

A Game Theory Analysis of Options

Corporate Finance and Financial Intermediation in Continuous Time

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Table of Contents

1	Methodological Issues	1
1.1	Introduction	1
1.2	Game Theory Basics: Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection	2
1.3	Option Pricing Basics: The General Contingent Claim Equation	5
1.4	The Method of Game Theory Analysis of Options	7
1.5	When is the Method Appropriate?	8
1.5.1	The Link Between Option Value and Expected Utility	9
1.5.2	When Will the Option's Value be Correct?	9
1.6	What Kind of Problems is the Method Particularly Suited for?	10
1.7	An Example: Determining the Price of a Perpetual Put Option	11
1.7.1	Step 1: Structure of the Game	11
1.7.2	Step 2: Valuing the Option for a Given Exercise Strategy	12
1.7.3	Step 3: Solving the Game	13
1.7.4	The Solution	15
1.8	Outline of the Book	16
2	Credit and Collateral	19
2.1	Introduction	19
2.2	The Risk-Shifting Problem	20
2.2.1	The Model	21
2.2.2	Profit-Sharing Contracts Between Lender and Borrower	22
2.2.3	Developing an Incentive Contract	23
2.2.4	Renegotiation-Proof Incentive Contracts	26
2.2.5	The Feasible Renegotiation-Proof Incentive Contract	28
2.2.6	The Financing Decision	29
2.2.7	The Effect of Payouts	29
2.3	The Observability Problem	31
2.3.1	Costly State Verification	31
2.3.2	Collateral	32
2.4	Conclusion	36

3	Endogenous Bankruptcy and Capital Structure	39
3.1	Introduction	39
3.2	The Model	41
3.3	The Value of the Firm and its Securities	43
3.3.1	The Value of Debt	43
3.3.2	The Value of the Firm	45
3.3.3	The Value of Equity	47
3.4	The Effect of Capital Structure on the Firm's Bankruptcy Decision	48
3.4.1	The Equity Holders' Optimal Bankruptcy Choice	48
3.4.2	The Principal-Agent Problem of Endogenous Bankruptcy	49
3.4.3	Measuring the Agency Cost of Debt Arising from Endogenous Bankruptcy	52
3.5	The Investment Decision	53
3.5.1	Underinvestment	53
3.5.2	Risk-Shifting	55
3.5.3	Measuring the Agency Cost of Debt Arising from Risk-Shifting	57
3.5.4	The Incentive Effects of Loan Covenants	58
3.6	The Financing Decision	59
3.6.1	Optimal Capital Structure	59
3.6.2	Interest Payments vs. Increase in the Face Value of Debt	62
3.6.3	Equilibrium on the Credit Market	64
3.6.4	Capital Structure and the Expected Life of Companies	66
3.7	An Incentive Contract	68
3.7.1	Impact of the Effective Interest Rate	69
3.7.2	Impact of the Rate of Growth in Debt	70
3.8	The Impact of Payouts	71
3.8.1	The Value of the Firm and its Securities	71
3.8.2	The Bankruptcy Decision	72
3.8.3	The Effect of the Payout Rate on Equity Value	73
3.8.4	Effect of a Loan Covenant on the Optimal Payout Rate	74
3.9	Conclusion	75
4	Junior Debt	77
4.1	Introduction	77
4.2	The Model	78
4.3	The Value of the Firm and its Securities	80
4.3.1	The Value of Senior Debt	80
4.3.2	The Value of Junior Debt	82
4.3.3	The Value of the Firm	84
4.3.4	The Value of Equity	85
4.4	The Equity Holders' Optimal Bankruptcy Choice	89

4.5	The Firm's Decision to Issue Junior Debt	91
4.6	The Influence of Junior Debt on the Value of Senior Debt ...	96
4.6.1	On the Impossibility of Perfect Immunization	96
4.6.2	On the Impossibility of Immunization Against Negative Wealth Effects	97
4.7	Conclusion	98
5	Bank Runs	101
5.1	Introduction	101
5.2	The Model	102
5.3	The Depositors' Run Decision	104
5.4	Valuing the Bank's Equity	106
5.5	The Shareholders' Recapitalization Decision	109
5.6	The Bank's Investment Incentives when Bank Runs are Possible	111
5.7	The Bank's Funding Decision	115
5.7.1	On the Feasibility of Viable Financial Intermediation .	115
5.7.2	Optimal Bank Capital when Asset Risk is Positive....	116
5.7.3	Optimal Bank Capital with Zero Asset Risk	120
5.8	Determining the Equilibrium Deposit Spread.....	120
5.9	Conclusion	121
6	Deposit Insurance	123
6.1	Introduction	123
6.2	The Model	124
6.3	Valuing Deposit Insurance, Bank Equity and Social Welfare..	126
6.3.1	The Cost of the Deposit Insurance Guarantee	126
6.3.2	The Value of Bank Equity	127
6.3.3	The Value of Social Welfare.....	128
6.4	The Guarantor's Liquidation Strategy and Social Welfare....	129
6.4.1	Minimizing the Cost of the Guarantee	129
6.4.2	Maximizing Social Welfare.....	130
6.4.3	Can Deposit Insurance Enhance Social Welfare?.....	130
6.5	The Incentive Effects of Deposit Insurance	133
6.5.1	The Investment Decision	133
6.5.2	The Financing Decision	136
6.6	The Impact of Deposit Insurance on the Equilibrium Deposit Spread	137
6.7	Deposit Insurance with Liquidation Delays	138
6.8	Deposit Insurance with Unobservable Asset Value	140
6.8.1	A First Approach: Extending the Model of Chapter 3 .	141
6.8.2	Merton's Solution	146
6.9	Conclusion	152
7	Summary and Conclusion	155

References 161

List of Figures 167

List of Symbols 169