

# The Borders of Schengen



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STUDIES AND DOCUMENTS



# **Schengen: removing borders while building fences?**

## **Introduction**

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The summer of 2015 has been marked by daily news reports, many of which have actually made the headlines, about the attempts of illegal immigrants and refugees to reach Europe. Never has this issue been talked about so much nor in such depth. In fact, this huge inflow has captured the attention of not only the media – who to some extent exploit stories of life and suffering – but also public opinion in the European Union's (EU) member states who are far from unanimous about the opening (or closing) of Europe's frontiers as they oscillate between humanitarian concerns and socioeconomic worries. Once again in the history of European integration, Europeans are divided between rhetoric (the desire to receive immigrants) and practice (the costs of this action).

From the time the first Schengen Agreement was signed in 1985, coming into force in 1995, until 2015 a great deal changed, including the EU itself. The idea to create a future Schengen Area which stipulated the gradual suppression of border controls at the common frontiers between these states was not, however, innovative within the European integration process since the Treaty of Rome (1957) had already referred to the concept of the freedom of circulation of people (article 3c).

From 1997 on, Schengen has been part of the institutional framework of the EU. It was included in the Treaty of Amsterdam and in the legal category of European citizenship, later undergoing alterations in the Treaty of Lisbon (2009). It focused on the notion of a “space of freedom, security and justice” with the objective of implementing common policies regarding not only the granting of visas and asylum but also immigration.

Basically, the Schengen area can be summed up as the free circulation of persons within the signatory countries and the abolition of internal borders. This does away with the need for border controls, which thus means that European citizens can circulate freely whenever they so wish without having to identify themselves or pass a border control when they cross the frontier from one country to another.

The idea of the Schengen area is thus essentially simple and efficient. Eliminating controls at the internal borders between member states could contribute to faster journeys with lower costs for the state (in terms of border patrols and border controls), increased exchanges between the different peoples of Europe and even to boosting the economy. At the celebrations commemorating the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Schengen, the European Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopoulos, emphasized the advantages and the importance of the abolition of internal border controls for the everyday lives of Europeans, their society and the economy when he said:

On a continent where nations once shed blood to defend their territories, today borders only exist on maps. [...] Removing borders, ensuring safety and building trust took many years after two devastating world wars. The creation of the Schengen area is one of the greatest achievements of the EU and it is irreversible.<sup>1</sup>

Even though the advantages and convenience of having movement between the Schengen signatory states made easier for millions of people are known and recognised, in the chapter on free circulation the Agreement contains a list of ambiguities. Illegal immigration, human trafficking and terrorism frequently turn Schengen into a delicate political issue. In this sense, and in parallel with there being open internal borders, the control of external borders has been strengthened, with news reaching us of frequent and mediatized incidents involving boats capsizing and sinking and the humanitarian drama that is unfolding along the shores of the Mediterranean. Following the deaths that have occurred in the Mediterranean in 2015, the European Commission proposed on 13 May a new European Agenda on Migration<sup>2</sup> that seeks to define both immediate and long term answers for the challenges that Europe is facing in this area. It has proposed various concrete measures including, among others, a recommendation that invites member states to resettle 20,000 people coming from third countries within a two-year period and a plan of action against migrant traffickers.

Data from 2014 shows that almost 300,000 people were detected irregularly crossing borders and that over 600,000 asylum applications were submitted, a 45% increase on the previous year. These figures

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<sup>1</sup> Schengen brochure, available at [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/docs/schengen\\_brochure/schengen\\_brochure\\_dr3111126\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/docs/schengen_brochure/schengen_brochure_dr3111126_en.pdf) (last accessed on 03/08/2015).

<sup>2</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication\\_on\\_the\\_european\\_agenda\\_on\\_migration\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf).

highlight the attraction and pull of the EU but at the same time they place under scrutiny and generate public debate on asylum and refugee policies, both of which are feeling the strain owing to the contradictory demands of human rights, internal security and limitations of member states' social security systems.

According to data from the last available Eurobarometer, immigration heads the list of Europeans' biggest concerns (38% of those surveyed<sup>3</sup>), followed by the economic situation and then unemployment. This data shows how immigration is now seen as an external "threat" that, instead of merely rivalling factors of an internal order such as unemployment and economic performance, has now overtaken them. This concern has been instrumentalised by some extreme right parties, European nationalists and populists with a certain degree of success – to judge by election results in some member states – who are using an increasingly intense anti-immigration discourse. But immigration has always been one of the most complicated areas even for those parties of the left considered pro-European and remains so inasmuch as these parties continue to not really know how to resolve the issue; at the same time right-wing parties and conservatives are also being drawn towards a more radical discourse. There is no doubt though that Schengen, which has facilitated the mobility of European citizens, has been one of the EU's major achievements. Moreover, despite the fact that intra-EU mobility has put pressure on national states at the level of social security, for example, it has greatly contributed to boosting the economy in general and to increasing cooperation, multiculturalism and the exchange of experiences between European peoples. Confronted with such data, some questions need to be asked: how can we idealize a European project that does not encompass the security and freedom of its citizens?; How can we protect borders in the global village of which the EU is part – and the Schengen area an even smaller part – while reconciling this *securitist* perspective with the founding idea of Schuman, Monnet or Adenauer?

However, if on one hand the abolition of internal borders within the EU has in fact had a positive and beneficial result, on the other, the question of the EU's external borders, the control of which was not mentioned in the Treaty of Rome, still remains to be resolved. In addition to the illegal immigrants and refugees who arrive every day on the island of Kos in Greece or in Sicily in Italy, a paradigmatic example is what is happening in Calais at the border of France, a Schengen signatory state, and the United Kingdom, a non-signatory state. Immigrants who have legally or illegally managed to enter France only want to use the country where they are at present as a means to get through the Eurotunnel and head for

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<sup>3</sup> European Commission, *Eurobarometer*, No. 83, Spring 2015, p. 14.

the United Kingdom where they intend to settle and take up residence. We thus have a situation in which, with the non-application of Schengen to the whole territory, situations co-exist within the EU itself in which a national of a third country is able to cross an external border of the Union but then cannot circulate between different member states.

At this moment the continuing debate within the EU centres on the measures that should be adopted to respond to this enormous influx of people from third countries arriving at various EU doors. Member states on their own are incapable of dealing effectively with this situation which in some cases is already presenting signs of a humanitarian crisis to which various non-governmental organizations on the ground are trying to provide the best possible available answer. Several world leaders have also raised their voices, like Ban Ki-moon who urged European countries to “show compassion” and do more to help the migrants<sup>4</sup> and Pope Francis who said that “we cannot allow the Mediterranean to become a vast cemetery”.<sup>5</sup>

Free circulation is one of the established rights of European citizens and has allowed over one billion journeys a year to be made within the area. However, despite the benefits, Schengen is an imperfect space whose fragilities point to the shortcomings of European immigration policies, especially with regard to the inefficiencies of the labour markets and the threat to social security models. At the same time the difficulty that member states have to reach agreement on a common immigration policy is highlighted. Borders within the EU have virtually disappeared whilst the external ones are increasingly the target of attention. The debate has developed focusing on proposals such as the reinforcement of information systems, the exchange of these between states and simply closing borders to immigrants from outside the EU and even – in some circumstances and according to more pessimistic analyses – to citizens of other member states. In this respect, we must question whether it is urgent to reinforce information systems? What is the importance of biometric data? Is it important to circulate information regarding the services that control European frontiers? Should we then plan a Europe with full mobility?

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<sup>4</sup> “Ban Ki-moon on migration crisis: EU member states must show compassion”, available at <http://www.euractiv.com/video/ban-Ki-moon-migration-crisis-eu-member-states-must-show-compassion-314897> (last accessed on 1/08/2015).

<sup>5</sup> Pope Francis’ speech at the European Parliament on 25 November 2014: Salvador, S., “Papa apela para que o Mediterrâneo não se torne num ‘cemitério’ de migrantes”, *Diário de Notícias*, available at [http://www.dn.pt/inicio/globo/interior.aspx?content\\_id=4259596](http://www.dn.pt/inicio/globo/interior.aspx?content_id=4259596) (last accessed on 25/11/2014).

In fact, Schengen is based on the idea of the free circulation of European citizens within this space, but this does not apply to citizens from third countries who must pass border controls, thus keeping out millions of people who are seeking a better life and future in the prosperous EU. Two different and opposing notions therefore co-exist: that of a Europe without borders and that of a fortress Europe, so that the Schengen area could even be, in an extreme case, a paradigmatic example of the co-existence of unrestricted mobility for some and the denial of that same freedom for others.

Schengen's complexity arises particularly when the observer places himself on the outside, looking at the Schengen area macroscopically as a common space set within a more extensive and globalized panorama where there are other regions and political "micro-regions" that grant similar facilities to their members. And, paradoxically, when looking inside with his eyes microscopically focused, situations can be identified that call into question the idea of a space of freedom that is especially vaunted by European political decision-makers and therefore the irreversibility that Avramopoulos referred to.

Based on the work of Didier Bigo, Scherrer and Guittet, we can state that the first possible equivocation of this discourse lies in the association of the conception of a securitized space ("ensuring safety"), the supposed idea of freedom ("removing borders") and the certainty that the two result in the construction of a generalized feeling of trust ("building trust"). According to these studies, it can be seen that the technologization of mobility control – which in part tends to be invisible, thanks to biometric body surveillance technology, numerical integration and the deterritorialization of the security apparatus with the construction of databases, thereby giving the impression that people can circulate without surveillance – tends to generate fear and hostility when faced with the other who is mobile and different. Thus, in a world that seeks to be increasingly fast and fluid, categories of individuals are being created: "authorized identities" and the rejected ones who do not satisfy the requirements for integration.<sup>6</sup>

The ambiguity lies primarily in the fact that in an area where there are policies to encourage mobility (for example, academic with the Erasmus programme) the frontier, rather than being diluted, acts as a filter where mobility and security are indissociable, thereby reinforcing mechanisms of domination between regions and creating excluded individuals who might potentially disturb this harmonious space. Control is exercised not only through immobilization or obstaculization when passing through the filter but also by innovating and enhancing identification techniques and

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<sup>6</sup> Scherrer, A., Guittet, E., Bigo, D. (dir.), *Mobilité(s) sous surveillance. Perspectives croisées EU-Canada*, Athéna Éditions, Outremont (Québec), 2010, pp. 7-24.

technologies in an attempt to foresee risks and anticipate movements.<sup>7</sup> It therefore culminates in the elaboration of a “risk profile”<sup>8</sup> which leads to the stigmatization of undesirable immigrants who are often confused with criminals.

If these identification, control and surveillance practices, despite their progressive technological development, have been a historical constant pervading both democratic and dictatorial regimes<sup>9</sup> inside and outside Europe, the discourse that legitimates their implementation has also been a constant, particularly in three aspects:

- the securitist discourse, in which the need to reinforce border surveillance to prevent penetration by alleged terrorists and criminals (drug, arms and human traffickers) is supported in the name of protecting the locals;
- the humanist discourse, which focuses on the protection of immigrants legitimating the reinforcement of surveillance and the means of intervention – for example, at sea – in order to prevent and rescue victims of capsized boats or to stop human trafficking;
- also associated to this discourse is the construction of the image of the migrant as an unwary victim (from whom, by association, agency or decision-making power is withdrawn), ingenuously enticed by networks of unscrupulous smugglers. With recruiters and smugglers serving as scapegoats for irregular immigration, political leaders continue to claim there is a need to strengthen the instruments used to combat illegality by eliminating any form of help for this type of mobility; they are unaware though (whether deliberately or not) of the complex web of social and informal relations which often lie behind these “structures”<sup>10</sup> and the strategies that intermediaries and migrants (re-)devise to get round new obstacles in order to enter and remain in European territory.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> Noiriél, G. (ed.), *L'identification. Genèse d'un travail d'État*, Belin, Paris, 2007, p. 24.

<sup>9</sup> Noiriél, G., *op. cit.*, pp. 22-26.

<sup>10</sup> On the informal organization of illegal migrants' networks, see for instance: Carolina, A., *As fronteiras de Nord-pas-de-Calais: um estudo de campo sobre a securitização da imigração na França*, Masters dissertation, ISCTE-Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, 2014; Mazauric, C., *Mobilités d'Afrique en Europe. Récits et figures de l'aventure*, Éditions Karthala, Paris, 2012; Antonopoulos, G., Winterdyk, J., “The Smuggling of Migrants in Greece: An Examination of its Social Organization”, *European Journal of Criminology*, 3, 2006, pp. 439-461.

<sup>11</sup> “L'histoire de l'identification est-elle également celle des falsifications.” Moatti, C., Kaiser, W., “Introduction”, in C. Moatti and W. Kaiser (dir.), *Gens de passage en Méditerranée de l'Antiquité à l'époque moderne. Procédures de contrôle et*

The ambiguity of Schengen is also present when we see how the classification that resulted from this agreement, distinguishing between internal and external borders, does not in fact alter the order of things completely. If, to all appearances, one of the symbols of the nation-state's power (the internal border) is eliminated, in practice what has happened and what some studies have shown, contrary to the irreversible nature the path outlined by the agreement might indicate, is that this division does not exist operationally and the borders that Schengen appears to have abolished have not totally disappeared. To see this, all we need to do is think about the temporary closures and compensatory measures provided for by the Schengen Agreement Application Convention, which allows border states to establish bilateral agreements in which they decide how to organize police cooperation and migrant readmission procedures. Such is the case of the Franco-Italian border (practically re-established in 2010) which has reactivated the type of procedures carried out at the old national borders.<sup>12</sup> Reconfiguration of the concept of border (a frontier line), giving rise to "border zones", does not seem to have been a factor in the total dissolution of national "walls" in terms of mobility control. In the case of the *raia* (Portuguese)/*raya* (Spanish) – meaning the border area between Portugal and Spain – for example, police sovereignty is maintained in the police and customs coordination centres on each side and mixed patrols operate that can intervene up to 50 kms on either side of the border line. Mobile controls are led by a national of the country and officers, guards and state employees must wear their regulation national uniform.<sup>13</sup> Observation of the processes Schengen encourages that are rendering frontiers invisible or opaque testifies in fact to a territorial management dependent on numerous factors, demonstrating once again that territorial limits, constantly called into question throughout history, are constructions we tend to view as a natural inheritance.<sup>14</sup>

Gérard Noiriel points to Schengen and the construction of European citizenship achieved through it as being the phenomenon that led to the increased development of police identification practices used to repress illegal immigration as happened in the United States of America after

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*d'identification*, Maisonneuve & Larose, Maison méditerranéenne des sciences de l'homme, Paris, 2007, p. 14.

<sup>12</sup> Casella-Colombeau, S., "La frontière définie par les policiers: Sur des fronts des frontières", *Plein droit*, No. 87, 2010, pp. 12-15.

<sup>13</sup> Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, artº 12 do Decreto 13/2007, de 13 de Julho, Diário da República, 1ª Série, No. 134, de 13 de Julho de 2007, p. 4432.

<sup>14</sup> Moatti, C., "Introduction", in C. Moatti (dir.), *La mobilité des personnes en méditerranée de l'Antiquité à l'époque moderne. Procédures de contrôle et documents d'identification*, École française de Rome, 2004, p. 1.



11 September.<sup>15</sup> In this way, illegality and the concept of immigration as a public problem are constructions for which the states and their representatives on the periphery (who do not always act in accordance with state orders<sup>16</sup>) are, at least in part, the producers.<sup>17</sup> Illegal immigration is, after all, illegalized immigration.<sup>18</sup> In various situations the EU has managed its relations with third countries using the migration question and the need for border controls as the basis for achieving economic and political agreements. This is the case of agreements made with Morocco, while for some Eastern European countries their EU membership is at stake and, as a further example, several African states receive development aid in exchange.<sup>19</sup>

Following a similar line of thought, according to Claire Rodier (a lawyer for the Groupe d'Information et de Soutien des Immigrés and co-founder of the Euro-African network Migreurop), there is also a group of private economic players who use their power to put pressure on states to promote such measures. These groups or multinationals are connected to the markets dealing in surveillance equipment and visa and passport computerisation, or for example the management of detention centres<sup>20</sup>, thus contributing to a veritable business built up around migrations and mobility.

All these issues that have given rise to debates that go beyond the party-political and media sphere and have occupied a prominent place in public opinion and academic reflection are what led the editors of this volume to organize an International Conference on *Schengen: people, borders and mobility* in Lisbon on 15 and 16 June 2015. After the Conference some of

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<sup>15</sup> Noiriél, G., *op. cit.*, p. 24.

<sup>16</sup> See for instance Mathilde Darley's case study on the Czech-Austrian border: Darley, M., "Le contrôle migratoire aux frontières Schengen: pratiques et représentations des polices sur la ligne tchéco-autrichienne", *Cultures & Conflits*, No. 71, 2008, pp. 13-29; or Casella-Colombeau, S., *op. cit.*, pp. 12-15.

<sup>17</sup> On the production of illegality, see for instance: Ambrosini, M., "Migrants dans l'ombre. Causes, dynamics, politiques de l'immigration irrégulière", *REMI*, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2010, pp. 7-32.

<sup>18</sup> Mazauric, C., *op. cit.*, p. 9.

<sup>19</sup> On these issues, see namely: Rodier, C., *Xénophobie business. À quoi servent les contrôles migratoires ?*, La Découverte, Paris, 2012; Pian, A., "Le cadre discursif du développement. Des discours et actions politiques concrètes, aux répertoires d'action des associations de refoulés", *Working paper 25*, International Migration Institute, 2010, available at <http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/wp/wp-25-10-fr.pdf> (last accessed on 24/07/2015).

<sup>20</sup> Rodier, C., *Xénophobie business...*, *op. cit.*; Rodier, C., "L'économie de la frontière", Communication in *Colloque international de l'antiAtlas des frontières*, 27/08/2014, available at <http://www.antiatlas.net/blog/2014/08/27/colloque-rodier/> (last accessed on 18/05/2015).

the papers presented were selected and this book is the result. Thirty years after the signing of the first Schengen agreement, it has become important to reflect on the processes (and their diversity) involving the circulation of people into and within this space.

In this age of globalization, when the implementation of policies by states and international communities to both encourage and repress the circulation of people can be found, academia has spawned a great deal of activity based on questions and concepts related to migration, borders and mobility. Research in this area, besides that enjoying a more wide-ranging focus<sup>21</sup>, is divided among several key issues such as border control<sup>22</sup> and securitization<sup>23</sup>,

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<sup>21</sup> For instance: Mau, S., Brabandt, H., Laube, L. & Roos, C., *Liberal States and the Freedom of Movement: Selective Borders, Unequal Mobility*, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndsmills, 2012; Bertozzi, S., "Schengen: Achievements and Challenges in Managing an Area Encompassing 3.6 million km<sup>2</sup>", The Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2008; Pécoud, A. and Guchteneire, P. (eds.), *Migration without borders: essays on the free movement of people*, Berghahn Books, Paris and New York, 2007; Grabbe, H., "The sharp edges of Europe: Extending Schengen eastwards", *International Affairs*, Vol. 76, Issue 3, 2000, pp. 519-536; Convey, A. and Kupiszewski, M., "Keeping up with Schengen: Migration and Policy in the European Union", in *International Migration Review*, Vol. 29, No. 4, 1995, pp. 939-940.

<sup>22</sup> Ruben, Z., *Cultures of Border Control: Schengen and the Evolution of Europe's Frontiers*, University of Toronto, Toronto, 2008 [PhD Thesis]; Anderson, M., "The Transformation of Border Controls: A European Precedent?", in P. Andreas and T. Snyder (eds.), *The Wall around the West. State Borders and Immigration Controls in North America and Europe*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2000, pp. 15-29; Pratt, M. A. and Brown, J. A. (eds.), *Borderlands Under Stress*, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2000; Bigo, D., "Frontiers and Security in the European Union: The Illusion of Migration Control", in M. Anderson and E. Bort (eds.), *The frontiers of Europe*, Pinter, London, 1998, 148-164.

<sup>23</sup> Neal, A., "Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of FRONTEX", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 47, No. 2, 2009, pp. 333-356; Wæver, O., "The EU as a security actor: reflections from a pessimistic constructivist on post-sovereign security", in M. Kelstrup and M. Williams (eds.), *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration*, Routledge, London, 2000, pp. 250-289; Bigo, D., "When two become one: internal and external securitisations in Europe", in M. Kelstrup and M. Williams (eds.), *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration, Power, Security and Community*, Routledge, London, 2000, pp. 171-204.

policies for granting visas<sup>24</sup> and asylum<sup>25</sup>, and immigration and immigration control.<sup>26</sup>

It was on this epistemological basis that the current view of the complexity of the European space invited us to think about the boundaries that separate territories as well as their absence. In this way, we believe we are contributing to an understanding of the process for implementing the Schengen area and the way in which this has affected and altered the relationships between member states and between them and third countries as well as the influence this has had within the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

At the same time, we think it is essential to analyse the changes to the concept of border and border control and to measure the evolution of movements within the Schengen area, which in its turn enables us to understand the relations between territories, states and individuals and to shed light on the various impacts the Schengen agreements have had on these spaces, the people and their societies and their border experiences.

It was also important to include new contributions on the exclusive migration policies put into practice in certain territories and the various movements and initiatives that have arisen as an alternative to the migration policies of Europe and Schengen. In brief, we have sought to understand to what extent the phenomena of human mobility affect the design of the mechanisms for managing the Community territory and vice-versa.

There are therefore various possible levels of analysis in a study about Schengen. We are dealing with a space that has generated controversy

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<sup>24</sup> Hobolth, M. H., *Border control cooperation in the European Union: The Schengen visa policy in practice*, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 2012 [PhD thesis]; Bigo, D. & Guild, E., "Policing at a Distance: Schengen Visa Policies", in D. Bigo and E. Guild (eds.), *Controlling frontiers: free movement into and within Europe*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Aldershot, 2005, pp. 233-263; Meloni, A., "The Development of a Common Visa Policy under the Treaty of Amsterdam", *Common Market Law Review*, Vol. 42, 2005, pp. 1357-1381.

<sup>25</sup> Huysmans, J., *The politics of insecurity: fear, migration, and asylum in the EU*, Routledge, New York, 2006; Lavenex, S., *The Europeanisation of refugee policies: between human rights and internal security*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2001; Collinson, S., "Visa Requirements, Carrier Sanctions, 'Safe Third Countries' and 'Readmission': The Development of an Asylum 'Buffer Zone' in Europe", in *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1996, pp. 76-90.

<sup>26</sup> Triandafyllidou, A. (ed.), *Irregular migration in Europe: myths and realities*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Farnham and Burlington, 2010; Broeders, D., "The New Digital Borders of Europe. EU Databases and the Surveillance of Irregular Migrants", *International Sociology*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2007, pp. 71-92; Ette, A. & Faist, T. (eds.), *The Europeanization of National Policies and Politics of Immigration: Between Autonomy and the European Union*, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, 2007.

and, in an attempt to understand it, we have sought to gather here more clues by bringing together multidisciplinary works that include research from the fields of history, international relations, European studies, anthropology, sociology, political science, psychology and law. The results of the research presented in this book were not based solely on institutional documentation (governmental and Community) but also on a methodology that included field work and ethnographic research as well as interviews carried out in different parts of Schengen Europe with migrants and actors from civil society. The series of texts collected here offer the reader a variety of perspectives. These are interrelated and reveal, first of all, the individual who is on the move (that is, the migrant) and therefore related to the state through the technical and human means that are imposed by the state as a condition for mobility; strategies to circumvent such obstacles are looked at as are the respective technological and legislative responses coming “from above”, the consequences of which are well known especially around the border area, as the works that address securitization discourses and practices make clear. Octávio Sacramento reflects on Schengen as a space of selection and exclusion based on his ethnographic research on the Portuguese border. The texts by Burcu Toğral Koca, Alejandra Germán Doldán and Lucía Payero López on Spain’s external border analyse the nexus between migration and security. The first aims to show the relationship between border technologies and the infringement of the rights of migrants using Foucault’s concept of biopolitics. The last two look at the current body of legislation and the accompanying political discourse which allows summary expulsions at the border, pointing out how international treaties are being violated and highlighting the ethical problems caused by the use of new control instruments and the implementation of an “operational border”.

Secondly, at a meso-level (or on the relation between state(s) and intermediary players), Francesca Esposito, José Ornelas and Caterina Arcidiacono’s joint research on the experience of daily life inside migrant detention centres shows us the role played by various actors and interests involved in the survival and expansion of detention centres, using the ‘Center for Identification and Expulsion’ in Ponte Galeria, Italy, as an illustrative case. In its turn, Leila Giannetto’s work, which takes the *Charter of Lampedusa* movement as a case study, allows us to see how civil society organizations act in the field of migration policies, distinguishing between those which operate locally and those which do so at the level of the European Union. Cristina Blanco Sío-López presents the debate and negotiations that have developed around the construction of the concept of the “free circulation of persons” using Schengen as a laboratory and aiming to show the importance of the role of citizens through their representatives in the European Parliament.

Finally, taking the direct relationship between state and European Community into account, migration policies and freedom of movement in their role as fundamental pieces for European integration/construction are studied. From a historical perspective, Simone Paoli seeks to answer the question: how and to what extent have the Schengen agreements influenced Italian immigration policy? Then Nicolae Păun and Adrian-Gabriel Corpădean revisit Romania's accession to the Schengen area, describing the demands and scepticism of the Community in general and of political groups and other member states in particular, while on the other hand showing how the topic appeared at the level of civil society and decision-making structures. Taking a broader approach, the work of Ana Isabel Xavier correctly stresses the weight of external "threats" – terrorism, migration, organized crime – when defining the EU's internal security policy.

These three dimensions are divided between the two parts that make up the present work. In the first part are the studies that deal with the challenges faced by the unification of the European space given the diversity of actors, pressure factors (both domestic and external) and powers involved in its administration when what is at stake is the circulation of people (*The free circulation of persons: actors, policies and challenges*). In the second part, more attention is paid to border management devices (*Mobility and border management*). The book opens with a chapter written by Carlos Coelho, a Member of the European Parliament whose work has long been devoted to this matter, on the origins and evolution of the Schengen Area, its compensatory measures and the improvements that need to be addressed.

This work has been made possible solely as a result of the support we received from the start to host the Conference in June 2015. This support came from the following institutions who we would like to gratefully thank: the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT), the Institute of Contemporary History (IHC-FCSH/UNL), the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities of the NOVA University of Lisbon, the Migration Observatory (OM), and the European Commission Representation in Lisbon which also financially sponsored publication of this work.

Lisbon, 3 August 2015