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Propositions and Corollaries

Throughout, empirical propositions are in **bold**; corollaries are not. Both are in SMALL CAPS. Normative propositions (in **bold**) and corollaries (not bold) are *italicized*.

AN UNORGANIZED GROUP CANNOT OPTIMALLY SATISFY ITS SHARED OR COLLECTIVE INTERESTS. *page 27*

A GROUP CAN ONLY GET MEMBERS TO CONTRIBUTE TO SOLVE ITS SHARED PROBLEMS BY PROVIDING INCENTIVES INDEPENDENT OF THE PUBLIC GOOD. *page 27*

INDIVIDUALS DON'T HAVE AN INCENTIVE TO GIVE THEIR TRUE VALUATION OF A PUBLIC GOOD. *page 28*

FOR GROUPS OF PEOPLE TO MEET THEIR SHARED NEEDS OVER TIME THEY MUST HAVE THE FREEDOM TO ORGANIZE THEMSELVES POLITICALLY. *page 28*

THE LARGER THE GROUP, THE FURTHER FROM OPTIMAL WILL BE THE AMOUNT OF A PUBLIC GOOD WHICH AN UNORGANIZED GROUP WILL SUPPLY ITSELF. *page 29*

THE FURTHER FROM OPTIMAL THE GROUP IS WITHOUT ORGANIZATION, THE GREATER WOULD BE THE POTENTIAL PROFIT IN ORGANIZING THE GROUP TO SATISFY THEIR COMMON INTERESTS OR TO SUPPLY THEM WITH PUBLIC GOODS. *page 29*

POLITICS IS POTENTIALLY MORE PROFITABLE FOR POLITICAL LEADERS IN LARGER GROUPS. *page 29*

POLITICAL COMPETITION WILL BE STIFFER IN LARGER GROUPS. *page 29*

IN MOST COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS THERE WILL BE A BREAKEVEN POINT, SUCH THAT IF MORE THAN THE BREAKEVEN NUMBER OF PEOPLE CAN

BE ORGANIZED TO GIVE, THEY WILL FIND IT REASONABLE TO GIVE, EVEN THOUGH THEY HAD A DOMINANT STRATEGY TO NOT GIVE. *page 31*

POLITICAL LEADERS CAN USUALLY SUCCEED IN TURNING A COLLECTIVE ACTION DILEMMA INTO SOMETHING OF A COLLECTIVE SUCCESS BY ORGANIZING JUST A SUBGROUP OF INDIVIDUALS. *page 31*

WHEN PEOPLE CARE ABOUT THE FUTURE PAYOFFS FROM INTERACTIONS THAT ARE REPEATED, THERE IS SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER POTENTIAL FOR COOPERATION IN PROBLEMS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION. *page 37*

PEOPLE WHO ARE TRANSITORY MEMBERS OF GROUPS (SHORT TIMERS) ARE LESS LIKELY TO BEHAVE COOPERATIVELY TO SOLVE COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS. *page 37*

SOMETIMES POLITICAL LEADERS CAN SUCCEED BY TURNING A COLLECTIVE ACTION DILEMMA INTO AN ASSURANCE GAME, AND THEN BY ORGANIZING A SUFFICIENT SUBGROUP, GENERATING A BANDWAGON EFFECT IN THE GROUP AS A WHOLE. *page 44*

EFFECTIVE POLITICAL LEADERS ENGINEER SITUATIONS TO EXPAND THE RANGE OVER WHICH A CONTRIBUTION WILL MAKE A DIFFERENCE. *page 48*

EFFECTIVE POLITICAL LEADERS ENCOURAGE INDIVIDUALS TO BELIEVE THE PROBABILITY THAT THEIR CONTRIBUTION WILL MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE IS HIGH. *page 48*

INDIVIDUALS HAVE A DISCOUNTED INTEREST IN ACQUIRING INFORMATION ABOUT POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND WILL, IN GENERAL, REMAIN RATIONALLY IGNORANT REGARDING POLITICS. *page 50*

THE WEALTHY WILL BE BETTER POLITICALLY INFORMED THAN THE POOR. THEREFORE, WITHOUT MASS ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS UNIONS OR CLASS-BASED PARTIES, THE POOR, MORE OFTEN THAN THE WEALTHY, WILL MISIDENTIFY THEIR POLITICAL INTERESTS. *page 51*

DEMOCRACIES ARE NOT LIKELY TO HAVE MUCH BETTER FOREIGN POLICIES THAN NON-DEMOCRACIES; THE BENEFITS FROM DEMOCRACY WILL MAINLY BE IN THEIR IMPROVED DOMESTIC POLICIES. *page 51*

POLITICAL BEHAVIOR BY CITIZENS (ALTHOUGH NOT LEADERS) CAN BE EXPECTED TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY MORE AMORAL AND IRRESPONSIBLE THAN THEIR ECONOMIC AND PERSONAL BEHAVIOR. *page 52*

THE GREATER THE COSTS OF ACQUIRING INFORMATION FROM COMPETING SOURCES, THE LARGER WILL BE THE MORAL GAP BETWEEN POLITICAL AND PERSONAL BEHAVIOR. *page 52*

If common-pool resources that are vital to life are to be privatized, then programs are required to ensure the less fortunate economic security or access to these resources in times of shortages when prices are liable to rise. page 55

A SMALL GROUP OF INTENSELY MOTIVATED INDIVIDUALS IS FAR MORE LIKELY TO TAKE ACTION TO ACHIEVE A SHARED GOAL THAN IS A LARGE GROUP OF INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE EACH NOT VERY SERIOUSLY AFFECTED BY THE OUTCOME. *page 56*

TURNOUT WILL BE HIGHER IN ELECTIONS THAT APPEAR TO BE CLOSER AND WHERE THE STAKES ARE LARGER. *page 59*

TURNOUT WILL GO DOWN WHEN VOTING BECOMES MORE INCONVENIENT OR MORE COSTLY. *page 59*

WITH SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCES IN ONE DIMENSION, THE EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOME OF A MAJORITY RULE, PAIRWISE VOTE WILL BE THE MOST PREFERRED (OR IDEAL) POINT OF THE MEDIAN VOTER. *page 68*

WITH SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCES IN ONE DIMENSION, AND PAIRWISE MAJORITY RULE, THE MEDIAN VOTER'S MOST PREFERRED (OR IDEAL) POINT WILL BE THE CORE. *page 69*

THE ALTERNATIVE CLOSER TO THE MEDIAN WILL ALWAYS WIN IN PAIRWISE MAJORITY RULE. *page 69*

MAJORITY RULE, WHEN ALL VOTERS HAVE SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCES, DELIVERS PARETIAN, OR OPTIMAL, RESULTS. *page 70*

IN SIMPLE TWO-PARTY ELECTIONS, CANDIDATES WILL HAVE A STRONG TENDENCY TO ADOPT A POSITION NEAR THAT OF THE MEDIAN VOTER. *page 71*

IN PRIMARIES THERE WILL BE A TENDENCY FOR THE COMPETITORS TO ADOPT POSITIONS NEAR THE MIDDLE OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THEIR OWN PARTY'S VOTERS. GIVEN CONSISTENCY AND CREDIBILITY REQUIREMENTS, THERE MAY BE LIMITED ROOM TO MOVE AWAY FROM THAT POSITION TOWARD THAT OF THE MEDIAN VOTER. *page 71*

IF THERE ARE ONLY TWO PARTIES IN AN ELECTION, AND BOTH TAKE AN UNAMBIGUOUS STAND ABOUT THE ISSUES OF THE DAY, THE PARTIES MAY EACH BE REPRESENTED BY A SINGLE POINT IN SOME LARGER (MULTIDIMENSIONAL) SPACE. VOTERS CAN BE EXPECTED TO SUPPORT THE PARTY WITH THE POSITION CLOSEST TO THEM. *page 73*

WHEN THERE IS A BICAMERAL LEGISLATURE AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF VOTERS VARIES BETWEEN THE CHAMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE, THEN WHICH CHAMBER DECIDES FIRST MAY DETERMINE WHETHER THE STATUS QUO WILL PREVAIL, AS WELL AS WHAT CAN REPLACE IT. *page 76*

INTRODUCING CHECKS AND BALANCES RESTRICTS THE RESPONSIVENESS OF THE SYSTEM TO THE NEEDS, WELFARE, AND PREFERENCES OF THE MEDIAN VOTER. *page 79*

WHEN ISSUES ARE MULTIDIMENSIONAL, MAJORITY RULE CAN LEAD TO RESULTS THAT ARE NOT PARETO OPTIMAL. *page 83*

IN GENERAL, WITH SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCES IN MORE THAN ONE DIMENSION THERE IS NO POINT THAT WILL BE IN EQUILIBRIUM WITH THE USE OF MAJORITY RULE. *page 84*

IN MULTIDIMENSIONAL SITUATIONS AND USING MAJORITY RULE, PREFERENCES ARE LIKELY TO SUPPORT VOTING CYCLES. *page 85*

IN GENERAL, WITH SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCES IN MORE THAN ONE DIMENSION AND THE USE OF MAJORITY RULE, THERE IS NO POINT THAT WILL BE IN THE CORE: THE CORE WILL BE EMPTY. *page 85*

WITH A SET OF ALTERNATIVES THAT ARE IN MORE THAN ONE DIMENSION, MAJORITY RULE CAN LEAD A GROUP TO CHOOSE OUTCOMES THAT ARE ANYWHERE IN THE ALTERNATIVE SPACE. *page 86*

WITH MAJORITY RULE, ANY SUBOPTIMAL OUTCOME IS LIKELY TO BE REPLACED BY ONE THAT IS CLOSER TO THE PARETO SET AND, HENCE, PREFERRED BY ALL. *page 86*

SPECIAL MAJORITY RULES CAN HELP STABILIZE GAINS THAT GROUPS CAN ACHIEVE IN THE MAKING OF BINDING DECISIONS WITH DEMOCRATIC RULES. *page 87*

IN GENERAL WHEN THE PLACEMENT OF “BADS” ARE THE SUBJECT OF COLLECTIVE DECISIONS, PLACEMENT WILL BE FAR FROM THE PHYSICAL LOCATION OF THE PREDOMINANT CLUSTER OF VOTERS. IF THERE IS NO SUCH CLUSTER, IT WILL STILL BE PLACED AT OR NEAR THE EDGE OF THE POSSIBLE SPACE. *page 89*

DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES AMONG PROFESSIONAL POLITICIANS LEAD TO OUTCOMES IN PREDICTABLE RANGES EVEN IF THEY CANNOT BE SPECIFIED MORE EXACTLY. WITH WIDE LATITUDE OF ARRANGEMENTS THESE RANGES TEND TO THE CENTER OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE VOTER’S IDEAL POINTS AND CAN BE EXPECTED TO BE WITHIN THE UNCOVERED SET. *page 92*

WHEN WE FACE EXTERNALITIES, ONLY WHEN A PARETIAN BARGAIN IS IN EQUILIBRIUM CAN WE EXPECT INDIVIDUAL RATIONAL BEHAVIORAL OUTCOMES TO GENERATE OPTIMALITY. *page 102*

FACED WITH EXTERNALITIES, GOVERNMENTAL ACTION IS AS LIKELY TO BE NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE GOOD SOCIAL OUTCOMES AS NOT. *page 102*

IN MOST PUBLIC GOOD SITUATIONS THE SUPPLIER IS A NATURAL MONOPOLIST. *page 103*

COMPETITION AMONG WOULD-BE SUPPLIERS OF PUBLIC GOODS IS ABOUT REPLACEMENT RATHER THAN MARKET SHARE. *page 103*

The first requirement of any decent political system is to ensure political succession not be contested in a manner that jeopardizes the welfare of the general population. page 103

NON-DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT BY SELF-INTERESTED RULERS CAN LEAD TO A PROSPEROUS CITIZENRY. FOR CIVILIZATION TO THRIVE, DEMOCRACY IS NOT NECESSARY BUT GOVERNMENT MUST HAVE AN INCENTIVE FOR THE POPULATION TO THRIVE. *page 104*

INCREASED COSTS OF A NON-DEMOCRATIC RULER’S COALITION INCREASES THE RULER’S RAPACIOUSNESS AND HURTS THE WELL-BEING OF THE CITIZENS. *page 105*

THE LARGER THE DEMOCRATIC (MAJORITARIAN) COALITION THAT RULES, THE MORE THEIR INCENTIVES WILL COINCIDE WITH THOSE OF THE CITIZENRY. *page 105*

BETTER OUTCOMES FOR BENEFICIARIES REQUIRE THAT THEIR INTERESTS IMPACT THE REWARD STREAM OF AGENTS. *page 108*

INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN TO INCREASE COMMITMENT TO POLICY DECISIONS IMPLIES A DECREASE IN POLITICAL RESPONSIVENESS. *page 109*

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WHEN INDIVIDUALS HAVE RIGHTS AND WHEN THEIR BEHAVIOR IS OF GREATER IMPORTANCE TO OTHERS THAN TO THEMSELVES, AND THEIR PREFERENCES ARE IN CONFLICT, PARETO OPTIMALITY MAY BE SACRIFICED. *page 115*

WHEN THE GOVERNMENTAL BOUNDARIES DON’T MATCH THE BOUNDARIES OF THE BENEFIT GROUP FOR THE PUBLIC GOODS BEING SUPPLIED, ONE CAN EXPECT A PARETO SUBOPTIMAL OUTCOME. *page 118*

ALLOWING SUBGROUPS OF BENEFICIARIES TO SET UP A LOCAL AUTHORITY TO IMPROVE THE DELIVERY OF PUBLIC GOODS FOR THEMSELVES WILL USUALLY HAVE REDISTRIBUTIVE CONSEQUENCES THAT CONFLICT WITH NOTIONS OF FAIRNESS. *page 119*

COMPULSORY VOTING LEADS TO LESS POLARIZATION OF PLATFORMS. *page 121*

Compulsory voting leads to platforms that, as a set, better reflect the values of the population as a whole. page 121

Any acceptable conception of social well-being requires that individuals’ welfare be comparable. page 129

No one, in general, is in a better position than the individual to gain direct knowledge of what is good for herself based on observation, discussion, consultation, and inward reflection. page 132

In a democracy the social good is inextricably wound up with the well-being of the citizenry. page 132

Individual welfare is given an implicit moral status in democracies: it is good. page 133

WITHOUT INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS, WE WILL BE UNABLE TO DO MORE THAN SEEK PARETO OPTIMALITY WHEN DECIDING WHAT IS BETTER FOR THE GROUP. *page 137*

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Definitions

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<i>other-regarding</i>	15
<i>self-interest</i>	15
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