the EU. NATO's changing role after the adoption of the 2010 Strategic Concept is discussed by Patrick Keller (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, KAS). The big member states bear a special responsibility for NATO's development and adaptation to new challenges. Traditionally, Germany had been among the driving forces in this respect, but confronted with the latest phase of NATO development, characterised by the US-driven pivot to more out-of-area intervention, Germany has become a defender of the status quo. Keller sees this as the result of a lack of strategic orientation which risks relegating Germany to the second tier of Alliance members. To maintain NATO's strategic significance, Germany is needed among the leading powers.

Paal Sigurd Hilde and Helene Forsland Widerberg (IFS/Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) analyse NATO's transformation from a Norwegian point of view. Norwegian policy is characterised by close ties to the United States and a strong focus on NATO's core functions and its Article 5 commitment. The elaboration of NATO's Strategic Concept of 2010 shows how an ambitious small state with a clearly defined agenda can make an impact in international negotiations. Backed by a strong record of contributions to NATO's out-of-area operations, Norwegian negotiators were able to make their "core area initiative" part of the new concept.

The attitude towards and affiliation with the process of European integration is one of the biggest differences between Norway and Germany. Alister Miskimmon (Royal University of London) describes Germany's position in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as that of an increasingly influential player, yet one who is reluctant to assume leadership and conscious to anchor every initiative with its partners. Germany's performance during the Libyan crisis of 2011 has reinforced the impression of an ambivalent European policy, torn between the elite's narrative of responsibility and the public's scepticism towards the use of military power. The chapter discusses how this ambivalence has shaped Germany's involvement in CFSP and what this means for the future development of EU security and defence policy.

In her chapter, Pernille Rieker (Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, NUPI) asks why Norway – a non-member – has a record of seeking close affiliation with the EU in foreign and security policy and participates in EU-led operations. Although any acceleration of the integration process is likely to limit the influence of Norway, decision makers in Oslo continue their quest for any association short of full membership in the EU. According to a recent evaluation of Norway's agreements with the EU, this has made the country the most integrated outsider, a country that stands both inside and outside the Union. Rieker identifies

four complementary explanations for this strategy: Following the EU is seen as the best way of pursuing Norwegian national interests; the policy is constrained by historical and institutional factors (path dependency); it is a result of 'corporative interests' of the *corps diplomatique*; and Norway has adapted and undergone Europeanisation, which in turn have led to profound changes in Norway's national interests and identity.

The fourth part of the book addresses the role of the armed forces in a changing security environment and assesses German and Norwegian experiences with military intervention. Sven Bernhard Gareis (German Marshall Center) assesses the Bundeswehr's transformation from the end of the Cold War to the engagement in Afghanistan. According to Gareis, one will hardly find an area where the changes in Germany's security policy become more evident than in the realm of the Bundeswehr's participation in international military operations. After 1990, Germany was no longer able to maintain its decade-old civilian power approach of embedding its huge but static Bundeswehr in NATO's defensive structures. Instead, its renewed firm commitment to multilateralism put Germany into a continuing dilemma: While Germany's allies insisted on enhanced military contributions in international crisis management, large parts of the German polity and society remained sceptical over new functions for the Bundeswehr, especially in combat missions. In a 'muddling through' approach, governments from Helmut Kohl to Angela Merkel tried to reconcile those contradictory expectations through low-profile deployments, which, however, became more dangerous and more violent over time. The ongoing overhaul of the Bundeswehr needs to be made on the basis of a new strategic consensus on the use of the military instrument.

Lene Ekhaugen and Ida Oma (IFS) discuss Norway's experiences from the war in Afghanistan, analysing the way Norway has managed its Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the northern province of Faryab. The Norwegian approach – or model – ran counter to the generally practised model as it focused on military operations, leaving civilian projects to the UN, NGOs and the embassy in Kabul. Ekhaugen and Oma conclude that the particular international cooperation in Afghanistan allowed even a small state to go for a management style that was at odds with most other models, most of them opting for strong civil-military cooperation. At the same time they observe that Norway had to adapt to this general trend, in particular following the so called "surge" in American commitment to Afghanistan, which included a strong civilian component.

Nordic defence cooperation is often seen as a model for pooling and sharing in a sub-regional framework. Håkon Lunde Saxi (IFS) starts his chapter with an evaluation of Norwegian, Swedish and Danish contributions to the Libya operation in 2011 before he looks back at the evolution of Nordic cooperation in the field of

defence. He points out that cooperation is working well based on geographic proximity as well as political and cultural bonds. He underscores, however, that major differences in strategic outlook and institutional affiliation have limited the scope of cooperation. His study rejects a common notion that regional clusters like the Nordic one are likely to weaken NATO and EU's CSDP. The Nordic defence cooperation coexists with the main pillars of the Euro-Atlantic system and reinforces the participating countries' linkages with EU and NATO.

In a concluding chapter, Robin Allers and Rolf Tamnes reflect on the current status of the Euro-Atlantic security framework and discuss some of the options at hand for its future development. Their argument is twofold. On the one hand, there is a trend towards more flexibility in security and defence cooperation, leading to numerous initiatives for cooperation at the bilateral and minilateral level. On the other hand, this trend does not put into question the main framework with NATO and EU/CSDP as its main pillars. While it certainly might affect cohesion, minilateral cooperation has the potential to bring defence and security cooperation a step further at a time when the multilateral framework is slow to reform. The trend towards pragmatic cooperation interlinking the multilateral structures with collaborative initiatives at the minilateral level is illustrated with two concepts for cooperation in Northern Europe, in which Norway and Germany play a role.