Introduction

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At the end of the twentieth century telling people that you are a classicist – we mean someone who studies and/or teaches ancient Greek and Latin, and their cultures – is likely to produce a variety of responses. For one of the editors of this volume, being a 'classicist' can serve as a form of social camouflage, if a rather odd one. At one end of the spectrum, incomprehension and embarrassed amusement ('I do Greek' can be an effective conversation-stopper); at the other extreme, there is the (imagined) recognition of a fellow-member of the club dedicated to preserving ancient (where 'ancient' means nineteenth-century) values, traditions and privileges: 'keep up the good work!' Different but related is the reaction of the wife of an older (non-classicist) male academic: 'a Greats man! You must be clever!' The other editor of this volume has provoked puzzlement, incredulity, discomfort. She has been asked if 'classics' is to be understood in its 'normal' sense (*she wonders what they regard as 'normal'*); if she does 'classics' in an 'extended' sense (*she wonders in turn if 'extended' denotes Penguin Classics, and the classics of English literature*[2]); or if she does ballet or music. She has also been told on more than one occasion that it is a pity that she does not do her own languages (*but she asks herself* to whom *can Greek and Latin actually belong*).[3]

What makes one of us more readily accepted as a classicist than the other? The answer is one that raises issues much larger than the question of what sort of people each of us as individuals might be or appear to be. A response to the term 'classicist' is to some degree a response

[1] I would like to thank Niall Livingstone for his meticulous editorial attention to the Introduction, and for his discussion with me of its arguments and points.

[2] See P. Cartledge, 'So different and so long ago', *New Statesman and Society* (1 March, 1996), pp. 36–7 and his chapter in this volume.

[3] In his excellent undergraduate dissertation, *'Laughter and Grief'? The Portrayal of Classics in School Fiction* (Part II Classical Tripos Dissertation), pp. 30–2, Jonathan Cooper points out that the Chinese pirate of Arthur Ransome's *Missee Lee* (published 1941) is an unlikely classicist who forces the children of the book into learning Latin grammar on the high seas of South East Asia.

to a perception, or perhaps the assumptions and presumptions that underlie a perception, of what classical learning and knowledge entail. It is a response to the perception of who might or should be expected to have classical learning and knowledge, and about the value of classical learning and knowledge. It is perhaps also a response to the understanding of what sort of community classics might be thought either to construct or to have validity within. *Pedagogy and Power* is a volume which turns to history for some of the explanations for these understandings, stereotypes and prejudices, precisely because history plays an important part in the pedagogical imaginary. In particular, it is classical antiquity which has provided us with ideals of how and what we teach, and how and what we learn, and it is the idea of classical education that is the concern of this volume.

In the contemporary academy, the study of classical education has a formidable genealogy. Where the classicist is concerned, the history of ancient education is a discourse that has been occupied in the latter half of the twentieth century almost solely by Henri Marrou's influential and much revered *Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité* (Paris, 1948).[4] This history concerned itself with what might be taught and learned in the ancient 'classroom', often drawing anachronistic analogies between the scholar's understanding of twentieth-century education and of ancient education. Education, its nature, functions, and discourses were never interrogated from first principles: for instance, what might it mean to pass on knowledge? What might 'knowledge' be? Typically, the history of education, and particularly of education in distant antiquity, can provide an insulating, because distant, set of images and ideals, an iconography of which we are not fully aware because we do not interrogate it. This history is liable to be rendered a static, perfect paradigm or reverentially studied as a closed text. When either of these situations happens, it becomes part of an *unconscious*, which creates our hopes and desires for pedagogy and which has authority and power precisely because it is not always noticed for what it is.

The historical unconscious conventionally dreams itself into an unproblematic 'esprit de corps' with its revered teacher and his descendants, into recreations of the Platonic Academy (of course, without its homoerotics and its oligarchic politics), Aristotle's Lyceum, the medieval monastic communities of scholar-priests, the Florentine circle of the

[4] Cf. H. I. Marrou, *De la connaissance historique* (Paris, 1954), p. 209. E. J. Brill will be publishing *A New History of Education in Antiquity* (ed. Y. L. Too) to replace Marrou's *Histoire* in 2000.

Renaissance tyrant Lorenzo de' Medici, the coffee house cliques of the eighteenth century, the untroubled quadrangles of Oxbridge of a few decades ago perhaps as misremembered in Evelyn Waugh's *Brideshead Revisited*. It has provided paradigms untroubled by questions of context, of explicit ideology (for its ideology is too often an implicit one), of interpretive method. Accordingly, existing accounts of (ancient) education often and largely implicitly propose its subject matter to be a discourse of reproduction, one which minimises change and individuality not just among teachers and students, but across historical eras.[5] Marrou totalised ancient pedagogy as a largely static process from archaic Greece to the Byzantine Period and beyond this to the mid-twentieth century (as his constant contemporary analogies, and indeed anachronisms, insinuate). It is worth pointing out that the shape of this narrative owes its origins to a particular historiographical ideology, in which social and economic structures were studied in preference to political events, and accordingly in which vast epochs and eras (so 'la longue durée') rather than short periods were studied in order to trace historical change and development.

On the other hand, the glorifying tradition likes to insist upon the possibility of a seamless line of descent from ancient Greece – most often the Athens of Plato – to the present. As Henry Louis Gates discerned, a rhetoric of lineage and inheritance, which has been most visible in apologies for the canon, especially in its form as 'Great Books', tends to insist upon the sameness of past and present, and in the process, creates a sense of Otherness for those who have no claims on this 'inheritance'.[6] As Pierre Bourdieu has observed, academic communities tend to appoint sucessors who are homogenised, or easily homogenised.[7] So histories of ancient education appoint the present as the inheritors of the past, demonstrating the likeness of then and now and closing ranks with the imperfectly distinguished past. Hence Marrou accorded little importance to specificities of method, of culture, or of individuals to the extent that Byzantine education was still essentially 'Hellenistic' insofar as it retained traces of Greek antiquity.[8]

[5] See M. W. Apple, *Education and Power* (Boston, London, etc., 1982), esp. pp. 54ff. and P. Bourdieu and J.-C. Passeron, *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*, tr. Richard Nice (London and Beverley Hills, 1977). That reproduction is the aim of pedagogy continues to underlie the recent collection of essays edited by J. Gallop, *Pedagogy: The Question of Impersonation* (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1995), see especially pp. 4–5.

[6] H. L. Gates, *Loose Canons: Notes on the Culture Wars* (Oxford and New York, 1992), pp. 109–10.

[7] P. Bourdieu, *Homo Academicus* (Oxford, 1988), pp. 143–4.

[8] Marrou, *A History of Education*, p. 452.

The idea that classical education might be inherited as a legacy also lends itself to less than plural accounts. In some (very influential) quarters classical learning is regarded as the basis for what makes the West what it is – namely, democratic, inquiring, original, creative: in fact, now as then, the antitype of the barbarian. Knowledge of classical texts has thus been lauded and reverentially celebrated by scholars and intellectuals both inside and outside of the field of classics.[9] In the United States, classical literature is most frequently celebrated in the context of the 'Great Books', the canon of literature that was thought to be essential to every *gentleman*'s education. (That the gentleman's education is the concern is evident from the attacks on feminism, deconstruction, post-modernism, and minority literature and criticism which often accompany defence of the canon.) Mary Louise Pratt points out that the establishment of the Western civilisation course at Columbia in 1919, which scholars trace as the origin of 'Great Books', actually grew out of War Issues courses held in 1918 at various universities to instruct US soldiers in the European culture and heritage that they were to defend.[10] W. B. Carnochan offers an alternative, but complementary explanation that the historical programmes of study were in part originally established in response to a sense of the need to integrate and homogenise a growing immigrant population.[11] But more to the point they offered a recuperation of the Arnoldian programme of classical and European literature as a civilising force.

The ideal of classical education has had a wide influence from antiquity up to the present day, and not just as a socialising force. It has also asserted its influence in a variety of different disciplines and discourses, especially in modern literary and cultural studies. Where the posture has been defensive, the homogenising potential of classics has been deployed as part of a response to anxieties about the fragmentation of cultural ideals and icons under the influence of problematising

[9] See S. Lawall (ed.), *Reading World Literature: Theory, History, Practice* (Austin, 1994), pp. 21–2 on the responses to this question produced by the National Endowment for the Humanities in the United States. The concern is above all that the contemporary academy is rejecting the 'Great Books', which are viewed as a means of constructing community. Cf. also P. du Bois, *Sappho is Burning* (Chicago and London, 1995), p. 32 on the need for feminist perspectives and presences to make themselves felt in classical scholarship.

[10] See Pratt in D. J. Gless and B. Herrnstein Smith, *The Politics of Liberal Education* (Durham, NC, 1992), pp. 13–31.

[11] W. B. Carnochan, *The Battleground of the Curriculum. Liberal Education and American Experience* (Stanford, 1993), p. 69.

discourses and realities (among them multiculturalism, feminism, deconstruction, postmodernism, gay and queer studies).[12]

The present volume, *Pedagogy and Power*, is not a history of ancient education in any conventional sense. Here the editors want to draw attention to the fact that they consciously use the term 'pedagogy' as one that is distinct from 'education' (from Latin *educare*, 'to raise up', 'to lead out'). 'Pedagogy' (from Greek *paid-* + *agōgē*, 'the leading of the child/slave') might quite literally, and in its original usage and sense, propose an exclusive process, one that is concerned with the training of pre-adult males. In the late twentieth century, however, it has very different connotations in that it seeks to include rather than to exclude. Contemporary pedagogy is an enterprise often associated with social change and left-leaning agendas – hence 'radical pedagogy'.[13] Pedagogy is not really a discipline in its own right, and when one tries to constitute it as such, this may lead to embarrassment. Scholars, such as Jane Tompkins and Susan Miller, observe that pedagogy was not so long ago a 'dirty little secret, the fearsome and demeaned professional impropriety'. Pedagogy is personal; it is a bit like sex. It involves talking about yourself, especially if you regard yourself as a teacher whose teaching is an activity with a significant impact.[14] Nonetheless, it has of late become a

[12] Camille Paglia is quoted as saying, 'When we hear all this nonsense about how we should be teaching poor students about the peasants of Guatemala in Marxist rhetoric, I say, excuse me, the factory workers I have had contact with, black and white, they don't want to read about the peasants of Guatemala. They want Sophocles and Shakespeare' (*THES* (3 March, 1995), p. 17). Paglia advocates a core curriculum based mainly on the classics, and dislikes gay studies, women's studies, African-American studies, and so on (p. 18).

[13] See P. Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (Harmondsworth, 1972; originally published New York, 1970); and more recently, also L. Davis and M. B. Mirabella, *Left Politics and the Literary Profession* (New York and Oxford, 1990); Gallop, *Pedagogy*; Gless and Herrnstein Smith, *The Politics*; G. Graff, *Beyond the Culture Wars. How Teaching the Conflicts Can Revitalize American Education* (New York and London, 1992); B. Johnson, *The Pedagogical Imperative. Teaching as a Literary Genre*, Yale French Studies 63 (1982); M. Le Doeuff, *Hipparchia's Choice: An Essay Concerning Women, Philosophy, etc* (Oxford, 1991) [*L'Etude et le rouet* (Paris, 1989)].

[14] See J. Tompkins, 'The Pedagogy of the Distressed', *College English* 52 (1990) 653–60, esp. p. 655 and S. Miller, '*In Loco Parentis*: Addressing (the) Class', in Gallop, *Pedagogy*, p. 155. For William Armstrong Pearcy III, talking about 'pedagogy' does indeed involve talking about sex; see his celebration of archaic and classical Greek pedagogy as a site of homoeroticism and homosexual relations, *Pederasty and Pedagogy in Archaic Greece* (Urbana and Chicago, 1996). Also cf. D. Lusted, 'Why Pedagogy?', *Screen* 27 (1986), pp. 2–4 (I would like to thank David Hamilton and Erica McWilliam for this reference). The uncomfortable affinity of the words 'pedagogy' and 'pederasty', which both share the '*pais*' (Greek for 'child' or 'slave') root may explain the embarrassing association between pedagogy and sex, one supported by the traditional stereotype of teaching and learning as a site of male homosocial and -sexual interaction.

major topic and theme in contemporary work in the fields of literature, feminism, cultural studies, philosophy, and political theory.

Without a distinct disciplinary locale, pedagogy has even less any obvious genealogy. Pedagogy lacks the venerable history that has accrued to education, even though history might serve to ensure the critical and theoretical dimensions of pedagogical inquiry. Radical pedagogy, as Henry Giroux defines it, must *understand* the world in order to change it for the better. Understanding means coming to terms with what we perceive to be the privileged past, and those who consider transforming the contemporary scenario will not reject but reread and reclaim what is deemed canonical.[15] An underlying axiom of this book is that our defining images are always inlaid with a set of other less familar and less visible dynamics and their discourses. Where some might envisage a conservative agenda for 'tradition', history might alternatively serve as a possible 'other', as a site from which the present may wish to differentiate itself. With the project of revisionism in mind, one might explore the ways in which prior pedagogies might signify in different ways or help us to make pedagogy signify alternatively, if only by supplying models that we must reject as unpalatable.

Such an enterprise necessarily involves intertextualities revealed by juxtapositions between the ancient and the more contemporary, between the pedagogic and the less obviously pedagogic. Situations depicted by earlier authors serve as valuable sub-texts for analysis of subsequent scenes, even if they are ultimately to be rejected as models for the latter. The privileged and authoritative pedagogical traditions and histories offer a genealogy for some of the long-held perceptions, sometimes mistaken, sometimes overidealised, sometimes unconscious, sometimes unarticulated, about what the 'pedagogical' might be. Indeed, one notes the almost obligatory reference to 'Socrates' – and not necessarily Plato's – in contemporary writing on pedagogy, and particularly in writing which attempts to wrest teaching and learning from its more conventional constituencies.[16] We reread the pedagogical past in the belief

[15] See L. Robinson's chapter in Davis and Mirabella, *Left Politics*.

[16] See e.g. S. Felman, 'Psychoanalysis and Education: Teaching Terminable and Interminable', in Johnson, *The Pedagogical Imperative*, pp. 21–44; Le Doeuff, *Hipparchia's*, pp. 9–10 and passim; L. Irigaray, *Speculum of the Other Woman*, tr. G. Gill (Ithaca, 1985) [*Speculum de l' autre femme* (Paris, 1974)]; D. Purkis, 'The Lecherous Professor Revisited' in C. Brant and Y. L. Too (eds.), *Rethinking Sexual Harassment* (London, 1994), esp. pp. 198ff.; for Socrates as aporetic teacher, see S. Kofman, 'Beyond Aporia?', in A. Benjamin (ed.), *Poststructuralist Classics* (London, 1988), pp. 7–44. Eve Sedgwick merely cites Socrates in a title of an essay on queer pedagogy and performativity to signal its concern with teaching, 'Socratic Raptures, Socratic Ruptures: Notes Toward Queer Performativity', in S. Gubar and J. Kamholtz (eds.), *English Inside and Out: The Places of Literary*

that it has become an imaginary zone both well imaged and rehearsed in and by subsequent academies and their pedagogies, and also a zone in need of demystification by the present.

This much said, where classics and pedagogy are concerned, the inkling of history might perhaps be claimed in Jacques Barzun's attempt in 1959 to dislodge antiquity from the ideas of 'legacy' and 'inheritance' by showing that 'classics' resists precisely the pull towards reproduction. For Barzun, studying 'classics', perhaps because of its association with the elite and with high 'standards', was what permitted individualism in contrast to the uniformity imposed by contemporary systems of mass education.[17] But individualism is an emphasis that risks obscuring the ideas of intellectual community and of social process which are inevitably aspects of the pedagogical scenario. By contrast with Barzun's approach, this is not a book about individual and great teachers, as, for instance, Gilbert Highet's *The Immortal Profession: The Joys of Teaching and Learning* is.[18] Distinctively, it is a pedagogical history which ventures the claim that pedagogy can have a past without re-inscribing tradition, a history which establishes a break from the history of writing about education. Despite, or possibly because of, this background of scholarship on classical education, *Pedagogy and Power* stands both in a vacuum and against a hegemonic discourse. It does not reject the canonical or privileged, and offers rereadings of them.

The essays in this volume seek to expand the issues we might address and the texts we might read in constructing histories of classical education. As a result, the present volume does not produce a familiar or predictable narrative. Contributors look at different, but no less significant, moments in the history of classical pedagogy, with the result that the volume establishes different continuities and discontinuities between ancient and post-antique models of classical learning and education. While insisting upon the relationship between classical pedagogy and power, this volume calls into question assumptions that this relationship is a straightforward or static one. It recognises that the discourses which represent and constitute classical teaching may both, and sometimes simultaneously, affirm and undermine the authorities of teacher, ruler, state, and even of the pedagogy itself. Pedagogy is a

Criticism (New York and London, 1993), pp. 122–36; see also M. Nussbaum, 'The Softness of Reason: A Classical Case for Gay Studies', *New Republic* (July 13 and 20, 1992), pp. 26–35.

[17] J. Barzun, *The House of Intellect* (London, 1959), pp. 88ff.

[18] (New York, 1976). Highet offers encomia of Gilbert Murray, Albert Schweizer and Jesus amongst others as teachers who exemplify 'the immortal profession'.

far more diffuse set of activities than what is most obviously recognised as the technique of imparting a knowledge. Insofar as pedagogy is a socially framed and socially constructed activity, it thus has the power to transform and to redefine social institutions. Accordingly, the political effect of education – and any education, for that matter – is always open to reinterpretation, for elites and their authorising/authorised knowledges may be defined and redefined, their boundaries shifted and problematised. This volume demonstrates that classical pedagogies have been and continue to be complex and plural in their significations. Prior pedagogies can be subsumed within and reinterpreted by later models through, for example, imitation or counter-definition, or they can be fictionalised/travestied and acquire mythical status.

Against a background of singulars and of absolutes, *Pedagogy and Power* deliberately and significantly addresses itself to plurals. The volume locates classical model*s* of pedagogy, their *knowledges*, and the ideal*s* which formed them or were formed on the basis of them within the social and intellectual context*s* which generated them, in which they have subsequently been invoked and specially privileged. It proposes that 'education in antiquity' is not necessarily 'classical education': pedagogy in the ancient world is not to be treated as a unity, and there exists a diversity of pedagogies that are classical, are influenced by the classics or give classics a central role. It demonstrates that it is not possible to uphold an unproblematic or simple paradigm of ancient education, arguing that classical pedagogy is complex and plural in its constitution and in its significations. A further premiss of this volume is that the 'knowledges' imparted by classical models of education and their rhetorics are never disinterested; such 'knowledges' are always necessarily implicated in the structures, processes, and articulations of power (political, social, cultural, and so on), and their critiques. *Pedagogy and Power* rejects the writing of a history of classical pedagogy which seeks to reclaim tradition or assert the legacy of classical education's past from a perspective of rose-tinted nostalgia. Rather it aspires to show that the authority and power that have been associated with classical learning and knowledge, and that we might associate with them, are far more complex (because varied and broadly disseminated) than has previously been recognised. So chapters in the volume disclose the various modes of political involvement in which classical models of pedagogy engage. They examine how in antiquity education instructs students to function as citizens and/or to rule and be ruled, how it constructs elites and trains subjects, in short how it produces

and reproduces its particular state. Other essays show that when post-classical pedagogies trace their genealogy back to antiquity they have constructed ideal pedagogies variously. Contributors demonstrate that these pedagogies engage in nostalgic retrospection towards the 'classics', taking from antiquity models of the Great Teacher, or alternatively violently reject the 'classics', arguing for a displacement of the pedagogical authority of the ancients.

This understanding of knowledge as a political structure is not unfamiliar in the late twentieth century. Concentrating for the most part on the post-Enlightenment, Michel Foucault's work has demonstrated the link between knowledge and power, namely that knowing – and 'knowing' is a complex condition – is linked to political structures and their economies, both creating and reflecting the structure of power within a community. Where classical antiquity is concerned, the assertions that knowledge is related to power have their own histories. In his study of Greek education and culture, *Paideia*, Werner Jaeger insisted upon the necessarily aristocratic nature of Greek education, insisting that 'all higher civilisation springs from the differentiation of social classes – a differentiation which is created by natural variations in physical and mental capacity between man and man.'[19] With Jaeger, one suspects that the recognition of the elite politics of Greek education is a reflection of a personal agenda involving advocacy of an intellectual meritocracy. Marrou highlighted the elitist origins of ancient education – and how could it be otherwise given the nature of the material he studies? He located the beginnings of Greek education in aristocratic, Homeric culture as depicted in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, where fathers educated their sons to rule.[20] In an article entitled 'The Training of Elites in Greek Education' Robert Bolgar attempts to offer a more carefully and sensitively inflected account, arguing that the rise of city-states produced groups of elites with diverse interests who together constituted and ruled the community.[21] Declarations of the power of ancient education and its latter-day counterparts have also sometimes been deliberately oblique, if only because they are regarded as self-evident truth.

Furthermore, the agents of classical pedagogies have been individuals who directly participate in the production and maintenance of power. The anthropologist Sally Humphreys has suggested that the intellectual

[19] W. Jaeger, *Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture*, vol. 1, tr. Gilbert Highet (Oxford, 1939), p. 2.
[20] See Marrou, *A History of Education*, pp. 24ff.
[21] R. Bolgar in Rupert Wilkinson, *Governing Elites: Studies in Training and Selection* (New York, 1969) pp. 23–49.

– the poet, the wise man, the teacher, the adviser, and so on – is a figure who occupies a special place in his community, an 'interstitial' position, inasmuch as through language 'he necessarily had the ability to recreate social relationships and manipulate them in thought'.[22] Frank Vatai, following in particular the work of Werner Jaeger, has amongst others drawn attention to the way in which the philosopher in the ancient Greek world might be a man of action or a contemplative.[23] But there is a sense in which the dichotomy between an active and a contemplative intellectual is a misleading one, and perhaps one which owes more to Christian models of identity. The contemplative is the individual who has wisdom; he is the wise adviser or counsellor, perhaps like Herodotus' Solon (cf. *Histories* 1.29ff.),[24] Themistocles' adviser, the sophist Mnesiphilus,[25] or the future ruler's teacher, perhaps as Aristotle was to the young Alexander. It is also the case, however, that in such a capacity, this figure is no less a man of action in that his discourse may determine political actions and decisions, and thus is no less a bearer of political authority. The ruler is after all someone who has been trained by a man of wisdom and intellect, if not ideally to become such a person himself, and the figure who best proposes the invalidity of the distinction between pragmatic and theoretical man is the Platonic philosopher-king. This is the individual who has had experience of Truth and Beauty and would like to continue in this detached condition, but whose very enlightened condition leads him or her to undertake the government of the state.

The editors and contributors to this volume are of course no less implicated in structures of authority, representing forms of institutional power as lecturers, teachers, writers, and researchers. But we also often call them into question, if only as individuals who wish to make some of the structures and discourses of power more apparent. For against a

[22] S. Humphreys, '"Transcendence" and Intellectual Roles: the Ancient Greek Case' in *Anthropology and the Greeks* (London, 1978), p. 238.

[23] F. L. Vatai, *Intellectuals in Politics in the Greek World* (London, Sydney, Dover, 1984), p. 31; also cf. W. Jaeger, *Aristotle. Fundamentals of the History of his Development* (Oxford, 1948), pp. 426–61. Vatai's study ignores cultural specificities in its attempt to draw analogies between the ancient Greek and modern world (cf. p. 11).

[24] On the figure of the 'wise adviser' in Herodotus, see R. Lattimore, 'The Wise Adviser in Herodotus', *CP* 34 (1939), pp. 24–35; for Xenophon's use of this motif, see V. Gray, 'Xenophon's *Hiero* and the Meeting of the Wise Man and Tyrant in Greek Literature', *CQ* 36 (1986), pp. 115–23.

[25] Cf. Herodotus 8.57, Thucydides 1.138.3 and Xenophon *Memorabilia* 4.2.2; also J. S. Morrison, 'An Introductory Chapter in the History of Greek Education', *Durham University Journal* (1949) pp. 55–63.