

Negotiating for Cyprus 1993-2003

Bearbeitet von
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1. Auflage 2009. Buch. ca. 200 S. Hardcover
ISBN 978 3 447 05989 3
Format (B x L): 17 x 24 cm
Gewicht: 520 g

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Glaftos Clerides

**Negotiating for Cyprus
1993-2003**



PELEUS
STUDIEN ZUR ARCHÄOLOGIE UND
GESCHICHTE GRIECHENLANDS UND ZYPERNS
BAND 43

VERLAG  FRANZ PHILIPP RUTZEN
MAINZ UND RUHPOLDING

PELEUS

Studien zur Archäologie und Geschichte Griechenlands und Zyperns
 Herausgegeben von Reinhard Stupperich und Heinz A. Richter
 Band 43

Cover vignettes:

Front Cover: Glaicos Clerides and Rauf Denktash, courtesy PIO

Opposite title: Cup by Peithinos painter, Berlin, Pergamonmuseum (CVA Berlin 2, Taf. 61).

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Gesamtherstellung: Druck Partner Rübelmann GmbH, Carl-Benz-Str. 11, 69 502 Hemsbach

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ISBN 3-938646-37-3

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Glossary

AKEL (Anorthotiko Komma tou Ergazomenou Laou: Progressive Party of the Working People, the Cyprus Communist party; the oldest established political party in Cyprus founded in 1926. Member of the United Left Group in the European Parliament. Obtained 32% of the vote in the last parliamentary elections in 2006.

DIKO (Dimokratiko Komma: Democratic Party) a centre-right party founded in 1976 by the late President Spyros Kyprianou. Obtained 17.9% of the vote in the last Parliamentary elections.

DISY (Dimokratikos Synagermos: Democratic Rally) a centre-right party founded in 1976 by Glafcos Clerides. The party is a member of the EPP-ED Group in the European Parliament and obtained 30.3% in the last parliamentary elections.

EDEK (Kinima Socialdemokraton: Movement of Social Democracy) a centre-left party founded by Dr. Vasos Lyssarides in 1969. Member of the SD Group in the European Parliament. Obtained 8.9% of votes in the parliamentary elections of 2006.

ELDYK and TOURDYK: the Greek and Turkish military contingents stationed on the island in accordance with the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee signed at the time of Cyprus' independence by Britain, Greece and Turkey, providing for 950 Greek and 650 Turkish troops.

PROLOGUE

My main reason for writing this book is that I believe that there should be a realistic first hand account of the difficulties Cyprus had to face in her accession to the European Union due to the long standing "Cyprus problem" and which she continues to face since 1963 in her on-going search for a solution to this problem. A search for a solution which has frequently occupied the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Secretary General of the United Nations, during the term of office of five successive Secretaries Generals, without any definitive outcome. I also considered it important for this account to be substantiated by first hand documentation which has never before been published.

My intention is not so much to record my contribution to the above efforts but rather to document succinctly and to make clear the limitations that make it impossible to achieve an absolutely just solution of the Cyprus problem, at least in the sense which our side, which is in fact the disadvantaged side, understands it. These limitations make the objectives of those who hope that at some point in the depths of time, at some undetermined future date, we will be able to achieve a solution better than those offered to us to date, quite simply a utopian dream. Unfortunately, such hopes are based on false evaluations of the situation and are not based on a realistic assessment of the true historical events and current political realities.

Under no circumstances is it my intention to judge either the policy of any other president or government on the Cyprus problem, nor that of third parties, in order to apportion blame. I consider it more important for us to understand the limitations that we face in seeking a solution which our side considers absolutely just. Unfortunately, the principles of customary and contractual international law, including the declaration of human rights and the European *acquis*, however much they are accepted in theory, cannot be fully implemented in order to solve international problems, one of which is the Cyprus problem.

I believe that in this book, based on the historical events to which I refer and the documents which I have included, which are being published for the first time, I substantiate fully the thesis outlined above.

Glafcos Clerides
March 2007