INTRODUCTION

Two Crises: 1709 and 1853

This book is about the reformulation of the French state during a critical century and a half of wars, famines, and revolutions. It takes as its theme the persistent problem of *subsistances* – the maintenance of the grain supply. The problem of the grain supply was a perpetual concern of townsfolk in early modern France. At the slightest rumor of failure, crowds in cities and towns would assail farmers as they brought sacks of grain to market, break into bakeries, and harass any visible representatives of public authority. In the countryside, too, such rumors halted the flow of grain, as rural consumers dissuaded producers, carters, or boatmen from moving cereals to urban markets, or even confiscated grain from barns or granaries. When supplies appeared to be short, officials grew edgy all over the country. The king, his ministers, his intendants, and greater and lesser law courts would struggle to keep order and to ensure that a minimum of grain and bread got to the consumers.

There were many reasons for such behavior. In most years, the country could produce enough cereals to feed itself. But periodically there were significant shortages. These occurred often enough – once every fifteen or twenty years on average – and the consequences were so disastrous that the memory of unsavory deeds done at those moments by desperate consumers and greedy suppliers left their mark on people of almost all ranks of society. The result was an abiding conviction among most people that the food supply was too important to be left to individuals. When the great jurist and political philosopher Montesquieu wrote in 1748 that the state "owes all its citizens regular means of subsistence," he was expressing what all but a tiny minority of French people took to be a truism.[1]

The tale of the shift from this regime of fear, bumbling, and disorder to

[1] Charles de Secondat, Baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, in *Selected Political Writings*, trans. and ed., Melvin Richter (Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1976), p. 228.

the free flow of supplies in a liberal economy has often been told. The story has been cast most often in the mode of political mobilization – the coming of a free market in grain provoking confusion and misgivings among Old Regime rulers and ruled alike. Both consumers and elites lost their faith in the institutions of a monarchical regime that had abandoned its responsibilities to the poor. Those who starved blamed the Crown and its new policies; those whose wealth sheltered them from the worst lamented the turmoil and suffering the policies had wrought. When the monarchy vacillated and backed away from free trade in 1770, in 1778, and again in 1788, it confirmed the growing suspicion that neither the king nor his ministers knew what to do. The coming of the French Revolution could be found in the stumbling policies of the grain trade alone – political disarray, popular resistance to capitalism, and the deepening sense that no true solutions would emanate from the chambers of Versailles.

This model of political mobilization characterizes most historical work on the organization of the cereal trade in the last twenty-five years. It doubtless has its uses, both as a historical explanation and for bolstering contemporary ideology. But there is another thread in the story that is seldom mentioned – the recreation of the state's power in the face of anarchy. For on reflection, what is striking about the period is less the disruptive effect of food shortages on the French state in the Old Regime, the Revolution, and after than the forces that restored order. Its actors are neither rioters nor sansculottes, although they hover in the wings. Instead, the story concerns the determined officials who mobilized resources to maintain order. They knew that provisioning could not be abandoned to the vagaries of the market; they knew equally well that regulations drove merchants away. Through their efforts, the state stepped in to smooth pathways to cities, supplementing and sheltering commercial networks while subsidizing merchants, bakers, and buyers. In the midst of wars, shortages, and revolutions, the state consolidated and defined its powers.

This book is intended for those who have caught the urgency of the insistent calls for total free trade by the liberal economists of the 1750s and 1760s such as Quesnay and Turgot, and have realized the contradiction between free trade and the sansculottes' cries for price ceilings in the Revolution, but who have not paused to consider the meaning of carefully calculated bread price schedules or export duties tied to Parisian flour prices. It is also for those who can measure economic performance but would prefer to keep the government at some distance from their models.

The evolving relationship between the state and economy can be found in daily tasks – the incessant struggles over how to set and enforce bread prices; private meetings with landlords who refused to send grain to market; scribes filling out endless forms, sometimes misadding their columns; secret

government imports quietly sent to market; and mayors perched nervously on wagons, wrangling with crowds over the ownership of a single sack of grain. The broad picture that emerges is one of increasingly skillful state intervention in the economy through many decades of unrest, hunger, and war.

The book takes issue with the way our scholarly energies have been directed toward the question of what destroyed the state, whether during the Old Regime, the constitutional phase of the Revolution, the Terror, or the Directory. Within that historiography, provisioning crises hold an esteemed and dignified position. Whether or not Marie Antoinette ever dismissed the hungry with her famous admonition that they eat cake, the connection between shortages and violence is indisputable. Pushing such inquiries further, several generations of historians have used food riots to illuminate the poor's hostility to nascent capitalism. Their studies reveal the increasing politicization of provisioning in the waning years of the eighteenth century. An embittered working class was caught between low wages and rising food prices, their livelihoods further eroded by the liberal economic policies that effectively stripped them of the fragile security of guilds and paternalist policies.[2] In this framework, Marxist historians saw the nucleus of class warfare.[3] The equation seemed simple. Angry consumers in France not only seized grain wagons, they also marched a king to the guillotine and burst into the Convention demanding "bread or death."

Against this backdrop of working-class agitation, revisionist historians have postulated an alternative source for the attacks directed at the monar-

[2] E.P. Thompson's article gave the fullest articulation of the idea of food rioters' resistance to capitalism, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century," *Past and Present* 50 (1971): 76–136. See also Cynthia Bouton, *The Flour War: Gender, Class, and Community in Late Ancien Régime French Society* (University Park, PA, 1993); Olwen Hufton, "Social Conflict and Grain Supply in Eighteenth-Century France," *JIH* 14 (1983): 303–331; Georges Rudé, *The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular Disturbance in France and England 1738–1840* (New York, 1964); Guy Lemarchand, "Les troubles de subsistances dans la généralité de Rouen," *AHRF* 35 (October–December 1963): 401–27; C.-E. Labrousse, *Esquisse du mouvement des prix et des revenus en France au XVIIIe siècle*, 2 vols., *Collection scientifique d'économie politique* 3 (Paris, 1933). Some of these points about Old Regime worklife have been problematized recently. See Michael Sonenscher, *Work and Wages: Natural Law, Politics and the Eighteenth-Century French Trades* (Cambridge, 1989); David R. Weir, "Les crises économiques et les origines de la Révolution française," *AESC* 46 (1991): 917–47.

[3] Georges Lefebvre, *The French Revolution*, trans. Elizabeth Moss Evanson (London and New York, 1962–4); Albert Soboul, *The Sans-culottes: The Popular Movement and Revolutionary Government, 1793–1794*, trans. Remy Inglis Hall (Princeton, 1980); Claude Mazauric, *Babeuf et la conspiration pour l'égalité* (Paris, 1962); R.B. Rose, "18th-Century Price-Riots, the French Revolution and the Jacobin Maximum," *International Review of Social History*, 4 (1959): 438–9; and "The French Revolution and the Grain Supply," *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* 39 (1956–1957): 171–87.

chy. Their literature follows the pitched battles that destroyed absolutism ideologically. The origins of this scholarly tack are complex, but in short, this critique of the Marxist model scrutinized the actions and beliefs of the classes that *theoretically* drove the Revolution. Very quickly, the revisionists' research revealed that none of the historical actors stuck to the expected script. The Revolution was not led by a capitalist bourgeoisie intent on establishing free trade, but by lawyers and notables; section militants were not suitably proletarian, but perhaps opportunistic shopkeepers and neighborhood demagogues; landed elites, while shaken by the Revolution, consolidated their power in the early nineteenth century.[4] Having thus dashed the Marxist model, the revisionists developed political and cultural explanations for the monarchy's demise. Directing attention to ideological conflicts and the emergence of a public sphere in eighteenth-century France, these scholars charted absolutism's utter disintegration in the decades before 1789.[5] This literature now locates the impending breakdown of the Old Regime in the struggles between the Crown and its sovereign courts. Those contests escalated after the 1750s, and called each side's claims to legitimacy pointedly into question. By 1789, these battles had spilled out into a wider public. Impassioned journalists, lawyers, and novelists and their steadily expanding readership brought their indictments right up to the gates of Versailles. The king himself was corrupt and despotic and had betrayed the nation.

The post-revisionist model implies first that the monarchy was to blame for its own demise, or at least its own ideological destruction, and, second, that the Old Regime state was not only illegitimate, but ineffective. Perhaps as early as the mid-eighteenth century, these historians have argued, the Crown's cause was lost. It had ceded ground to its enemies by fighting the war on their terms. Each time the Crown invoked the public as its judge, it undermined even its most convincing assertions of authority. Every royal attempt to shore up absolutism, whether by disbanding parlements, by declaring partial bankruptcies, or by changing the rules of venal offices, gave credence to allegations that monarchy and despotism were one and the same. Such was the absolutist state of pamphlets, playwrights, and garrulous lawyers. It was grasping, confused and, ultimately, powerless and

[4] See especially William Doyle, *The Origins of the French Revolution*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1988).

[5] Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, Mass., 1989); *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture*, Keith Baker, Colin Lucas, and François Furet, eds., 4 vols. (Oxford, 1987–94); Furet, *Interpreting the French Revolution*, trans. Elborg Forster (Cambridge and Paris, 1985); Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture and Class in the French Revolution* (Berkeley, 1984); Sarah Maza, *Private Lives and Public Affairs: The Causes Célèbres of Prerevolutionary France* (Berkeley, 1993).

illegitimate. Long before the opening processions of the Estates General, the corridors of power were vacant.

Such courtroom fireworks and public invective no doubt created a stir at the time, and did indeed signal a real crisis of authority. But I argue that such accounts present only one vision of the state. There was another state to be found outside the opera houses, salons, and other venues of recent scholarship. It had other countenances beyond the grizzled ones presented in *causes célèbres* newsheets and Grub Street bestsellers. It was there on the ground in the late eighteenth century, intermittently emerged in skeletal form during the Revolution, and finally achieved coordination and effectiveness in the early nineteenth century.[6] It labored in the bureaus of intendancies, in town halls, and in subdelegates' cramped chambers. Venturing into bakeries and marketplaces, it distributed profits and losses.

This state was not rudderless. Instead, it was conscientious, determined to navigate the twists and turns of policy changes and harvest shortfalls. The windows of countless petty officials looked out on market squares and bakeries, and these men knew that, day in and day out, people had to eat and that their charge was to feed them. Each time the central government changed course, lifting or reimposing the controls on the grain trade, for instance, they took note, adapted, and returned to their task. At times, these market officials, subdelegates, mayors, and police lieutenants were helpless before desperate crowds. The means they had to combat harvest shortfalls, muddy roads, and grain owners' intransigence were often insufficient. By the end of the eighteenth century, these officials also had the failed promises of both liberal economic ideologies and the harsh controls of the Revolution to explain. Nonetheless, they did not give up.

While one could see in the food riots of the Old Regime and the Revolution one further sign of the ideological bankruptcy of the state, that would be to misunderstand fundamentally the process at hand. The state was not tottering – waiting to fall – nor was it lost in either 1789 or 1794. Those stormy moments were only waystations in a longer process of growing competence and authority. It is a mistake to see the Old Regime's policial and economic policies as simply an endless series of miscalculations. This book tells a different story. It outlines the process through which the state harnessed the grain trade and turned it to meet the needs of cities over the course of nearly two centuries. This was a vital and beneficial undertaking if there was to be any hope for political stability.

[6] See P.M. Jones's recent synthesis, which suggests that the monarchy and many of its ministers evinced enthusiasm for reform throughout the late Old Regime. *Reform and Revolution in France: The Politics of Transition, 1774–1791* (Cambridge, 1996), especially pp. 88–9.

A Longer Time Frame: 1700–1860

In order to make such a case, the problem of *subsistances* must be placed in a long time frame, showing how, in a century and a half, administrators moved from confusion to assurance. The extension of this study into the nineteenth century points to a second glaring problem with historiography – namely, the prevailing formulation of the period's chronology. To date, much of the work on the Revolution has centered on either its origins or its radicalization under the Jacobins. Even the few historians who have continued to examine the economy have generally accepted those boundaries and have stopped short in either 1789 or 1794.[7] There remains, however, the crucial issue of how the Revolution was resolved. How did the denouement of the Revolution shape the first half of the nineteenth century? Of Napoleonic battles and sanguinary exploits, we know much. Of the resolute struggles of early nineteenth-century administrators to create a viable state, we know very little.[8] By extending the framework beyond 1789 or 1794, the Revolution can be understood in part as but one episode in the gradual evolution of the French state and economy.

This story of the state's mastery of urban provisioning trades begins in the early eighteenth century. At that time, two needs defined policy – cities clamoring for affordable bread, and a royal treasury desperate for tax revenues. By the mid-eighteenth century, the Crown had been persuaded to embrace the emerging liberal ideology of free trade. It looked toward increasing crop yields as a source of steady receipts for its coffers. Pushed by Physiocratic reformers, the monarchy lifted controls on the grain trade

[7] Of course, an important problem here is that the Revolution interrupted many of the data series that would be helpful in carrying explorations across these political divides. See the proceedings of several conferences from the Revolutionary bicentennial. Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques, *La Révolution française et le monde rural, Actes du colloque tenu en Sorbonne les 23, 24 et 25 octobre 1987* (Paris, 1989); *La Révolution française et le développement du capitalisme, Actes du colloque de Lille, 19–21 novembre 1987, Revue du Nord*, special issue, no. 5, 1989, Gérard Gayot and Jean-Pierre Hirsch, eds.; *La pensée économique pendant la Révolution française, Actes du colloque international de Vizille (6–8 septembre 1989)*, G. Faccarello and Ph. Steiner, eds. (Grenoble, 1990); Ministère de l'économie, des finances et du budget, *Etat, finances et économie pendant la Révolution française, colloque tenu à Bercy les 12, 13, 14 octobre 1989* . . . (Paris, 1991).

[8] One of the few exceptions is Isser Woloch's broad study of the new civic order and institutions, although he does not cover the economy. Isser Woloch, *The New Regime: Transformations of the French Civic Order, 1789–1820s* (New York and London, 1994). A call by two of the foremost experts on the period for "an administrative history of the economy" has gone largely unanswered. Guy Thuillier and Jean Tulard, "Conclusion," in *Administration et contrôle de l'économie, 1800–1914*, Michel Bruguière and Jean Clinquart, et al., eds., *Publications de l'Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes*, V, *Hautes Etudes médiévales et modernes* 55 (Geneva, 1985), pp. 161–7.

three times between 1763 and 1789, and periodically allowed grain owners, anxious for profits, to export their grain. During these decades, however, agricultural production was sometimes insufficient to feed the kingdom, and each experiment gave way to high prices and riots. Growing restive and increasingly politicized, cities erupted during shortages, and the liberal policies brought no immediate agricultural breakthroughs.

Well into the nineteenth century, the pound or so of bread per day that most French consumers required remained a major component of their diet. As milling and commercial networks shifted, bread, not grain, became the commodity of contention. Thus, still greater animosities were generated whenever bakers were unable or unwilling to stock their shelves. Except in the most rural areas, most consumers bought bread, and so generally were more dependent on the provisioning trades than their Old Regime ancestors. Toiling many hours at looms and spinning wheels, they exchanged a few copper coins for loaves of wheaten bread, or asked the baker to extend them another week of credit. They frequented the grain market only in times of shortage, when they hoped to save a few centimes by purchasing their own grain and having it milled and baked. If the baker failed them, then, they had no alternatives that did not add time and effort to their already long days.[9] Given their increased reliance on bakeries and bread, it was critically important to ease the journey from field to mill and bakery.

The problem was not so much one of wholly inadequate harvests, but rather of sporadic shortages, whether regional or continent-wide. In the eighteenth century, poor harvests brought high prices in 1709–10, 1713, 1738–40, 1747, 1757, 1767–77, 1788–1790, 1792–3, and 1795–6. The deepest crises occurred in 1709, 1740, 1768, 1771, 1789, and 1795. The irregular occurrence of shortages lent a permanent feeling of uneasiness to French consumers. They could not predict when the next crop failures would happen, only that scarcity would inevitably strike. The seriousness of such failures undermined confidence and public order, and could not be ignored. Northern France and the Paris Basin witnessed steady increases in both production and productivity, although these were spaced unevenly, and shortages in one area could place heavy burdens on others.[10] Once authorities and merchants realized a harvest had been insufficient, delays

[9] Reply to the Ministry of Agriculture's 1853 survey, "Fabrication du Pain," 6 December 1853, Archives départementales de l'Eure (AD Eure) 6M 762.

[10] Philip T. Hoffman, *Growth in a Traditional Society: The French Countryside, 1450–1815* (Princeton, 1996). There is still intense debate over the timing and progress of agricultural change in France, although there is a growing consensus that areas near cities witnessed the earliest increases in productivity. See Michel Morineau, *Les faux-semblants d'un démarrage économique: agriculture et démographie en France au XVIIIe siècle*, *Cahiers des Annales* 30 (Paris, 1971); Jean-Marc Moriceau, "Au rendez-vous de la 'Révolution agricole' dans la France du XVIIIe siècle: A propos de la grande culture," *Annales HSS* 49

proved destabilizing. The weeks it took for merchants to send purchase orders to Amsterdam, Danzig, Liverpool, or Virginia, and the months that followed before the ships pulled into port, could spell disaster. Reliable crop yields, steady imports, and smooth transportation networks did not come on the scene until after 1860. Then, steam-powered farm equipment, railroads, and improved farming techniques ensured more stable harvests and their more even distribution. In addition, the wheat fields and railroads of the American Midwest after the Civil War provided essential emergency supplies.

Until these supplies were certain, shortages provoked outbursts in front of bakeries and handwringing in prefectural halls. When failures occurred, public authorities could not simply shrug their shoulders and counsel their *administrés* to wait for a better year. The situation had to be dealt with right then, supplies secured and distributed, and concerns confronted and allayed. The earnest attempts by local and national authorities to address these problems stirred tensions and misgivings throughout the late Old Regime, the Revolution, and into the nineteenth century when they finally yielded success.

Controller General Desmarets and the Shortages of 1709

Two episodes – the shortages of 1709 and 1853 – serve as the opening and closing scenes of this story. The contrast between the two reveals the confusion and impotence of the state in 1709 and its marked confidence and effectiveness in 1853. In 1709, the royal government's efforts to feed cities were scattershot, contradictory and, for the most part, counterproductive. In 1853, Paris escaped unscathed. This was no accident. Instead, it signalled the state's abilities to shape supply lines and ensure that grain was on hand well in advance of any shortages. Nearly two centuries of provisioning experiments had generated effective means to protect cities from the ravages of shortages.

A brief analysis of these two shortages helps to illustrate the nature of the changes underway. In 1709, no supplies were readily available. The Crown engaged in a long and nearly fruitless battle to dislodge grain from warehouses across the kingdom so that cities would not starve.[11] This

(January–February 1994): 27–63; George Grantham, "Agricultural Supply During the Industrial Revolution," *JEH* 49 (March 1989): 43–72.

[11] This account is drawn from the correspondence between the Controller General (CG) and the intendants regarding subsistence crises late in the reign of Louis XIV, found in Archives nationales (AN) G7 15–16. I am grateful to Elizabeth Nachison for calling it to my attention. See also *Correspondance des Contrôleurs Généraux avec les intendants des provinces . . .*, A.M. Boislisle and P. de Brotonne, eds., 3 vols. (Paris, 1897); Marcel Lachiver, *Les*

undertaking, often ad hoc and poorly coordinated, failed to offset the harvest shortfalls and the demands of war. At first, Controller General Desmarets was inclined to see if market forces themselves would solve the shortage. He hoped that high prices might induce owners to part with their wares. To avoid frightening the owners, officials were to use "less authority and more tact." Owners were to be exhorted – not ordered – to speed their sacks of grain to market.[12] To stretch scarce supplies, many cities prohibited the production of the finest white loaves. When that amalgam of efforts failed, the Crown, along with the Parlement of Paris, employed an escalating series of heavy-handed measures – grain censuses and confiscations, orders to provinces to release supplies for cities, and capital punishment for rioters and hoarders alike.[13]

Provincial magistrates and even some intendants fought those initiatives every step of the way by blocking rivers and roads and interfering with the Crown's attempt to prosecute the guilty.[14] Attacking the problems one by one, Louis XIV and Desmarets rebuffed these attempts to hold onto local supplies, and insisted that grain be allowed to move freely toward cities.[15] Many local authorities, along with members of the Parisian police, urged Louis to set price ceilings on grain. While the king wished to keep prices in

années de misère: La famine au temps du grand roi, 1680–1720 (Paris, 1991); and W. Gregory Monahan, *The Year of Sorrows: The Great Famine of 1709 in Lyon* (Columbus, Ohio, 1993).

[12] This was in line with late seventeenth-century policies. "Police pour le blé et le pain," 1665, Bibliothèque nationale (BN) Manuscrits français (Mf) 8127.

[13] There was some confusion about the jurisdiction and the chronology of a series of royal and parlementary measures, especially the Royal Declaration of 27 April 1709 ordering searches. This led to conflicts between intendants, parlements, and police officials. "Déclaration portant qu'il sera procédé à la visite des magasins . . . ," 27 April 1709, *Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises*, F.-A. Isambert, et al., eds., 29 vols. (Paris, 1822–33), 20: 539. See, for example, CG to M de Bernière, Procureur général du Parlement de Rouen, 28 June 1709; CG to Mssrs de Bonville, Pinon, de Sagonne, Trudaine, de Basville, Le Bret, Angervilliers and Turgot [de Tours], 25 March 1709; and CG to Mssrs d'Ormesson, Turgot de Tours, and de Haroüys, 22 April 1709, AN G7 15.

[14] Among the parlements and intendancies enacting measures to obstruct the royal will were those of Burgundy, Paris, Bordeaux, Toulouse, Orléans, and Rouen. CG to M de Haroüys, 16 May 1709; to M de Basille, 9 May 1709; to de Courson, 8 May 1709; to M de Sagonne, 28 June 1709; to d'Ormesson, 11 June and 2 July 1709, AN G7 15; CG to Bouchus, Premier Président of the Burgundy Parlement, 15 December 1708; to Pinon, 29 August 1708; to Bouville, 13 May 1709, AN G7 16; Boislisle, *Correspondance*, 3: pièce 559; Monahan, *Year of Sorrows*, pp. 56–7; Abbot Payson Usher, *The History of the Grain Trade in France* (Cambridge, Mass., 1913), p. 321.

[15] Trudaine to CG, 18 August [1708] CG to Mssrs d'Ormesson, Turgot de Tours, and de Haroüys, 22 April 1709; CG to M de Bernaye, 30 April 1709, AN G7 15, CG to Turgot d'Auvergne, 9 May [1709]; CG to M de Bouville, 13 May 1709, and CG to M de Colembercq, 15 May 1709, AN G7 16.

check, he worried that such limits would only drive merchants from the trade and make matters worse. It was acknowledged widely that similar controls clamped on barley by the Parlement of Paris had caused that grain to disappear from markets.[16] Yet pressure for more sweeping price controls continued unabated, and the monarch opened a brief kingdom-wide discussion with intendants and parlements on the merits of such measures. In the end, he decided against ceilings, but since he refused to make any formal pronouncement, the matter remained unsettled late into the summer of 1709.[17] Persuasion, threats, and controls aimed at merchants, bakers, local officials, and unruly crowds proved unreliable. Calm only appeared with the harvest at the end of the summer.

While the measures of 1709 were undeniably chaotic and ineffective, the crisis nonetheless articulated the main lines of later policies – price ceilings on grain were rejected in general, and the unimpeded transport of cereals to cities was to be protected. Because there were no stores of grain to be mobilized during shortages, the best Desmarets could do was to try to provision the cities after the crisis had been announced. To that end, he invoked laws protecting "*la liberté du commerce*." This was not the same as the *libre commerce* that would become so dear to the physiocrats of the mid-century, but was instead the *libre circulation* of Old Regime administrators intent on directing shipments to cities. It meant primarily the free flow of grain across local boundaries and secondarily and only occasionally some form of circumscribed freedom for grain owners to sell how, where, and for how much they wished. The vision of grain supplies moving easily across the kingdom, unopposed by provincial authorities or desperate crowds, occupied royal and urban reveries. Balancing the needs of the rural regions against those of the cities, Versailles and Paris placed their weight on the side of the latter.[18]

[16] The Paris Parlement probably had royal approval to impose the price controls, although the Crown specified that the parlement was acting under its own authority and that such matters fell within the traditional rights of those bodies. D'Ormesson to CG, 10 April 1709; CG to D'Ormesson, 16 April 1709; M de Bernaye to CG, 7 April 1709, and CG's reply [n.d.]; CG to the Procureurs généraux of the parlements, 6 May 1709; and CG, "Lettre circulaire," 8 July 1709, AN G7 15.

[17] CG, "Lettre circulaire," 8 July 1709; "Memoire," 28 July 1709; CG to Roujault, 8 June 1709, CG to Pinon, n.d. [ca. 7 June 1709], AN G7 15.

[18] In response to local attempts to curtail shipments leaving Burgundy in 1708, the Controller General ordered Intendant de Haroüys "to reestablish trade and the *liberté du transport* of wheat going to the Lyonnais" and later, to "let shipments for Lyons pass freely . . ." In Sens, Desmarets cautioned that "it would be an evil to prevent the *liberté* of that transport." Another less frequent expression, the *liberté des marchés*, generally meant a calm market environment, free of upheaval and riots, in which buyers and sellers bargain without interference. See the many letters that use these terms in AN G7 15 and 16.