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Whilst in everyday life every shopkeeper is well able to distinguish between what somebody professes to be and what he really is, our historians have not yet won this trivial insight. They take every epoch at its word and believe that everything it says or imagines about itself is true.

Karl Marx, *The German Ideology*

The student uprisings and general strikes in South Africa in 1976 dramatically focused attention on the growing mass struggles against the apartheid state. Since 1976, these struggles have taken an increasingly anti-capitalist form, and have been supplemented by a slowly escalating guerilla war waged by the military wing of the banned African National Congress. In the midst of the worst recession in the country’s history, a new South African Prime Minister came into office in September 1978 claiming that the state confronted a ‘total onslaught’.

The simultaneous economic crisis and intensified struggles of the 1970s posed as a central political question the requisite state policies to ensure renewed capitalist prosperity and stability. The ability of the ruling Nationalist Party to effect the necessary reforms became a pressing issue. Much attention was focused on Afrikaner nationalism as a result (e.g. Adam & Giliomee 1979). It is a central contention of this study, however, that the terms of many of the arguments have been miscast, and, in the process, the specific relationship between Afrikaner nationalism and the capitalist state has been misconceived.

The present Nationalist Party (NP) government has been in office since 1948. It regards itself as, and is almost universally acknowledged as, the political representative of the ‘Afrikaner volk’. Its explicit ideology is that of Afrikaner nationalism. Its programme is apartheid, or the euphemism currently in use.¹ The capture of office by the NP in 1948 has generally been explained as the victory of the rigid, reactionary and racist ideals of a monolithic ‘Afrikanerdom’ over the modernising and integrative imperatives of economic development – as the triumph of ideology over the countervailing forces of production and the market economy. This is then extended into a
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view of the post-1948 Nationalist government as the agent of an ‘ethnic revolution’ (Adam & Giliomee 1979: 36). Its apartheid policies are seen as external to, but productive of distortions within the otherwise rational and colour-blind operation of market forces, leading both to strains within the economy and acute social dislocation and racial conflict.²

This supposed antagonism between apartheid and capitalism has led to a widespread explanation of currently escalating social conflict in South Africa as the product of Afrikaner nationalism. The peculiar vices of Afrikaners – or, in the title of a recent BBC television programme, ‘The White Tribe’ – are held responsible for the present situation. On Afrikaners alone lies the onus to change. As a recent book put it: ‘The great problem for South Africa... is essentially a problem for the Afrikaners, since they hold the power in everything that matters’ (de St Jorre 1977: 4).

In the face of the gathering political storms of the mid-1970s, and despite widespread demands for reform from powerful sections of the white population – most notably businessmen – the NP government appeared to intensify political repression and harden its apartheid policies. This response was widely seen as evidence of the intransigence of Afrikaner nationalism, retreating in the face of international censure and pressure for change into a narrow, but formidably defended laager, ready to fight to the finish to preserve white supremacy. ‘No cracks in the Afrikaner monolith’ and ‘Afrikanerdom heads for the laager’ were typical headlines of the mid-1970s (de St Jorre 1977). They reflected the widespread belief in a monolithic party controlled by the ‘super Afrikaners’ of the secret Afrikaner Broederbond (hereafter Bond), able to unite the volk behind its implacable position (Wilkins & Strydom 1978).

The open infighting in the NP since the ‘Muldergate’ imbroglio and the intense conflicts over policy changes introduced by P.W. Botha (O’Meara 1980) somewhat weakened this conventional view of monolithic Afrikaner nationalism. The erosion of support for the NP in the April 1981 general election has undermined it even further.³ Yet the belief in a system of ‘ethnic mobilisation’ whose ‘secret appeal’ lies in providing ‘psychological security rather than material benefits’ (Adam & Giliomee 1979: 52 and 61), dominates the literature on Afrikaner nationalism.

In recent years, stimulated by the social struggles of the 1970s, a growing body of Marxist literature has challenged such interpretations. This is not the place to detail the now well-known thrust of these critiques, but suffice it to say that they reject the liberal notion of a fundamental contradiction between the racist apartheid policies of Afrikaner nationalism on the one hand and a supposedly inherently colour-blind capitalist economy on the other. On the contrary, despite sometimes deep differences, the various authors have all sought to situate the analysis of the South African social formation squarely within the context of the processes of capital accumulation and the class struggles through which it takes place. In analysing the apartheid pheno-
menon, much work has been done on the specific material conditions and class struggles of the late 1940s. Yet there remains a gap in this literature. Existing writings have extensively analysed aspects of the process of capital accumulation and the contradictions between class forces which established the material preconditions for the development of the apartheid state after 1948. Yet the existence of such contradictions does not automatically dictate the specific form of their attempted resolution in state policy. It is both mechanistic and undialectical to make a leap from the identification of particular class contradictions to the implementation of apartheid state policies. To do so ignores the vital concrete elements through which the struggle between classes is fought out: organisation and ideology.

The struggle between the exploited and exploiting classes is never simply a question of contending homogenous armies ranged against each other in a battle for supremacy. Rather, it rages at all levels and interstices of society and takes many forms, both spontaneous and organised. However, as Lenin pointed out time and again, the specific forms of organisation (and Gramsci would add, ideology) of various class forces are a vital element in the determination of the manner in which the temporary resolution of class contradictions takes place. Any analysis of the state and state policy must necessarily pose for itself the question of organisation and ideology – of the particular organisational and ideological forms of the collective harnessing of the forces of this or that class or alliance of classes.

For all the recent advances made in the analysis of the South African social formation, it remains to be explained how and why it was the Herenigde Nationalist Party (HNP), under the banner of Afrikaner nationalist ideology, which was able to mobilise and organise specific class forces in a form which temporarily resolved the crisis of the late 1940s on the basis of new state policies. To do so requires coming to terms with the particular place of Afrikaner nationalism in the development of South African capitalism. This question is of much more than historical interest. Its answer provides the basis for an explanation of the current crisis of the capitalist state in South Africa, and as such is of great contemporary political significance.

This study then seeks to explore the material conditions, contradictions and struggles in the development of capitalism in South Africa which gave rise to ‘Afrikaner nationalism’ as the (differentiated) form in which specific class forces came to be organised in the crucial formative period, 1934 to 1948. In doing so it aims both to remedy a lack in the Marxist literature on South Africa, and to lay to rest the myriad myths in the conventional understanding of Afrikaner nationalism. Following Marx’s critique of the German philosophers that ‘not only in their answers but also in their questions was there a mystification’ (1968c: 29), the analysis proceeds in terms very different from those of the existing literature of Afrikaner nationalism. However, before elaborating the assumptions underlying the approach adopted here, it is necessary briefly to review this literature.
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AFRIKANER NATIONALISM IN THE LITERATURE

Any review of the large and uneven literature on Afrikaner nationalism must necessarily be schematic and gloss over important differences and nuances. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify specific common elements and trends in this literature and examine them critically.

The first point to note is the tendentiousness of the great bulk of this writing. Almost without exception the literature in Afrikaans is written from a nationalist perspective. Much of it self-consciously seeks to construct political/cultural mythology. One leading author has gone so far as to claim divine appointment to this task (Scholtz 1967). This literature views ‘Afrikaners’ as much more than aggregates of people sharing a common language. Rather, they are seen as the constituents of ‘Afrikanerdom’ – a discrete, embattled nation, determined through a long history of struggle against external enemies to assert its separate ethnic identity and the social values inherent in the organic unity of the Afrikaner volk.

According to this mythology, ‘Afrikanerdom’ was shaped by its 300-year struggle to implant itself in the hostile South African soil, its roots constantly under attack from both the primitive inhabitants of the region and the relentless enmity of British imperialism. It was the resolute resistance to all attacks on Afrikaner identity, the assertion of a compelling and exclusive sense of self-identity (eie), and the history of suffering occasioned by these struggles, which forged the Afrikaner volk. United by the sense of eie, exhibiting an innate ‘race consciousness’, inspired by a sombre Calvinism, and far removed from the eroding effects of industrialisation, this volk is presumed to have developed for itself an exclusive, but democratic and classless form of social organisation, again undermined by the encircling enemies of British greed and black competition. With the electoral victory of the NP in 1948, the volk emerged from the wilderness. This represented its triumph over these forces of division and a glorious reassertion of the eie. Further, the ‘cleansing fire’ of long struggle, suffering and sacrifice, first tested and then sanctioned the historical mission of Afrikanerdom as the bearer of Christianity and justice in Southern Africa. Behind these ceaseless struggles, the human suffering, the fierce determination of the volk to resist, lurks ‘the Hand which guides the fate of nations and men’. Like the prophets of Israel, the ideologists have elevated Afrikanerdom to the special instrument in Africa of their Calvinist God. Divine Will explains Afrikaner history. Divine Will forced Afrikanerdom into a discrete organic unity and converted it into its special instrument.

This at least is the nationalist mythology. As such, it has been extensively criticised. The leading contemporary liberal historian of South Africa has condemned the ‘bitter and humourless’ mythology of Afrikaner historiography for failing to ‘present the facts fairly and draw valid conclusions from them’. The result is a ‘diseased’ national outlook in which ‘the capacity for formulating and pursuing a rational goal becomes vitiated by illusion’
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(Thompson 1962: 138, 125). Such a critique presumes of course that the work of the critic is untainted by such illusions. Yet, in questioning these myths, many histories in English likewise take for granted the discrete identity and organic unity of ‘Afrikanerdom’, and simply revise the moral assessment of Afrikaner nationalism from positive to negative. The central assumption here holds that Afrikanerdom (or ‘the Boer race’) and its associated social attitudes evolved ‘in the long quietude of the eighteenth century’ (de Kiewiet 1972: 17). Isolated on the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century ‘frontiers’, far removed from the centres of colonial authority and the civilising ideas and influences of the Enlightenment and Industrial Revolution, and trapped in the conservative Calvinist dogma of the Synod of Dort, the migrating pastoralists who fathered the Afrikaner volk are presumed to have developed a chauvinist, backward, individualist Weltanschauung (de Kiewiet 1972: 17). Honed in long battles against various African societies and regular confrontation with the British, this Weltanschauung became rooted in an idea of compulsion, a continuing sense of strife, notions of eie, racial hierarchy and a ‘paranoid’ fear of threats to ‘Afrikaner existence’ (de Villiers 1971: 365). This developed in contradistinction to the blossoming of rationality and individual liberty in the urban centres of exchange. Characterised by the domination of ‘non-economic’ cultural values over the laws of the market, and a corresponding abhorrence of racial equality, this ‘frontier tradition’ is seen as the defining characteristic of the Afrikaner nationalism it fostered. The NP victory in 1948 is then taken to represent the triumph of the frontier over the forces of economic rationality – of ideology over economics.⁵

Accounts of Afrikaner nationalism in English have generally been written by people opposed to the NP. Some are openly disparaging in their view of Afrikaners, treating ‘the Boer’ as a backward, ‘paranoid’ simpleton, ‘out of touch with reality’, suffering from ‘an inferiority complex’ and the gullible tool of manipulating leaders (de Villiers 1971: 365–6). One recent study concludes that Afrikaners are ‘immature psychopaths’ in a sociopathic culture (Lambley 1980:6–32). In the inherited pro-British spirit which inspires much of this writing, a number of non-Afrikaner authors have failed to read, or at least take seriously, what Afrikaners write about themselves (Marquard 1960), giving nationalist historians legitimate cause for complaint.

Not all histories of Afrikaner nationalism suffer from such obvious ideological limitations. However, serious problems remain with those works which do try to explain, rather than simply condemn, Afrikaner nationalism. I would argue that despite many differences at the level of conclusions, both the Afrikaner nationalist and liberal literature share uncritically the same principles of investigation and explanation – they operate within a similar epistemological framework. As a result, the liberal analysis of Afrikaner nationalism remains at the level of counter-ideological history. It presents but a pale, negative mirror-image of the assumptions of Afrikaner nationalist analysis. As this point is fundamental to my critique of this literature, and forms the point of departure of my own analysis, it is necessary to develop it.
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Firstly, and most centrally, both Afrikaner nationalist and liberal traditions begin with the same assumption. Without exception their starting point and principal concept is the a priori, self-generating category, ‘Afrikanerdom’ or ‘the Afrikaner’. This is taken as given and is subject to no historical, let alone critical, examination. ‘Afrikanerdom’ defines itself – it is Afrikanerdom because this is how Afrikaners see it’ (de Villiers 1971: 365) – thus neatly and unquestioningly reproducing the basic tenet of Afrikaner nationalist ideology. The historically always disparate, differentiated and highly fractious Dutch- and Afrikaans-speaking populations are unproblematically reduced to a static and monolithic ethnic group. Here it is necessary to spell out the implications of the almost universal use of the category ‘Afrikanerdom’, as these impose themselves without exception on the existing literature.

Embedded within the category ‘Afrikanerdom’ are the questionable premises that all (white) Afrikaans-speakers are automatically integrated into the cross-class organic unity of the volk, instinctively share the presumably innate ‘Afrikaner’ conservative traditional cultural values, and are always available for ethnic mobilisation in terms of their common ‘Afrikaner’ interests. Now clearly, at specific junctures of South African history – and particularly from 1948 to 1978 – large numbers of Afrikaans-speakers have been politically mobilised and organised in a unified party on the basis of ethnically exclusive and racist ideologies. This is not in dispute. However, it is equally clear that at other junctures, Afrikaans-speaking whites of various classes have differentially resisted such ‘ethnic mobilisation’ and have been organised on other (and varying) bases. Moreover, the various Afrikaner nationalist movements in South African history were always constituted by a differentiated and shifting ensemble of social forces – each clearly articulating widely different conceptions and expectations of the ‘volk’ and what ‘its’ interests were.

Thus, periods of successful ‘ethnic mobilisation’ do not simply explain themselves. Nor are they explained by a notion of Afrikanerdom realising ‘itself’ or its ‘civil religion’ (Moodie 1975) in the 1948 election. The very concept of ‘Afrikanerdom’ rests on an extreme form of historicism. Only occasionally is this made explicit. Welsh, for example, states that ‘as nearly 80 per cent of Afrikaners support the National Party and its extreme right-wing offshoot, the Reconstituted (Herstigte) National Party, I have used the terms Afrikanerdom and Afrikaners cotermously with Afrikaner nationalism’ (1974: 249). This quote is of interest for a number of reasons. Firstly, as Heard’s detailed electoral study (1974) makes clear, the first clause of Welsh’s statement is probably true only after 1960, and not before. But more significant is the inference drawn from this claim and the subsequent function this inference performs in Welsh’s analysis. A perceived aspect of South African politics of the period after 1960 (i.e. support for a political party) is subverted from its historically specific conditions of existence and unproblematically transformed into something else – into a timeless ethnic concept, ‘Afrikanerdom’. This is then imposed backwards in linear historical time as a
core concept to organise aspects of South African history as far back as the Great Trek of 1836–8. In these terms, the past becomes the inevitable movement to the present. The present explains the past. The development of Afrikaner nationalism becomes one all-embracing, teleological process in which an undifferentiated historical subject, ‘nascent Afrikanerdom’ (Welsh 1974: 250), realises its self-positing end. The history of the development of Afrikaner nationalism is the simple unfolding of ‘what was there in embryo’ (de Villiers 1971: 368). It matters little whether the historian invokes Divine Will (Scholtz 1967) or ‘ethnicity’ (Adam & Giliomee 1979) to explain this process of the self-realisation of ‘Afrikanerdom’. In either case, the uncritical use of this historicist ethnic concept necessarily inscribes the result on the process from the very outset. Analysis then becomes the simple description of a predetermined unfolding.

This collapsing of the shifting, contradictory and historically specific bases of support for a political party (the NP, 1948–70) into the timeless ethnic categories of Afrikanerdom and ‘the Afrikaner’ is not the peculiar failing of Welsh’s analysis, but is common to almost everything written on Afrikaner nationalism. Given that the NP has been in power since 1948, this conflation of party and ethnic group has led to the argument that ‘Afrikaners’ monopolise political power in South Africa, and so constitute a ‘ruling ethnic group’ or ‘political class’ (Adam & Giliomee 1979: ix, 36). The very different social categories of common language, ethnic group, political party, government and state are thus commonly used interchangeably, thereby simply obliterating the vastly different areas, levels and types of social action and organisation to which these categories refer.6 This conflation closes a logical circle in which the South African state is reduced to an Afrikaner entity and seen as a simple instrument in the hands of this ‘ruling ethnic group’. The logical confusion apart, what gets concealed in this view is precisely the character of the South African state as a capitalist state. Thus, the current crisis of the capitalist state in South Africa is reduced to a problem of ‘the Afrikaner’. In asking ‘can South Africa change without destroying itself?’, a recent, influential treatise has answered its own question through an exclusive focus on ‘the ruling Afrikaner ethnic group’ (Adam & Giliomee 1979: ix).

The generalised historicism and logical circularity of liberal historiography likewise reflects the idealism characteristic of such analysis. By this I mean the tendency to treat ideas, ideologies, cultural values, belief systems – in short, all ideational phenomena – not only as ‘independent... instances of social action’ (Moodie 1975: 295), but also as sufficient explanation of social action. In these terms, historical processes, conjunctures and epochs are explained largely in terms of the expressed ideas, ideologies and values of social actors. In the literature on Afrikaner nationalism, such idealism is occasionally crudely ahistorical, in taking cultural values and ideologies as the unproblematic explanation not only of social processes, but also of themselves. ‘Afrikaner traditions’ are reified into an unchanging, timeless ethnicity possessed of the same essential ‘pre-industrial’ meaning and content in, say,
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1875, 1915 and 1960. There is no need to explore the material conditions and struggles which produced these values: ‘It came about that the numerically small and widely dispersed Afrikaner people... gradually developed a group consciousness which, by the end of the 19th century, had grown into a national cohesion with its own distinct philosophy and way of life’ (de Villiers 1971: 366).

There do exist a few attempts to explore the historical generation, development, transmission and acquisition of the cultural values of Afrikaner nationalism (de Klerk 1975, Giliomee 1975, Hexham 1974, and Moodie 1975). Moodie’s book in particular is an extremely well-researched and valuable analysis, the first serious study in English to explore systematically how Afrikaner nationalist ideologists interpreted the world for themselves and the volk. Yet, in common with the other studies cited, Moodie’s analysis rests finally on the nationalist conception of Afrikaner culture and an undifferentiated Afrikanerdom. It fails to pose the questions, who were the differential constituents of Afrikanerdom, and what were the conditions and struggles which led to ‘the rise of Afrikanerdom’? At best he distinguishes between the ideological ‘elite’ of the Bond, and the ‘ordinary Afrikaners’ who came to be mobilised by the visions of the former. The ideological redefinition of Afrikaner nationalism after 1934, the intense divisions of the 1940s and the victory of the NP in 1948 are all explained in terms of the internal political developments of Afrikaner nationalism. Yet, as Moodie now concedes (1980:xiv–xv), social reality cannot really be explained ‘purely in terms of the conscious meanings of social actors’. To do so must finally reproduce Afrikaner nationalism’s explanation of itself – an explanation which produces its own static and idealist conception of Afrikaner culture as the determining factor of social action. Ideology then becomes a simple elaboration of what is already present in fixed form.

The work of Adam and Giliomee (1979) recognises the need for structural explanations of the emergence of ‘ethnic identities’. However, they rely finally on an extreme form of idealism, arguing that ‘psychological security rather than the material benefits attached to it must be seen as the secret appeal of nationalism everywhere’ (p. 52). If Afrikaners huddle together because nobody likes them, exactly the same could be said of, say, communists in South Africa. All ideologies provide some form of ‘psychological security’ and emotional anchorage to those who believe in them. This tells us nothing and begs precisely the most important question – why, and under what conditions do differentiated collectivities of people come to be organised in terms of one ideology rather than another? This Adam and Giliomee are unable to explain, except through the highly circular concept of ‘ethnic mobilisation’ in which a priori ‘ethnically organised groups’ compete with each other for ‘scarce resources’ (1979:39).

The liberal critics of Afrikaner nationalism do not generally spell out the theoretical positions underlying their work.7 None the less they clearly rely on an empiricist theory of knowledge and its assertion of a fundamental
theory/facts dichotomy in which the latter are innocent and neutral in a pre-existing givenness. Explanation is derived from the observation, ordering and cataloguing of facts, apparently without the intervention of a theoretical apparatus. In these terms, inadequate and incorrect explanation is attributed either to insufficient research and a failure to gather all the relevant facts (Thompson 1969: 3–6), or to the intervention of a theory (such as Marxism) which does not fit, and therefore distorts, the facts (Moodie 1977; Kuper 1974: 285; Kantor & Kenny 1976). In either case the primacy of facts is asserted outside of, and prior to, theory.

The idealism which permeates this work is but one form of such an empiricist theory of knowledge. As van der Berghe has argued, the primacy of ideology in South Africa is self-evident (1967: 267). Thus the primary terrain on which facts are collected is that of ideas. Social processes are then analysed predominantly in terms of the ideas held by different historical subjects—in this case, the unproblematic ‘Afrikanerdom’.

Clearly, as social actors, both individually and collectively, people constitute (or if you like, define, interpret) reality for themselves through ideas, ideologies, values, belief systems, etc. Their actions in reality occur through such ideas. This is not in dispute. However, idealism rests on an unacceptable inference from this proposition to a completely different one which is in no sense axiomatic. Because objective social reality is constituted for people through ideas, idealism draws the conclusion that ideas (or ideologies, cultural values, etc.) explain the processes of social reality. In its most crudely Hegelian form, history is reduced to the movement of ideas (de Klerk 1975).

Whilst cultural values, belief systems, ideologies, etc. are crucial aspects of social reality, in no sense do such ideational phenomena constitute sufficient explanation either of reality or of themselves. For, as Wolpe has cogently put it:

The failure to examine the changing, non-ideological conditions in which specific groups apply and therefore interpret and therefore modify their ideologies, results in treating the latter as unchanging [and undifferentiated—D.O.'M.] entities. By simply ascribing all action to generalised racial beliefs, prejudices or ideologies, the specific content of changing social relations and the conditions of change become excluded from analysis (1971: 101).

There does exist a body of literature on Afrikaner nationalism which seeks to go beyond such teleological and idealist circularity, namely, that operating within one or another model of fascism. There are generally two streams of such explanation. The first is broadly derived from the analysis produced by the Third International, and concentrates particularly on the racial themes in the perceived South African variant of fascism (Bunting 1969; South African Communist Party n.d.; Simons & Simons 1969; Slovo 1976). The second employs later Marxist theories of fascism, particularly influenced by the work of Poulantzaz (1974) and Simson (1980). Both streams operate within the conceptual framework of class and class struggle, generally explaining
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Afrikaner nationalism and its racial policy as the survival of pre-industrial relations under capitalism (Simons & Simons 1969) and/or as an alliance between the petty bourgeoisie and a fraction of ‘big capital’ leading to the hegemony of monopoly capital (Simson 1980). Yet there remain problems with both streams of explanation.

The first variant generally employs the term ‘fascism’ as a descriptive device rather than an analytical concept. Bunting, for example, offers no explicit definition of fascism and seems to regard the South African variant as an unproblematic combination of extreme racism and brutal repression. Here the concept of fascism operates by analogy to refer to the racist policies of the Afrikaner nationalist government. Great stress is placed on the similarity between statements made by the leaders of German and Italian fascism, and the pronouncements of the various spokesmen of Afrikaner nationalism. Explanation proceeds by elision rather than an analysis of the material conditions and struggles which produced such pronouncements. This leads Bunting in particular into idealist explanations.

The 1962 Programme of the South African Communist Party followed the Comintern in defining (South African) fascism as ‘an open and terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary and racist section of the ruling class’ (n.d.: 3) Although the relationship is not clearly explicated, this dictatorship is complemented by monopoly, as ‘real power is in the hands of the monopolists who own and control the mines, the banks, the finance houses, most of the farms and major industries’. Their rule is maintained in a system of ‘internal colonialism’ which combines the ‘worst features both of imperialism and of colonialism within a single national frontier [and] which determines the special nature of the South African system’ (n.d.: 3 & 28).

The theory of internal colonialism in which white colonisers dominate and exploit the black colonised under a fascist dictatorship clearly situates the exploitation and oppression of black people in South Africa within a matrix of monopoly capitalist interests. Yet, I would argue, it rests finally on a racial polarity, and as such is a descriptive device rather than a theoretical concept. The analysis treats class on the one hand and race on the other as independent factors in South African history. The task is then to assign relative weight to each. The most recent elaboration of the theory acknowledges that as a ‘useful shorthand’ it is ‘based on analogy’ to deal with the obviousness of ‘immediately perceived reality’. Here again, the primacy of race is taken as ‘obvious’ – that is, given by the empirical world (Slovo 1976: 118, 132). This begins at the wrong level and again begs the most important question. For Marxist analysis, the starting point is not the independence of ‘racial factors’, but the relations of production:

It is always the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the producers . . . which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social structure, and with it the political form of the relationship of sovereignty and dependence, in short, the corresponding specific form of the state. This does not prevent the same economic basis – the same from the