

Culture, Social Representations, and Peacemaking: A Symbolic Theory of History and Identity

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Peace psychology has emerged like a phoenix from the ashes of the Cold War to provide an interdisciplinary approach to the psychology of peace and conflict that draws more strongly from macro-level and institutional factors than from individual-level cognitive-motivational factors characteristic of mainstream intergroup theory in psychology. A recent review by Christie (2006) highlighted three major themes for peace psychology in the post-Cold War environment: “(1) a greater sensitivity to geohistorical context, (2) a more differentiated perspective on the meanings and types of violence and peace, and (3) a systems view of the nature of violence and peace” (p. 3). These themes bear major structural similarities to social psychological movements in Asia privileging culturally appropriate social actions (Atsumi, 2007; Liu & Ng, 2007) and those in Europe articulating a representational form of social psychology (Moscovici, 1988). Reflecting its origins in the United States, however, current approaches to peace psychology have little compelling theory about how culture and its representational systems influence war and peace. The purpose of this chapter is to present a symbolic representational approach to culture and conflict resolution developed in Asia and the Pacific that synthesizes European theories of social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and social representations (Moscovici, 1988).

Symbolic Representations of Culture

Asian social psychology has come of age out of a dialogue between North American psychologists interested in testing the universality of their theories and East Asian psychologists interested in delimiting boundary conditions for Western theories and articulating indigenous systems of psychology (Hofstede, 2007; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Yang, 2000). Accordingly, Asian social psychology has come to be identified with a cultural approach to psychology (Leung, 2007; Liu & Ng, 2007), and cross-cultural psychology has been strongly influenced by North American constructs like attitudes, values, norms, and stereotypes. Currently, major cross-cultural theorists operationally define culture as national-level means along global dimensions of variation in values (Schwartz, 1992), orientations (Hofstede, 2001), and

social axioms (Leung & Bond, 2004) or as implicit theories of behavior based on civilizational scripts (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). These definitions identify culture with the individual and the nation or civilization without the critical intervening layer of the institutions of culture that mediate between individuals and the state.

European theories of societal psychology are useful to bridge the gap between the individual and culture: social representations theory (Moscovici, 1961/2006) in particular specifies a mediating role for institutions and the modes of communication and the systems of knowledge and belief that they foster. While there is little consensus around how either social representations (Wagner & Hayes, 2005) or culture (Triandis, 1995) should be defined, in the symbolic approach taken here, social representations are defined as a shared system of knowledge and belief that facilitates communication about social objects, and culture is conceptualized as a meta-system of social representations mediated by language, symbols, and their institutional carriers. But at this level of abstraction, little is added to the definition of culture provided by Geertz (1973) as a system of symbolically communicated meaning by calling it a “meta-system of social representations.” There is need for definitions of more specific aspects of culture that can be operationalized as social representations using the analytical and quantitative techniques typical of social psychology that still retain the richness and multiplicity of the concept.

History as an Essential Ingredient in the “Imagined Community” of Nationhood

Peoples that aspire to self-governance, like ethnic and national groups, seek to establish norms, traditions, and institutions that maintain temporal continuity between past, present, and future (Liu & Hilton, 2005; Hilton & Liu, 2008). History confers immortality to events and people by weaving them into stories Malinowski (1926) calls “narratives of origin.” These historical narratives allow a society to maintain continuity in the midst of change, as core symbols and the institutions and discourses associated with them are used to cope with difficult new situations (Wagner, Kronberger, & Seifert, 2002). These symbolic representations tend to retain their core properties across time and space while changing in their peripheral aspects (Abric, 1993). Social representations of history are particularly important for political culture, as a society renews its social contract with members or encounters new situations that require it to make use of and adjust the wisdom of the past in the light of challenges from the present and future. “A group’s representation of its history is *constitutional*: it can serve the function of a foundational myth or ‘charter’ for a society, defining rights and obligations for a group and legitimizing its social and political arrangements . . . A group’s representation of its history will thus condition its sense of what it was, what it is, and what it can be . . .” (Liu & Hilton, 2005, p. 538).

It does so in the form of canonical narratives (Liu and László, 2007), museum displays and commemorations (Olick & Robbins, 1998), collective memories of heroes

and martyrs (Schwartz, 1997), maps and vernaculars (Anderson, 1983), as well as the more standard psychological repertoires of attitudes, values, beliefs, and discourses. From a psychological viewpoint, Liu and László (2007) have described how narratives grasp together or configure (Wertsch, 2002) the raw materials of history in a way that responds to the challenges of the day. Rather than being static, historical representations are conceptualized as a “symbolic reserve” mobilized by cultural elites who use them to justify their political agendas (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). In many cases, especially with contemporary nation states, it is political agendas that drive cultural memories rather than vice versa (Liu & Atsumi, 2008). Sociologist Zerubavel (1996) shows how Masada evolved from a peripheral and little-known account of Jewish zealots’ futile resistance to the Romans into a central historical account of the meaning of Never Again after Jewish people formed the state of Israel after the Holocaust. Social psychology’s contribution to a symbolic conceptualization of culture is to provide a quantitative, verifiable approach to complement the more qualitative and archival approach taken by sociologists.

Unlike the standard theoretical repertoires of social psychology, social representations of national history are in large part unique to a culture and its people. This is particularly relevant for peace psychology in Asia, because as Montiel (2003) notes, 107 of the 131 conflicts in this region in the last 30 years were internal to a state. But while each people have their own experiences and collective remembrances of moving through time, they share connections to earth-shaking events of world and regional history. The collisions and collusions between local and international events through time are grist for the mill of a symbolic theory of history and identity applied to conflict and peacemaking between states as well as culture-specific phenomena within states.

Four Steps to Operationalizing Social Representations of History in National Cultures of Conflict and Peacemaking

Social representations theorists (SRT) have an eclectic approach to research methods because “They have been encouraged by the founder of the SRT who has never desired to claim himself as an *owner of his own theory* with the power to legitimize or de-legitimize the work of researchers who inspired him” (p. 185, de Rosa, 2006). In this spirit of sharing, we contribute our summary of a decade of work in New Zealand operationalizing its national political culture, drawing lessons from this work for peace psychology in Asia as represented by selected chapters in this volume. These steps can be taken in sequence or separately. The actual time involved in developing this sequence has spanned a decade.

Step One: Ascertain the Symbolic Landscape of History

In cross-cultural psychology, there is a strong tradition of resisting imposed etics, that is, universal theories or measures imported from another culture and

automatically assumed to apply to the local culture (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 2002). Therefore, the first step in operationalizing social representations of history for a given people is to ask a pair of open-ended questions: "What are the most important [people/events] in the history of [your people or your place]?"¹ The 10 most frequently nominated people and events are then coded into categories for each relevant demographic group (e.g., major ethnic groups for national histories, nationalities for world history, men and women, adults and university students, etc.). From this, a narrative structure can be inferred, as seen in the example of New Zealand from Liu, Wilson, McClure, and Higgins (1999).

In New Zealand, the two historically most important ethnic groups are Maori, Polynesians who first settled in the islands about 800 years ago, and Pakeha or New Zealand Europeans who began arriving 200 years ago and wrested control of the land and colonized Maori subsequently. The four events consensually nominated by Pakeha and Maori in both adult and student populations according to Liu et al. (1999) were all events that can be "grasped" or configured in a bicultural narrative of New Zealand national identity as a partnership between Maori and Pakeha peoples: the arrival of Maori, the arrival of New Zealand Europeans, the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi promising a covenant between them, and then the betrayal of the promise of the treaty in the Land Wars that followed (where control was wrested from Maori and a colonial structure put in place). The signing of the Treaty of Waitangi between Maori chieftains and the British Crown was consensually regarded as the most important and foundational event of New Zealand history.

Liu et al. (1999) showed that this bicultural configuration of history was accompanied by a reversal of the typical finding of in-group favoritism on the part of the dominant group: for the most important event in New Zealand history, both Maori and Pakeha thought that Maori, the subordinate, colonized, low-power group had honored the Treaty of Waitangi better than the dominant group. Contrast this to the United States, for example, where, if Native Americans are accorded any position in the national historical narrative, it is primarily as antagonists, occasionally as helpers of the dominant cultural group of European colonists, but not as "partners." Furthermore, in New Zealand, beliefs about how well the treaty had been honored predicted attitudes toward current political events involving the two groups, like paying compensation for colonial land alienation from Maori or teaching Maori language in schools. Similar findings about the relevance of historical perceptions to present-day political attitudes and identifications have been found in Asia from Malaysia and Singapore (Liu, Lawrence, Ward, & Abraham, 2002), Taiwan (Huang, Liu, & Chang, 2004, see also Huang, this volume), and the Philippines (Liu & Gastardo-Conaco, under review).

Liu (2005) argued that the Treaty of Waitangi is a powerful historical symbol that anchors a bicultural narrative of New Zealand not just in attitudes and talk (Liu & Sibley, 2006), but in societal institutions and commemorations: two gigantic replicas

¹Depending on the complexity of the object of study, this may involve asking about both the nation and sub-regions or peoples in the case of multi-ethnic or federal states.

of the treaty (in Maori and English) tower over visitors to the national museum, and the signing of the treaty is commemorated annually as a national holiday. This bicultural configuration of history produces massive effects on national identity, even as measured in milliseconds using a reaction-time paradigm from social cognition. Sibley and Liu (2007) showed that at the implicit level, both Maori and Pakeha reacted equally quickly to the pairing of symbols of New Zealand national identity (e.g., the flag, a map of the islands, the silver fern, a kiwi bird) with brown (Maori) or white (Pakeha) faces and much faster than they reacted to the same symbols paired with New Zealand Chinese faces. Indeed, in subsequent studies using both undergraduate students and random samples drawn from the general population, Sibley and colleagues have shown that Pakeha consistently associate both members of their in-group and Maori equally in representations of nationhood, whereas Maori tend to demonstrate an in-group bias in which they associate faces of Maori more strongly with representations of what it means to be a New Zealander (Sibley, Liu, & Khan, 2008; Sibley, Robertson, & Liu, 2008). This pattern deviates substantially from the pattern found in the United States, where Whites explicitly claim that all ethnic groups are equally American, but at the implicit level demonstrate a strong and consistent in-group bias (or American = White effect) where they associate White faces more closely to American national symbols than those of other ethnic groups (Devos & Banaji, 2005).

These findings illustrate empirically the geohistory of conflict and peace rooted to the local culture of New Zealand, provide alternative definitions of peace (where indigenous claims to compensation and recognition are configured as part of the national narrative), and articulate a culture-specific system of inter-ethnic relations unique to a nation that is a fusion between European and Polynesian peoples and their cultures.

Step Two: Describe Discursive Repertoires in Dialogue with Historical Symbols

The colonization of New Zealand provides the contours of both the problems and solutions endemic to many of its present-day social dilemmas, just as African-American president Barack Obama has referred to the United States' history of slavery as its "original sin." If New Zealand were truly as egalitarian as New Zealanders appear to implicitly and explicitly believe, then how is it that Maori form 16% of the total population but 50% of the prison population, earn 16% less income, and have a life expectancy 8 years lower than other New Zealanders (The Social Report, 2005)? A major part of the answer lies in structures of inequality created in the colonial era (King, 2004; Walker, 1990) whose legacy not only influences the distribution of wealth and power today, but has also contributed to the formation of discursive repertoires that legitimize, maintain, and normalize these inequalities (McCreanor, 2005; Wetherell & Potter, 1992).

Social representations theorists (de Rosa, 2006) have argued that representations are inextricably woven in a dialogical relationship with communication patterns, but cannot be reduced to discursive repertoires as radical discourse analysis suggests. While representations exist in talk, they also exist as collective memories, societal values and beliefs, photographic images, commemorations, and exhibitions – in all these media, it is communication that is central to the relationship between thought, feeling, and action. Kirkwood, Liu, and Weatherall's (2005) analysis of submissions concerning legislation nationalizing the land between the high and low tides (and therefore precluding Maori treaty claims for customary ownership) demonstrated that both writers for and against the legislation used symbols like the treaty and liberal democratic discourses of meritocracy and equality of opportunity in ways that countered one another's arguments and produced alternative forms of identity. This submission cited by Kirkwood et al. (2005) in favor of nationalizing the land employs several discursive tactics to marginalize Maori claims against this and normalize majority ethnic identity as national identity:

Dear Helen,

I am writing to you as a concerned kiwi, with regard to recent events attempted maori ownership of our sea bed and coastline of our country. Are we to dispell the myth to the world that we as a nation celebrate our multi-cultrual belief that segrgation is alive and well in New Zealand. It appears there are too many that prefer to hold onto the past, rather than as a nation move forward together. I am tired of paying for my forefathers mistakes. 20 years on my own children are being subjected, to something that happend back in 1840. We are reminded periodically that maori own this land; Yet on the rugby field / netball court we are a proud nation all cultures come together, but as soon as the land is mentioned we would sooner not discuss it, for with this subject comes so much anger, segrgation, huge set backs, I want to feel safe in the knowledge that the beaches belong to all who visit there, this is getting ridiculous. When will it all end? I cannot see it, why can't people just get along. Maori are not doing themselves any justice by being greedy.²

The use of "concerned kiwi" claims a super-ordinate national identity for the writer and attempts to position Maori claims for the seabed and foreshore as "greedy" desires for preferential treatment by a special-interest group that prefers to "hold on to the past, rather than as a nation move forward together." By contrast the following submission against nationalization takes an ethnic identity for the writer ("pakeha New Zealander") and positions Maori claims for the land between the high and low tides as based on both "The principle of respect for property rights" and "The principle of acceptability to Maori" – on both liberal democracy and the treaty. Moreover, a direct connection is made between past, present, and future in the last sentence rather than positioning the past as irrelevant as in the previous submission.

I wish to make a submission on the Government's proposals [...]. I do so as a third-generation pakeha New Zealander who has a passionate commitment to the building of a strong and harmonious national society, based on the recognition and protection of the rights and interests of all New Zealanders, including the special rights and interests of Maori as the tangata whenua [...] There are also two other, over-arching principles that must be

²Misspellings contained in the original are retained in the cited transcription.

applied if any solution involving legislation is to have any prospect of being accepted and honoured. They are: The principle of respect for property rights: the Government must respect the property rights of all New Zealanders, without discrimination. The principle of acceptability to Maori: Principle ought not to enact *legislation affecting things of particular importance to Maori unless its terms are generally acceptable to Maori*. [...] If they are not observed, Maori are likely to claim, in the New Zealand courts and internationally, that they have been deprived of their property in an arbitrary and discriminatory fashion. Today's grievances are likely to become tomorrow's new claims

A substantial body of qualitative research from New Zealand (see McCreanor, 2005) has detailed the discursive repertoires recounted by press, politicians, and ordinary citizens alike to marginalize indigenous peoples' claims of redress for colonial injustices and to maintain the status quo of ethnic inequality in reality side by side with equality in principle.

Sibley and Liu (2004) used factor analysis to identify a simultaneous configuration of attitudes of support for biculturalism in principle or symbolic biculturalism side by side with inequality in fact or opposition to resource-based biculturalism (compensation for past injustices). Biculturalism in principle reflects support for accepting symbols of Maori culture as symbols of New Zealand culture: like accepting a Maori war dance as a national dance to represent the nation at sporting events, singing the national anthem in Maori language, wearing Maori bone carvings overseas, or using Maori arts to represent New Zealand. Opposition to resource-based biculturalism refers to resistance to attempts to provide material redress for historical and current injustices: they include attempts to position Maori claims for redress and social justice as "special privileges" for a minority and attempts to define equality in a narrow sense of equality of opportunity in the here-and-now while ignoring a history of colonization or a history of material and cultural deprivation (see also Sibley et al., 2008).

Interestingly, a general orientation toward support for group-based inequality known as social dominance orientation (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) that predicts various forms of ethnocentrism is correlated with opposition to biculturalism in principle, but is only weakly correlated with support or opposition to resource-based biculturalism among New Zealand Europeans (or Pakeha New Zealanders). Sibley and Liu (2004) interpreted this to mean that Pakeha New Zealanders had genuine anxiety that affirmative action policies for Maori might create new inequalities rather than simply reflecting modern forms of racism (see Liu & Mills, 2006). Any system of categorical preferences has the possibility of creating new injustices, and Pakeha especially in the media focus on these by highlighting the abuse of public funds by Maori elites (Liu & Mills, 2006). Sibley and Liu (2007) have referred to the combination support for biculturalism in principle with opposition to resource-based biculturalism as "the New Zealand dilemma," a culture-specific national problem. According to theory of history and identity presented here, Myrdal's (1944) identification of racism and the historical legacy of slavery as the "American dilemma" is also a culture-specific repertoire rather than a universal, as some social scientists seem to think.

What binds these two dilemma together is history, and the legacy of Western civilization's recent domination of other peoples like Maori in New Zealand and the

Africans who were brought as slaves to the Americas. In cross-cultural psychology, universals are neither affirmed nor denied in principle, but treated as empirical questions instead. In the representational theory developed here, historical contingencies, that is, the legacies of history, are treated as key variables determining the universality versus culture specificity of psychological constructs relevant to peace psychology.

Step Three: Operationalizing Historical Representations as Legitimizing Myths or Group-Based Ideologies

Unlike discursive psychology, social representations theory uses a plurality of methodological approaches. The discursive repertoires used to maintain post-colonial White privilege identified in the previous section can be transformed into precise psychological measures. Sibley and colleagues (Sibley & Liu, 2004; Sibley, Robertson, & Kirkwood, 2005; Sibley, Liu, Duckitt, & Khan, 2008) have progressively refined quantitative measures derived from prevalent local discourses to develop a cultural psychology of social identity and intergroup relations for New Zealand.

Sibley et al. (2008) in particular reframed statements culled from qualitative sources to derive a measure of historical negation, which they argued was employed by the dominant majority as an ideological justification or legitimizing myth that justified contemporary inequality stemming from historical injustice. Statements loading positively on the scale, like “We should not have to pay for the mistakes of our ancestors” and “We should all move on as one nation and forget about past differences and conflicts between ethnic groups,” echo statements common in everyday discourse in New Zealand, just as reverse coded items like “Grievances for past injustices should be recognized and due compensation offered to the descendants of those who suffered from such injustices” and “We as a nation have a responsibility to see that due settlement is offered to Maori in compensation for past injustices echo opposing although less mainstream discourses.” The historical negation scale, which is comprised of eight such statements, was highly reliable ($\alpha = 0.92$) and fully mediated the effects of two motivational goals, that for group-based dominance and superiority (or social dominance orientation) and that for collective security and social cohesion (or right-wing authoritarianism) on attitudes toward resource-based bicultural policies (e.g., Maori ownership of seabed and shore and rates exemptions on Maori land). It partially mediated their effects on symbolic biculturalism (e.g., performance of the Haka, a Maori war dance at international sports events, the use of Maori cultural icons to promote New Zealand tourism). The overall amount of variance explained by historical negation on the bicultural policy preferences was a staggering 71% for resource-based policies and 59% for symbolic policies in one study. Therefore, to understand policies related to biculturalism, you must understand the function of ideology related to historical negation and very little else. Importantly, it is unlikely that the strong predictive utility of the historical negation scale was affected by content overlap, as the

scale assessing historical negation contained discursive or ideologically prescriptive attitude statements (as described in the above paragraph), whereas social policy attitudes were assessed simply by asking people to rate their support for specific policies and did not contain any prescriptive evaluative component embedded within the statements. This emphasizes the strong role that socially elaborated ideologies anchored in historical context play in determining levels of support versus opposition for specific social policies.

Such levels of precision in measurement are virtually impossible for universal measures taken from the literature in North America or Europe and applied elsewhere. They point to the utility of the culture-specific approach outlined here, where the symbolic landscape is first ascertained, then the relevant discursive repertoires articulating the language of symbols are identified, and then statements are extracted from these discourses to be operationalized as culture-specific measures of legitimizing myths like historical negation, where the sins of the past are acknowledged, but seen as irrelevant to the present and future.

The measure of historical negation published by Sibley et al. (2008) is relevant to other disputes involving historical injustices. Certainly, historical injustice and subsequent mistrust of externally imposed authority are at the center of Taiwanese narratives of history as detailed by Huang et al. (2004), but Huang (this volume) argues that it is orientation toward the future not the past that is the driver of Taiwan's current quest for sovereignty. The historical problems between Muslims and Hindus described by Khan and Sen (this volume) are the product of a form of historical romanticism and historical reconstruction more than an issue of historical grievance, and so the historical negation scale developed for New Zealand would be unlikely to be easily exported to India.

On the other hand, the concept seems to appropriately capture aspects of the "naïve universalism" and historical discontinuity displayed by young Japanese as described by Atsumi et al. (this volume). In their review of history and identity for China and Japan, Liu and Atsumi (2008) noted that the current historical conflict between these two countries is a product of political decisions made in the Cold War, where Japan took the position as the principal ally of the United States and the "unsinkable aircraft carrier" against Communism in Asia after World War II. Japan consequently made its peace with the United States, but not its Asian neighbors. Post-war Communist China, on the other hand, narrated World War II and the Sino-Japanese War as a battle against capitalism and imperialism (often with the United States as an opponent), with China as the victor, and so did not single out Japan as its main historical opponent or victimizer. With the liberalization of China's economy in the last 30 years, and the increasing inequality this has brought with greater wealth, Chinese now appear more nationalistic in their historical narratives, as Communism is not as credible as a ruling ideology (Gries, 2004; He, 2007; Liu & Atsumi, 2008). Since the Deng Xiaoping era, the mainland has been reconsidering its national historical narratives, including the view that China was a victim of Japan, particularly during the Nanjing massacre (see Gries, 2004, Chapter 5). This has led to periodic outbursts of sometimes violent protest against perceived Japanese recalcitrance over telling the truth about history. Liu and Atsumi (2008)

argued that the time was right for Japanese and Chinese leaders to engage in a positive cycle of diplomacy beginning with a Japanese apology accompanied by actions to avoid future accusations of insincerity (i.e., settling the textbook controversies, avoiding official visits to the Yasukuni shrine, and setting up a humanitarian relief fund) and continuing with a reciprocal visit by a Chinese leader to commemorate Japanese suffering at Nagasaki.

The basic point stands that elements of culture-specific experiences resonate in time with things that happened as part of the same historical period or movement in other parts of the world. Liu et al. (in press) summarize social representations of world history across 24 societies by reporting that “(1) world history is a story about politics and war, (2) representations of world history are focused on the present, and (3) characterized by Eurocentrism tempered by nationalism.” Paez et al. (2008) found that the collective remembering of World War II, being a victor nation, and suffering low casualties was positively correlated to willingness to fight in present-day conflicts.

Conflict and the post-conflict narration of conflict (Liu & László, 2007) are central in describing the historical contingencies necessary for a geohistorical and systems-oriented approach to peace psychology. While the previous three sections have described steps toward developing a bicultural psychology for Aotearoa/New Zealand, many elements of this story are intertwined with events in world history taking place over the same time period. World War II was considered around the world as the most important event in world history. Some of its legacies have been settled, such as the discrediting of fascism and Hitler. But other post-war legacies are still in play, among them the post-war decolonization movement that has left important (and often bitter) legacies for many non-Western peoples.

The rise of liberal democracy has brought freedom and better governance to the peoples of Western Europe and North America, but this has been experienced in more diverse and often negative ways by non-Western peoples (Liu, Li, & Yue, in press) because of the temporal coupling of the rise of political liberalism with colonization. The logic and necessity of these varying reactions to this “ideal state” of liberalism according to Western political theory (Fukuyama, 1992) are a fundamental assertion of the historical contingency premise of Liu and colleagues (see Hilton & Liu, 2008; Liu et al., in press). In China, for instance, an indigenous theory of benevolent authority has been used to justify Communist rule as the only source of protection from the predatory practices of foreign states that tried to dismember China from the 1840s to 1945 (Liu & Atsumi, 2008; Liu et al., in press).

In New Zealand, as we have seen, people use liberal democratic arguments about freedom and equality “in principle” that render indigenous peoples’ claims for resources and group recognition as illegitimate: they are prejudiced against these claims in the broadest sense, not as racists, but as people whose cultural lenses are blind to the suffering that progress for Western peoples inflicted on non-Western peoples during the colonial era (see Walker, 1990). As recent qualitative work by Rata, Liu, and Hanke (2008) has shown, Maori people do not narrate colonial injustices as things of the past, but as part of an ongoing legacy of oppression and cultural dispossession. Biculturalism, in narrating New Zealand national identity as

a partnership between Maori and the Crown (representing all other New Zealanders but mainly New Zealand Europeans or Pakeha), offers an alternative to liberal democracy's ideal of one person, one vote and equality in principle translating into inequality in fact. According to a bicultural narrative, the past continues to be manifest in the present through post-colonial structures of inequality, discourses that justify these inequalities, and institutions that maintain social injustice for indigenous people. A bicultural theory of nation for New Zealand would not only strive to correct these injustices, but put forward a state where Maori people are considered partners not only symbolically, but in the administration of the realistic resources of the state. This is a continuing project that will not be solved easily: it links the action orientation of Asian social psychology (Atsumi, 2007; Liu & Ng, 2007) to a psychology of liberation (Martín-Baró, 1996) that moves beyond representation and culminates in our fourth and final step, action. This step is rarely taken in mainstream psychology, but is logical, given the degree of social injustice in the world and the constructivist epistemology that symbolic and representational theories espouse.

Step Four: Beyond Representations to Action: Ethics of Research as Good Social Practice

Following Filipino indigenous psychologist Enriquez (1992), and Latin American liberation psychologist Martín-Baró (1996), Liu, Ng, Gastardo-Conaco, and Wong (2008) asserted that one domain where China and other developing countries in Asia may be able to equal or surpass the West is to employ a globally distributed form of action research to produce "psychological knowledge that is socially situated to produce direct benefits to *all* involved in its system of knowledge production" (p. 1165) – particularly students and local communities. This is because psychologists in the developing world, while often lacking in material resources, also have more freedom to think (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001) and act (Liu & Liu, 1999, 2003) in holistically interconnected ways than their developed world counterparts who are locked into institutions that demand that they publish or perish. According to Liu et al. (2008), developing countries will be driven by political and economic necessities caused by the end of cheap oil and climate change to develop working social sciences that contribute to community well-being because they do not have the surplus value to afford the purely epistemic social sciences characteristic of developed countries (see Atsumi, 2007). They proposed a globally interconnected psychology where grants from developed countries are used to fund collaborative projects with colleagues and students in developing countries that both serve knowledge production needs in first-world communities and produce direct societal benefits in third-world communities.

In New Zealand, Maori intellectuals have argued that social scientists working in Maori communities should be accountable to them as a basic ethical requirement (Smith, 1999). The legal contract protecting participants and the institution typical

of Western research ethics is not acceptable for a community that has been treated as an object of research, while rarely receiving any benefits from it. In tune with this new awareness of the necessity of redress for historical inequality, in New Zealand the only one of seven national centers of research excellence in the area of social sciences is the National Institute of Research Excellence in Maori Development and Education (<http://www.maramatanga.co.nz/>). Because lower levels of educational achievement have been identified as a causal factor related to negative social indicators for Maori, the center is devoted to fostering Maori postgraduate achievement as the major pathway toward research excellence, that is, producing social and human capital as a primary mission, and epistemological knowledge is a desirable by-product of this basic social good.

On a smaller scale, the research cited previously has been used in practice to support academic achievement for Maori and the development of indigenous psychology in Victoria University of Wellington's School of Psychology. Tutorials tailored to the needs of Maori students were begun five years ago in response to unacceptably high failure rates for first-year Maori students in psychology. The lessons from research were used to present the tutorials not as preferential treatment, but as equitable treatment to raise Maori pass rates to be equal to that of students from other ethnic groups. Non-Maori are not excluded from these tutorials, but the overall atmosphere and space is such that Maori cultural practices are the norm rather than New Zealand European practices. A *kaiawhina tauira* (senior Maori tutor) position was established to support academic achievement for Maori undergraduates, and in time, a cohort of Maori postgraduates has emerged, opening the door for a more truly bicultural psychology to emerge, with Maori researchers (e.g., Rata et al. 2008) strong in indigenous psychology engaging in dialogue with Pakeha (e.g., Sibley, Liu, & Khan, 2008). The indigenous psychology research group at Victoria University is currently engaged in developing research papers and modules for teaching the ethics of working with Maori, where accountability and long-term investment in community-based relationships are key features. Rather than describing representations, the group is in the business of creating alternative representations based on Maori culture and the inequities surrounding it that are a colonial legacy of New Zealand culture.

A bridging sequence of dialogues between indigenous, bicultural, and mainstream psychology is envisaged as a theory of practice to allow multiple agendas to be fulfilled. Ultimately, peace psychology cannot support hegemonic, uniform practices across different groups and societies with different needs: the step from representational theory to a theory of situated and historically contingent practice is central to transforming research from narrative epistemic to narrative design sciences (Atsumi, 2007).

Conclusion

This chapter traced the development of a general theoretical perspective operationalizing social representations of history in national cultures as tools to unpack culture-specific/historically contingent versus universal aspects of conflict and

peacemaking. The research emphasized that New Zealand national identity is constructed out of a symbolic repertoire – including the Treaty of Waitangi and Liberal Democracy – rooted in historical perceptions. We argued that the ways in which history is (re-)presented in New Zealand serves an important ideological-justificatory function in both creating and maintaining inequality and providing the levers to attempt societal change. This conclusion has emerged from a synthesis of studies that yield a four-step framework: (Step 1) ascertaining the symbolic landscape of history, (Step 2) describing discursive repertoires in dialogue with historical symbols, (Step 3) operationalizing historical representations as legitimizing myths or group-based ideologies, and (Step 4) going beyond representations to social action. The key promise of such research is not the description of psychological processes that maintain or justify social systems, though this is necessary to understand the logic of how the society functions. Instead, we challenge both ourselves and others to take the fourth step and translate such research in action within the wider community. This can be achieved through multiple intertwined pathways, both by doing research that provides insight into the mechanisms and interventions that promote social change and by doing action research that functions, in its own right, as an instrument of social change.

Atsumi (2007) refers to this as “flying with fraternal wings” of both scientifically sound and socially responsible research. Key benefits are to be found for both the social science and the social practice of peace psychology through the processes described here. On the social science side, for example, the work on discourse and historical representations in New Zealand has revealed that Moscovici’s (1998) taxonomy of different types of representations being hegemonic, emancipated, and polemical fails in describing intergroup relations. All groups in New Zealand consider the Treaty of Waitangi to be a central event of symbolic importance in New Zealand history, and all groups carry a narrative of New Zealand history involving interactions between indigenous (Maori) people and Europeans. This would appear to make the treaty a hegemonic representation, as Liu et al. (1999) tentatively proposed. However, subsequent research revealed that while all groups share this content, people differ in how they position this history in terms of contemporary relevance: those opposed to historical redress position the past as irrelevant to the present, whereas those in favor of historical redress position the present as embedded in structures produced by past injustices (Sibley et al., 2008). Much debate in New Zealand around issues like racism and ethnic diversity flows through the treaty and the relationship between Maori and the Crown (government), but different political agenda take the raw materials of history and configure them in a bicultural narrative that favors historical redress or a liberal democratic narrative that focuses on individual-level equity and the politics of the here and now (Liu, 2005). For social representations theory, the take-home message is that in democratic societies, representations are intimately connected to societal discourses that in the political domain allow precious few symbols to operate in a “hegemonic” manner.

For social identity theory, this work shows how phenomena such as in-group favoritism that appear to be ubiquitous in laboratory settings become contingent on culture and shared knowledge in society once these are freed up to act as causal

factors. More fundamentally, it suggests that the particular category system that is most salient in a country is based on historical experience, so the focus on race in the United States is a function of its history of the enslavement of Africans and the attempted elimination of Native Americans and their culture (Churchill, 1997; Mann, 2005); for these political agenda, a strong category system hardening ethnicity into race is politically expedient. A similar process of colonization without the additional burden of slavery and without the same degree of violence directed against natives has led to the predominant use of categories based on ethnicity, cultural learning, and partnership rather than race in New Zealand. The content of national identity in the United States and New Zealand seems contingent on the ways that their peoples have created and then tried to resolve historical dilemma (Sibley & Liu, 2007).

For peace psychology, this means that the application of laboratory findings to real-world conflict should be exercised with great caution: symbolic representations form the ground for the conflict and peacemaking on which basic psychological models will stand or fall. The historical contingency premise of the symbolic theory of history and identity holds that history provides the symbol system or the meaningful content on which basic psychological processes operate. These symbolic representations are adaptations of a given people's experiences of the world through time, providing them with psychological repertoires to manage the perennial problems in their society and connecting them to the world. They can be designed to manage radically different contingencies depending on whether the people being studied were benefactors or victims of the colonizing processes emanating from the West over the last five centuries.

In terms of peace psychology in Asia, all Asian (and Pacific) peoples with the possible exception of Japan were on the victim side rather than the benefactor side of Western colonization. Japan suffered initially, with its national sovereignty compromised by American gunboat diplomacy in the 19th century, but adapted quickly during the Meiji restoration to bring in Western technology and bureaucratic systems to strengthen national unity. But in the Showa era that followed (see Atsumi, this volume), they also adapted Western nationalism and Western notions of racial superiority and inflicted them on other Asian peoples during the invasion of Korea, the Sino-Japanese Wars, and finally World War II. The narration of the common, then divergent, and perhaps once again common fates of the peoples of East Asia, who share so much culturally but have much recent history to divide them, is a crucial item on the agenda of peace psychology in Asia (Liu & Atsumi, 2008; Liu & Ng, 2007; see Liu & László, 2007 on narrative theory). The most important premise of symbolic theory of history and identity that affects this peacemaking process is the idea that while historical representations constrain the range of political action, political actions and political agenda equally may reconfigure narratives of the past. Because there are no serious realistic conflicts between them today, political elites in Japan and China could decide to take actions described in Liu and Atsumi (2008) and Atsumi and Suwa (this volume) to resolve the historical conflict between them and heal the wounds of the past (just as they have been healed in large part in

Western Europe). With “good” leadership, it can be political agenda that drives collective remembering, not vice versa (Paez & Liu, *in press*).

The separation of Taiwan from China as a consequence of the first Sino-Japanese War and its 50 years as first a Japanese colony and then an anti-Communist Chinese society in opposition to the mainland is another enduring legacy of history that peace psychology confronts. Taiwanese, like many other Asian people living under democratic rule, configure their narrative of history as a movement from external, authoritarian, and unjust rule to freedom and self-determination (Huang et al., 2004; Huang, *this volume*). Ironically, the mainland Chinese narrative of history follows a similar path that brings it into direct representational conflict with Taiwan. Gries (2004) notes that contemporary Chinese narratives of history focus on not only the greatness of its ancient civilization, but the extent of the unjust humiliations inflicted on China in recent centuries by Western societies and Japan. The alienation of Taiwan from China is seen as an open wound and an affront to national pride, and hence any discussion of national sovereignty for Taiwan is taboo in Beijing. This is one representational conflict where we do not see any immediate or forthcoming resolution, because current political agendas involving the two societies are mutually exclusive. Economic cooperation with tactful political avoidance may be the best that can be hoped for at present.

Finally, how the present weighs on the past can be seen in a negative direction as Khan and Sen’s chapter (*this volume*) illustrates. Hindutva, or Hindu nationalism for India, like Chinese forms of nationalism, tries to make sense of how a great civilization could have fallen on hard times in recent centuries, but unlike Chinese nationalism, it focuses more on romanticizing the past to capture the future. Khan and Sen (*this volume*) and Sen and Wagner (2005) show how the past can be romanticized and reconfigured in order to fulfill the political agenda of an emerging political party. As secularism and liberal democracy failed to bring sufficient benefits to broad masses of Indian people, they have looked to their own history and culture for alternatives: unfortunately, Hindutva excludes the largest religious minority (Muslims) from participation in such a national identity, leading to considerable tensions. The malleability of the past, especially the semi-mythological past of ancient history, is an important lesson for peace psychology that can be carried to other settings like the former Yugoslavia, where a representation of Kosovo as the “field of black-birds,” a centuries-old battle between Muslims and Christians, was used to justify crimes against humanity by Serbian leaders. In both these cases, demagogic historical narratives demonizing a minority were used successfully by political leaders to win votes. Democracy is apparently no antidote for the use of historical narratives to mobilize sectarian conflict.

Muluk’s (*this volume*) account of the settling of a smaller scale injustice in Indonesia underscores the same premise that the collective remembering of the past can be shaped according to the political agenda of the present, this time in the direction of peace rather than conflict. Social activists accepted monetary compensation from their former army persecutors and revised their historical accounts of grievance in order to move forward with their lives and not engage in perpetual conflict with

a segment of Indonesian society (the military) that is very difficult to overcome or inflict punitive damage upon.

As all these examples illustrate, the development of a symbolic theory of history and identity offers rich possibilities for intergroup relations and peace psychology. In Asia in particular, where issues of culture stand at the center of psychology, and where Asian peoples share a legacy of historically contingent reactions to Western colonization, analysis of the intermediate layer of representations and the institutions that maintain them are essential to the development of better forms of teaching, politics, and research practice that create new representations and improved intergroup relations.

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