

Contents

<i>List of Figures</i>	<i>page</i> ix
<i>List of Tables</i>	xi
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xiii
1 One Problem Shared by 50 Governors	1
2 The Roots of Executive Power	26
3 What Do Governors Propose?	74
4 Gubernatorial Success	103
5 Do Governors Set the Size of Government?	135
6 The Power and Perils of Popularity	157
7 The Item Veto: A Negative or a Positive Power?	188
8 Legislative Professionalism and Gubernatorial Power	219
9 Governors and the Comparative Study of Chief Executives	250
<i>References</i>	261
<i>Index</i>	273

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Table of Contents
[More information](#)

List of Figures

2.1	Predictions for two hypothetical governors when the branches want to move existing policy in opposite directions	<i>page 47</i>
2.2	Policy game in extensive form with definitions of variables	68
2.3	Predictions for two hypothetical governors, when the governor favors a more extreme departure from the status quo than the legislature does	70
3.1	Sampled states	77
3.2	Governors' proposals by issue area and year	82
3.3	Share of liberal policy proposals	95
4.1	Batting averages by year and governor	109
4.2	Impact scores by year and governor	112
6.1	Approval ratings of governors before and after Hurricane Katrina	162
6.2	Approval ratings of governors before and after the "coingate" scandal	166
6.3	Governors' overall batting averages before and after Hurricane Katrina	167
6.4	Governors' overall batting averages before and after the "coingate" scandal	167
6.5	Changes in governors' agendas before and after Hurricane Katrina	175
6.6	Governors' policy impact scores before and after Hurricane Katrina	182
7.1	How matching makes cases more comparable	205

x	<i>List of Figures</i>	
7.2	Case study: Success of State of the State proposals before and after Iowa’s court decision	212
7.3	Case study: Changes to governors’ proposed level of spending before and after Iowa’s court decision	213
8.1	California budget delays before and after professionalization	225

List of Tables

2.1	Predicted effects on chances of success for a governor's proposal	<i>page 64</i>
3.1	Examples of policy and budgetary proposals from State of the State addresses	78
3.2	Features of gubernatorial agendas by party	92
3.3	Governors' legislative agendas (2001 and 2006)	99
3.4	Partisan change and ideological change (2001–6)	100
3.5	Voter liberalness and the ideological orientation of gubernatorial agendas	101
4.1	Predicted probabilities of gubernatorial success	131
4.2	Determinants of gubernatorial bargaining success	133
4.3	Determinants of gubernatorial legislative success	133
5.1	Legislative professionalization and gubernatorial bargaining success	147
5.2	Governors' budgetary proposals, fiscal years 1989–2009	154
5.3	Determinants of gubernatorial success, fiscal years 1989–2009	155
5.4	Gubernatorial budget requests and enactments, fiscal years 1989–2009	156
7.1	Predicted effects of the item veto by political condition	199
7.2	The item veto and state per capita spending changes, fiscal years 1989–2009	217

xii	<i>List of Tables</i>	
7.3	The item veto and gubernatorial bargaining success, fiscal years 1989–2009	218
8.1	Success of California governors before and after legislative professionalization	244
8.2	Agendas and success of the governors used in the California case study	249
9.1	Summarizing the powers of American governors	252
9.2	Comparing the success rates of chief executives’ legislative agendas	257