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978-0-521-02924-7 - Summa Theologiae: Volume 16 - Purpose and Happiness,
(1a2ae. 1-5)

Thomas Gilby O.P.

Excerpt

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Foreword

MAN IS MADE TO GOD'S IMAGE,^a and since this implies, so Damascene tells us,^{1b} that he is intelligent and free to judge and master of himself, so then, now that we have agreed that God is the exemplar cause^c of things and that they issue from his power through his will,^{2d} we go on to look at this image, that is to say, at man as the source of actions which are his own and fall under his responsibility and control.^e

The first matter to come up is the destiny of human life, and next how it may be reached or missed:^f remember, all our plans get their meaning from their final purpose. Happiness is set down as being this;^g accordingly we shall start with human teleology in general (1), and then relate it to happiness (2-5).

anthropological theology: cf 1a. 1. Vol. 1, ed. T. Gilby. 1a. 13. Vol. 3, ed. H. McCabe. What he has done in the second half of the *Prima Pars* is to consider the human creature for what it is in itself, that is, wholly from God: cf 1a. 45, 3. Vol. 8. Now he considers the same thing, but as wholly to God, and so begins the second part, *Secunda Pars*, of the *Summa*. Yet his moral theology does not represent a switch to a field other than that of dogmatic theology: the separate treatment of the two disciplines calls for more safeguards than is customarily accorded. *Sacra doctrina* is centred on God, and loses nothing of its single-mindedness when it also extends to his friends and creatures: 1a. 1, 3 & 7.

Note, too, from the start, that man will be taken throughout as he really is within the economy of divine Providence, that is, compact of natural claims and of supernatural needs for grace and mercy, not in a hypothetical state of pure nature, though this may appear as a methodological abstract to furnish a point of reference. Hence the constant appeal will be to God's revelation transmitted by the Christian Church, though the discourse will quite easily gather in teachings from Plato and Aristotle, and St Augustine's meditations on Cicero, *De vita beata*.

^fThe treatises onward from 1a2ae. 6, on human acts, until the end of the *Secunda Secundae*.

^gNamely by Aristotle. Happiness, *beatitudo*, *eudaimonia*. The author here declares his hand, though it will not be until 1a2ae. 18, Vol. 18, ed. T. Gilby, that an explicit moral theory will enter into eudemonism.

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SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a2ae. I, I

Quaestio I. de ultimo fine hominis

CIRCA PRIMUM quaeruntur octo:

1. utrum hominis sit agere propter finem;
2. utrum hoc sit proprium rationalis naturæ;
3. utrum actus hominis recipiant speciem a fine;
4. utrum sit aliquis ultimus finis humanæ vitæ;
5. utrum unius hominis possint esse plures ultimi fines;
6. utrum homo ordinet omnia in ultimum finem;
7. utrum idem sit finis ultimus omnium hominum;
8. utrum in illo ultimo fine omnes aliæ creaturæ conveniant.

articulus 1. utrum homini conveniat agere propter finem

AD PRIMUM sic proceditur:¹ I. Videtur quod homini non conveniat agere propter finem. Causa enim naturaliter prior est. Sed finis habet rationem ultimi, ut ipsum nomen sonat. Ergo finis non habet rationem causæ. Sed propter illud agit homo, quod est causa actionis: cum hæc præpositio *propter* designet habitudinem causæ. Ergo homini non convenit agere propter finem.

2. Præterea, illud quod est ultimus finis non est propter finem. Sed in quibusdam actiones sunt ultimus finis; ut patet per Philosophum in *Ethic.*² Ergo non omnia homo agit propter finem.

3. Præterea, tunc videtur homo agere propter finem quando deliberat. Sed multa homo agit absque deliberatione, de quibus etiam quandoque nihil cogitat; sicut cum aliquis movet pedem vel manum aliis intentus, vel fricat barbam. Non ergo homo omnia agit propter finem.

SED CONTRA, omnia quæ sunt in aliquo genere derivantur a principio illius generis. Sed finis est principium in operabilibus ab homine; ut patet per Philosophum in *Physic.*³ Ergo homini convenit omnia agere propter finem.

¹cf 1a2ae. 6, I. CG III, 2

²*Ethics*, I, I. 1094a4

³*Physics*. II. 9. 200a34

^aEnd, an analogical term: take here as final cause or objective purpose. cf Glossary, also Appendix 1.

Readings for this Question. J. Rohmer, *La finalité chez les théologiens de saint Augustin à Duns Scotus*, Paris, 1939. O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe. et XIIIe. siècles*. Vol. 1, *Problèmes de psychologie*, Louvain, 1942. V. de Broglie, *De fine ultimo humanæ vitæ*, Paris, 1948.

For scholastic commentaries on this part of the *Summa* two classical works are recommended. D. Bañez, *De fine ultimo et de actibus humanis*, unpublished until edited by V. Beltrán de Heredia, Salamanca, 1942. B. de Medina, *Expositio in 1a2ae Angelici Doctoris*, Salamanca, 1582.

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PURPOSE IN LIFE

Question 1. purpose in life

UNDER THIS HEADING there are eight points of inquiry:

1. whether we should speak of men acting for an end;^a
2. whether this is peculiar to rational beings;
3. whether the end determines the kind of act they do;
4. whether human life has an ultimate goal;
5. whether an individual can have several final ends;
6. whether there is an over-riding purpose in all a man does;
7. whether this is the same for all;
8. and common to all creatures.^b

article 1. does acting for an end apply to man?

THE FIRST POINT:¹ 1. It seems not. For of its nature a cause comes before an effect. Now an end, as the name indicates, means what comes last. Consequently its meaning is not that of being a cause. This with respect to a man's deeds is what he acts 'on account of': the preposition designates the causal relationship. His actions, therefore, are not on account of their endings.

2. Besides, an ultimate end is not for another end. Yet sometimes, as Aristotle shows,² actions themselves are ultimates.^c And so not all a man does is for an end.

3. In addition, then apparently does a man plan for an end when he acts deliberately. However he does many things without deliberation, sometimes even without thinking about them, as when absently he makes a gesture or shifts his feet or rubs his chin. Not all he does, then, are of set purpose.

ON THE OTHER HAND, all specimens of a class have a common root.^d Now, as Aristotle points out,³ men's deeds originate from having an aim. And so this is why they are performed.

^bThe Question falls into two groups of articles; that there is a final aim of activity (to art. 4), and that it is single, namely God (5-8).

^cThat is, are values, *honestas*, or are pleasurable, *delectabilia*, and therefore not just means, *utilia*, to something else: cf 1a. 5, 6. The point will recur.

^dA common *principium*: a broader term than element or cause, it stands for any kind of start, beginning, origin, or source, whether in reality or just in the logical order of thought: cf 1a. 33, 1.

Note that a *sed contra* is usually a statement of position, sometimes a gambit, sometimes an appeal to authority, sometimes put forward as a persuasion, by showing what is fitting, *conveniens*, or otherwise would be odd, *inconveniens*.

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SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a2ae. I, I

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod actionum quæ ab homine aguntur, illæ solæ proprie dicuntur *humanæ* quæ sunt propriæ hominis inquantum est homo. Differt autem homo ab aliis irrationalibus creaturis in hoc, quod est suorum actuum dominus. Unde illæ solæ actiones vocantur propriæ *humanæ* quarum homo est dominus.

Est autem homo dominus suorum actuum per rationem et voluntatem: unde et liberum arbitrium esse dicitur *facultas voluntatis et rationis*.⁴ Illæ ergo actiones propriæ *humanæ* dicuntur quæ ex voluntate deliberata procedunt. Si quæ autem aliæ actiones homini convenient, possunt dici quidem *hominis* actiones; sed non propriæ *humanæ*, cum non sint hominis inquantum est homo.

Manifestum est autem quod omnes actiones quæ procedunt ab aliqua potentia causantur ab ea secundum rationem sui objecti. Objectum autem voluntatis est finis et bonum. Unde oportet quod omnes actiones *humanæ* propter finem sint.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod finis, etsi sit postremus in executione, est tamen primus in intentione agentis. Et hoc modo habet rationem causæ.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod, si qua actio humana sit ultimus finis, oportet eam esse voluntariam: alias non esset humana, ut dictum est.⁵ Actio autem aliqua dupliciter dicitur voluntaria: uno modo quia imperatur a voluntate, sicut ambulare vel loqui; alio modo quia elicitur a voluntate, sicut ipsum velle. Impossibile autem est quod ipse actus a voluntate elicitus sit ultimus finis. Nam objectum voluntatis est finis, sicut objectum visus

⁴Peter Lombard, II *Sent.*, 24, 3⁵In the body of the art.

⁶Psychologically the difference lies in intelligence and the ensuing rational appetite of will, which is self-determining with respect to objects which are for an end: morally it lies in responsibility with respect to what ought to be done. Morality will be restricted later to the field of human actions properly so called.

⁷Peter Lombard (1100–60), the Master of the *Sentences*, the text for many commentaries in the Middle Ages. Reason: take narrowly here for the mind as coming to conclusions or decisions, rather than as having insight, *intellectus*. A parallel distinction applies to the will, which should be understood here as *boulêsis*, deliberate willing, which adapts itself by choice of goods which are to an end, rather than as *thelêsis* which intends good as an end: cf 3a. 18, 3. The practical discourse is shared by mind and will: 1a. 79, 8 & 83, 4. 1a2ae. 12 & 13. The free decision is called *liberum arbitrium*, not always adequately rendered as ‘freewill’, which may slur over the practical rôle of reason. *Ethics* VI, II. 1113a11. 1a. 83, 3.

⁸Shaped by its formal interest, literally ‘caused by the nature of its object’. The principle, which runs throughout the *Summa*, will be significantly applied in the course of the treatise: cf note a to Foreword. All powers, dispositions, and activities relate to an object, which as a real thing in a sufficiently complete though undifferentiated situation is called the ‘material object’, and as offering that special aspect which engaged the power, disposition and activity is called the ‘formal object’.

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REPLY: Of the actions a man performs those alone are properly called *human* which are characteristically his as a man. He differs from non-intelligent creatures in this, that he is the master of what he does. Consequently those actions alone which lie under his control are properly called *human*.^e

Now he is master through his mind and will, which is why his free decision is referred to as an ability *of reason and will*.^{4f} Therefore those acts alone are properly called *human* which are of his own deliberate willing. Others that may be attributed to him may be called ‘acts of a man’, but not ‘human acts’, since they are not his precisely as a human being.

Clearly all activities a power elicits come from it as shaped by its formal interest.^g And this, for the will, is being an end and good.^h Consequently all human acts must be for the sake of an end.ⁱ

Hence: 1. Though last in respect to execution, an end comes first in respect to the agent’s intention: it is thus that it has the force of a cause.^j

2. A human act that were an ultimate would still have to be willed, otherwise, as we have observed,⁵ it would not be human.^k An act can be willed in two ways, first as being commanded by the will, thus speaking or walking; second as being elicited from the will, thus willing itself.^l Let us start with this elicited act. For it to be itself the ultimate end is out of the question, since the end is its objective, as colour is sight’s objective.

^hOn the will as a power of which the object is good-as-the-end, cf 1a2ae. 8.

ⁱNotice the words of the conclusion. The teleological formula for this part of the *Summa* is that actions rather than things are for an end, cf Appendix 1, and Glossary s.v. ‘end’.

^jThe order of intention, constituted by cognitional and appetitional relations to objects, which scale down from judging and willing ends to the deliberate choosing of what is for them. The order of execution, the subsequent carrying out of the decision. The twelve stages in the dynamic structure of a complete human act are examined 1a2ae. 8–17. See also Vol. 18, Appendix 5, note 5.

The end is a cause in the order of intention, nevertheless it is wanted as a thing, not as a thought of a thing. Cajetan *in loc*: to be intended is a condition of its causality, to be effectively reached coincides with its causality, to be real is of the essence of its causality.

^kThe *voluntarium*, or the nature of voluntary activity is discussed later, 1a2ae. 6. It has two requirements, that the activity is natural and spontaneous or from within (and so is not forced or artificial) and that it works through knowledge (and so is not blind or ignorant). Since some perception of ends is present in animals, their natural actions are in a sense voluntary, but in its proper sense the term is restricted to rational beings: 1a2ae. 6, 2. Note that it is not strictly speaking synonymous with human or moral acts, which are voluntary acts working through deliberation and choice: the terminology can prove confusing. All acting through mind and will, e.g. our seeing God in the beatific vision and loving, is not ‘voluntary’ in the sense of being free. cf note *f* above.

^l*Actus elicited*, here an act from and in the will; *actus imperatus*, an act from the will but in another power. The distinction will occur again, and applied to the hierarchy of the virtues. Thus religion may command what it does not elicit, e.g. almsdeeds.

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SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a2ae. I, 2

est color: unde sicut impossibile est quod primum visibile sit ipsum videre, quia omne videre est alicujus objecti visibilis, ita impossibile est quod primum appetibile, quod est finis, sit ipsum velle. Unde relinquitur quod, si qua actio humana sit ultimus finis, quod ipsa sit imperata a voluntate. Et ita ibi aliqua actio hominis, ad minus ipsum velle, est propter finem. Quidquid ergo homo faciat, verum est dicere quod homo agit propter finem, etiam agendo actionem quæ est ultimus finis.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod hujusmodi actiones non sunt proprie humanæ, quia non procedunt ex deliberatione rationis, quæ est proprium principium humanorum actuum. Et ideo habent quidem finem imaginatum, non autem per rationem præstitutum.

articulus 2. utrum agere propter finem sit proprium rationalis naturæ

AD SECUNDUM sic proceditur:¹ 1. Videtur quod agere propter finem sit proprium rationalis naturæ. Homo enim, cujus est agere propter finem, nunquam agit propter finem ignotum. Sed multa sunt quæ non cognoscunt finem: vel quia omnino carent cognitione, sicut creaturæ insensibiles, vel quia non apprehendunt rationem finis, sicut bruta animalia. Videtur ergo proprium esse rationalis naturæ agere propter finem.

2. Præterea, agere propter finem est ordinare suam actionem ad finem. Sed hoc est rationis opus. Ergo non convenit his quæ ratione carent.

3. Præterea, bonum et finis est objectum voluntatis. Sed *voluntas in ratione est*,² ut dicitur in *De Anima*. Ergo agere propter finem non est nisi rationalis naturæ.

SED CONTRA est quod Philosophus probat in *Physic.*³ quod *non solum intellectus, sed etiam natura agit propter finem.*

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod omnia agentia necesse est agere propter finem. Causarum enim ad invicem ordinarum, si prima subtrahatur, necesse est alias subtrahi. Prima autem inter omnes causas est causa finalis. Cujus ratio est, quia materia non consequitur formam nisi secundum quod movetur ab agente: nihil enim reducit se de potentia in actum. Agens autem non movet nisi ex intentione finis. Si enim agens non esset determinatum ad

¹cf 1a2ae. 12, 5. CG II, 23; III, 1, 2, 16 & 24. *De potentia* I, 5; III, 15. *In Meta.* v, lect. 16

²*De Anima* III, 9. 432b5

³*Physics* II, 5. 196b21

^mYet people can be in love with love, particularly in friendship, which is a supple, complex, and reflex activity, not moving rigidly in one direction: cf 2a2ae. 25, 2.

ⁿThe question will be pursued later, and a distinction will be drawn in the following Question between the end as a thing or object, *finis cujus gratia*, to *heneka*, and the

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What is first visible cannot be the act of seeing, for this always lights on some visible object, and no more can the very act of loving be the first beloved, or the end.^m And so we are left to speculate whether the ultimate might not be an act commanded by the will. Yet even there the human act, at least on the part of the willing, will be on account of the end.ⁿ Therefore it is true to say that whatever a man does is for an end, even in the doing of an act which holds the ultimate end.

3. Semi-automatic movements of this sort are not human actions in the strict sense, for they do not come from reasoned deliberation, which sets the stage on which men act as men. Such ends as are present stay on the level of sense, and are not presented by reason.^o

article 2. is acting for an end proper to rational beings?

THE SECOND POINT:¹ 1. So it seems.^a Acting with purpose is a function of a human being, and he never does so without knowing what he is about. Yet many beings are not aware of an end, for either they are quite without consciousness, thus insentient things, or they do not recognize the meaning of end and purpose, thus brute animals. Apparently, then, acting with purpose is exclusively for rational beings.

2. Moreover, to aim at an end is to direct activity towards it. This is the work of reason. And is not therefore found in things without reason.

3. Further, being an end and good is the object of willing. Now willing, as Aristotle notes,² *is in the reason*. And so acting for an end is for none but a being of a rational nature.

ON THE OTHER HAND Aristotle proves that *nature as well as intelligence acts for a purpose*.³

REPLY: All efficient causes must needs act for an end. In an ordered system of causes, strike out the first, and the others have to go too. And the first of all causes is the final cause or end. Our reasoning goes as follows: matter does not achieve form unless it be changed by an efficient cause, for nothing potential is self-actualizing.^b Now an efficient cause does not start this change except by intending an end. For were it not shaped towards pro-

end-condition of the subject obtaining it, *finis quo*. That the act of possession can be an act of will is later denied: 1a2ae. 3, 4.

^oSee note *k* above.

^aProper, i.e. peculiar or exclusive to: rational beings, i.e. creatures with intelligence. The argument will be for the need of a final cause before any other type of cause can come into play, not for an ultimate in a series of final causes, for which see below, art. 4. Yet though the end comes first in causing, it comes last in the thing caused: 1a. 5, 4.

^bA cardinal principle, first stated 1a. 2, 3. Here applied to material taking shape.

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SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a2æ. I, 2

aliquem effectum, non magis ageret hoc quam illud: ad hoc ergo quod determinatum effectum producat, necesse est quod determinetur ad aliquid certum, quod habet rationem finis. Hæc autem determinatio, sicut in rationali natura fit per rationalem appetitum, qui dicitur voluntas, ita in aliis fit per inclinationem naturalem, quæ dicitur appetitus naturalis.

Tamen considerandum est quod aliquid sua actione vel motu tendit ad finem dupliciter: uno modo sicut seipsum ad finem movens, ut homo; alio modo sicut ab alio motum ad finem, sicut sagitta tendit ad determinatum finem ex hoc quod movetur a sagittante, qui suam actionem dirigit in finem. Illa ergo quæ rationem habent, seipsa movent ad finem: quia habent dominium suorum actuum per liberum arbitrium, quod est *facultas voluntatis et rationis*.⁴ Illa vero quæ ratione carent tendunt in finem per naturalem inclinationem, quasi ab alio mota, non autem a seipsis: cum non cognoscant rationem finis, et ideo nihil in finem ordinare possunt, sed solum in finem ab alio ordinantur. Nam tota irrationalis natura comparatur ad Deum sicut instrumentum ad agens principale, ut supra habitum est.⁵

Et ideo proprium est naturæ rationalis ut tendat in finem quasi se agens vel ducens ad finem, naturæ vero irrationalis quasi ab alio acta vel ducta, sive in finem apprehensum, sicut bruta animalia, sive in finem non apprehensum, sicut ea quæ omnino cognitione carent.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo, quando per seipsum agit propter finem, cognoscit finem: sed quando ab alio agitur vel ducitur, puta cum agit ad imperium alterius, vel cum movetur altero impellente, non est necessarium quod cognoscat finem. Et ita est in creaturis irrationalibus.

⁴Peter Lombard, II *Sent.*, 24, 3⁵1a. 22, 2 ad 4

⁶A nature is its end, says Aristotle, thereby indicating how his natural philosophy is no mere classification of static types. Accordingly the definition of a thing should cast forward to its purpose, whether proposed by a governing mind or embodied in the immediate agent, rather than in its result, which may be arrested or open itself out for other indefinite ends. Thus a clockmaker proposes to make an instrument for telling the time, yet it may be used as an antique piece of furniture: laying a fertilized egg has the biological purpose of perpetuating the species, but other purposes, culinary or cosmetic, may supervene; yet the internal finality of the hen is not directed to making an omelette or beauty-cream. cf art. 1, note j. The 'intention' referred to in the text is not, of course, necessarily appreciated by the immediate agent at work.

⁷Appetite, *orexis*: a relationship, *habitus*, to the good; in creatures a bent or tendency, *inclinatio*, to a good other than themselves, arising from their forms, which make them actual beings, not active beings. To reach their good they have to be not merely being but also acting. cf art. 3, note c.

Their natural form originates a natural appetite, a *pondus naturæ*, which as such is unconscious. A form they possess by understanding, *forma intelligibilis*, originates a voluntary or rational appetite. cf 1a. 19, 1. Vol. 5, ed. T. Gilby. 1a. 59, 1. Vol. 19, ed. K. Foster. 1a. 60, 1.

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ducing a determinate effect, it would not produce this rather than that, and to produce a determinate effect it must be set on something defined, which is what an end, *finis*, implies.^c In rational beings this determinateness is attained through the rational appetite, termed will, in other beings through an inborn bent, termed natural appetite.^d

Observe all the same that a thing in its acting and moving may tend towards an end in two ways. First, by setting itself in motion towards it, thus a man; second, by being set in motion towards it, thus an arrow flighted by an archer to the target. Now things possessing intelligence set themselves in motion towards an end, for they are masters of their acts through their own free decision, of which they are capable by reason and will,⁴ whereas things without intelligence tend towards their ends by their natural bent stimulated by another, not by themselves; they do not grasp what being an end means, and therefore cannot plan, but can only be planned for a purpose as such.^e In fact, as we have established,⁵ the whole of non-rational nature is compared to God as an instrumental to a principal cause.^f

Our conclusion is that to be self-acting and bringing oneself to an end is proper to rational beings, whereas non-rational beings are acted on and brought there, whether with some purposive perception, as in brute animals, or without it, as in things quite devoid of sensation.^g

Hence: 1. When a man is self-acting for an end he appreciates what it is, but not necessarily when he is led or driven by another—he may be carrying out orders blindly or submitting to force, like non-rational creatures.

The terms 'nature' and 'natural' have varying meanings in the *Summa*, which can be decided only from the context. Here natural appetite is contrasted with voluntary appetite, a natural agent, *agens per naturam*, with a will-agent, *agens per voluntatem*. Elsewhere the contrast may be, with the violent or forced, or with the artificial, or with the civilized, or with the juridical, or with the supernatural, or with the preternatural.

^cWhat an end means, *ratio finis*. This does not require that the end-object is comprehended or even recognized in its true nature, but that it is at least inferred as an *x* to which other objects are subordinate (cf by analogy our rational knowledge of the existence of God. 1a. 2, 1 & 2. Vol. 2). That it be perceived or anticipated by sense as the last item of a process to be initiated, that is to say as a term of action, is not enough; it has to be an object of action. Though animals are not machines, but exhibit inner and sense purposes, they are without teleological thinking. 1a2ae. 6, 2. Art. 1, notes *j* & *k*. Note *c* above.

^dYet note that while there is no instrumentality in God's creative activity, 1a. 45, 5, nevertheless creatures are true principal causes in their own order, 1a. 105, 5.

^eThis activity, not merely of consciously willing, but also of making up one's own mind and carrying out a decision, is analysed in the following treatise, 1a2ae. 6–17. Vol. 17.

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SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a2ae. I, 3

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod ordinare in finem est ejus quod seipsum agit in finem. Ejus vero quod ab alio in finem agitur est ordinari in finem. Quod potest esse irrationalis naturæ, sed ab aliquo rationem habente.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod objectum voluntatis est finis et bonum in universali. Unde non potest esse voluntas in his quæ carent ratione et intellectu, cum non possint apprehendere universale: sed est in eis appetitus naturalis vel sensitivus, determinatus ad aliquod bonum particulare. Manifestum autem est quod particulares causæ moventur a causa universali; sicut rector civitatis, qui intendit bonum commune, movet suo imperio omnia particularia officia civitatis. Et ideo necesse est quod omnia quæ carent ratione moveantur in fines particulares ab aliqua voluntate rationali, quæ se extendit in bonum universale, scilicet a voluntate divina.

articulus 3. utrum actus hominis recipiant speciem ex fine

AD TERTIUM sic proceditur:¹ I. Videtur quod actus humani non recipiant speciem a fine. Finis enim est causa extrinseca. Sed unumquodque habet speciem ab aliquo principio intrinseco. Ergo actus humani non recipiunt speciem a fine.

2. Præterea, illud quod dat speciem oportet esse prius. Sed finis est posterior in esse. Ergo actus humanus non habet speciem a fine.

3. Præterea, idem non potest esse nisi in una specie. Sed eundem numero actum contingit ordinari ad diversos fines. Ergo finis non dat speciem actibus humanis.

SED CONTRA est quod dicit Augustinus,² *Secundum quod finis est culpabilis vel laudabilis, secundum hoc sunt opera nostra culpabilia vel laudabilia.*

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod unumquodque sortitur speciem secundum actum, et non secundum potentiam: unde ea quæ sunt composita ex materia et forma constituuntur in suis speciebus per proprias formas.

¹cf 1a2ae. 18, 6; 72, 3. II *Sent.* 40, 1. *De virtutibus* I, 2 ad 3; II, 3

²*De moribus Eccl. et Manich.* II, 13. PL 32, 1356

³Universal value, cause. Common good. There is a wealth of suggestion here, but to keep to the thread of the argument the reader need take universal to mean here no more than not restricted to, though implied in, any one exemplification particularized in space and time. The analogy from the sovereign ruler rather weakens the argument if the common good suggests only the collective good, or the good of the majority. But see 1a2ae. 90, 2. Vol. 28, ed. T. Gilby, Appendix 4.

⁴cf 1a. 19, 4. Vol. 5.