The Notion of lebendige Gegenwart as Compliance with the Temporality of the «Now»

The Late Husserl's Phenomenology of Time

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Introduction and Acknowledgements

The last century has been marked by numerous discussions about the concept of T as well as the [t]y of \cap . This motif has been constantly recurring in the works of Alfred Jules Ayer, Richard Bevan Braithwaite, Charlie Dunbar Broad, Donald Davidson, Sir Michael Dummett, John Earman, Albert Einstein, Peter T. Geach, Peter Godfrey–Smith, Adolf Grünbaum, Stephen W. Hawking, John Leslie Mackie, Eugène Minkowski, John Perry, Karl Raimund Popper, Arthur Norman Prior, Hilary Putnam, Wiliam Van Orman Quine, Hans Reichenbach, Bertrand Russell, George N. Schlesinger, John Jamieson Carswell Smart, Richard Swinburne and Hermann Weyl (cf. Mellor 1981: 2).

According to David Carr, the three books that proved to be of the upmost importance to the phenomenology of T and that were coincidentally published in a short time interval were: Logische Untersuchungen by Edmund Husserl, Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften by Wilhelm Dilthey, and Sein und Zeit by Martin Heidegger. The first book introduces a new theory of consciousness of time, the second one treats about a [t] character of the experience of being, whereas the third one reveals the reformulation Hn notion of T. The philosophy of pure \mathbb{D} —Hn phenomenology of T—is strictly related to the notion of T as the core of the \mathbb{D} . This book shows the basic significance of the category of \cap in the constitution of the \mathbb{D} of T. This rudimentary statement does not exhaust the issue though but only introduces the reader into the field of *lebendige Gegenwart*. The most essential issues of this topic are presented in the analysis of the \mathbb{D} and its character. This idea is described as a cognitive tension that is released by the depiction of the constitution of the flow of T that is temporalized into a–[t] surroundings.

I do not consider Hn text to be an evolution of H's depiction of T. My objective is to present only those Hn terms and notions that are relevant to the *lebendige Gegenwart*.

The first part of the book is dedicated to the necessary reconstruction of the category of \cap introduced by H in his early work: *VZ* and on *BM*. \cap is inscribed in the \square of T as the notion constituting the \equiv ss of \equiv . In other words, the core of the [t]y that is instilled in the \square is reflected in the a–[t]y of the category of \cap . According to H, there is no linear [t]y as \neg and \nvdash do not manifest themselves in a linear outlook of the passing T. Instead, there are secondary [t] surroundings of the [t]y given in the actuality of the present \cap —in the \equiv ss.

The second part of the book treats about the depiction of the phenomenology of T given as a-temporality of \cap , provided by H in his later work, whereas the third one is an additional reference to Hn phenomenology of T in the context of the deepest transcendental reduction.

The main objective of the book is to show that every modification in Hn phenomenology of T until 1935 composes a new meaning of \cap . \cap is freed from the [t] context of the \Re -P \equiv in view. H's research of \cap explicitly describes the source of [t]y of the stream of \square and is more focused on the beyond-[t] meaning of \cap . The core term shows us the link between the objective [t]y and the \equiv ss of the temporalized \square . In other words, the T of the \square is actually the \square of the reflection of the earlier time given in the universal meaning of \cap . The classic phenomenology of T gives \cap its ontological significance that does not necessarily depict the existential significance. This kind of significance is present in the post-Hn phenomenology of reliving of the [t]y as a "modalization of the \equiv ss" and the total negation of \equiv .

This publication has also served as a prelude to the writing of my next book which will be devoted to the contemporary phenomenology of T and its two major streams of thought: the ontological—also called neoclassic, and the social or "radical". They are not philosophical schools of thought per se but rather philosophical tendencies. I have to admit that it would be somewhat difficult to separate the ontological aspect from a radical one based on the Derrida's or Heidegger's school of thought. The notion of *lebendige Gegenwart* will play the main role as a core of phenomenology and as a derivative phenomenologization of the constitution of T and the issue of T. In this book I have argued that Hn constitution of T is given in the a–temporality of \cap .

In conclusion, the core of *lebendige Gegenwart* lies in Hn philosophical intervention consisting of the redefining of the grammatical classification of \cap . He is the first philosopher to classify \cap as a noun. From this point on, not only is \cap becoming a noun in the terminology of the philosophy of T but also an essential part of the language of epistemology where we ask a question of "*what*"? Not "*when*"?.

The category of \cap is also an autonomous and an a-[t] notion of Hn phenomenology of T. \neg and \neg do not appear in a linear passing of T but are embedded in the [t] surroundings of the [t]y given in the actuality of the present \cap . H discards the mono-linear scheme of T proposed by Aristotle but instead introduces a concept which is very similar in nature to the Plato's idea of T and \cap .

Furthermore, my initial analysis of *apodiktische Evidenz* or—the constitution of T given by H—has to confront the diagnosis of the European culture. The constitution of T can be perceived both individually and collectively. I am going to elaborate more on this issue in my next book where I am going to compare my thoughts with other thinkers like Edward S. Casey, Ernst Cassirer, Martin Heidegger, Immanuel Lévinas, Maurice Merleau–Ponty, Paul Ricœur, Eric Voegelin, and Bernhardt Waldenfels. A common denominator of these ideas is the connection between the radicalism of the new philosophical order with the ontological dimension of the category of \cap . The constitutive relations between different categories of T—immanent, primordial, intersubjective, inter-monadic or objective are not yet completely explicated.

In conclusion, I would like to draw attention to the fact that there is no complete analysis of the phenomenological constitution of T or intentionally even though these notions are extremely important. The existing analysis is still very limited due to an assumed convention of publication.¹

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I gave my first series of lectures on the subject of the phenomenology of time in 2003 and the following year my lectures were published. Since then, many debaters and co-panelists have awarded me with their invaluable criticism, making a significant contribution to the completion of my book.

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My special thanks also go to my mother Bożenna, for her encouragement and warm support for every project I ever undertook.

I would like to express my gratitude to everybody who has provided me with the constructive criticism of my work however—the disparagement of this book will ultimately rest with me.

¹ Some passages in the chapters I B and II B were originally published as Olbromski 2011; 2011a; 2011b.