

Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-06909-0 - Economic Behavior within Organizations Stephen A. Hoenack Table of Contents More information

Contents

	Pre	face	page xi
1	Introduction		1
	Α	Overview of the theory and core definitions	2
	В	Three analytical points and progress in connection with them	10
2	Definitions and determinants of employees' discretion		16
	A	er an organization's resources and production An organization's production functions, its production domains, and its employees' discretion	10
		over resource substitutions	16
	В	Information about production domains	24
3	Em	iployees' resource diversions and employers'	
		position of resource responsibility	34
	Α	Employees' resource diversions	34
	В	Types of resource responsibility	40
	С	The determination of cash salaries under overall value and specific responsibility and the supply of	
		labor to the organization	59
	D.	Issues affecting the employer's optimal choices in	
		imposing resource responsibility constraints	61
4	Sh	ort-run resource allocation under fixed budgets	68
	Α	Resource allocation with a fixed budget and no	
		spillovers under overall value responsiblity	69
	В	Resource allocation with a fixed budget and no	
		spillovers under specific responsibility	80
	\mathbf{C}	The coordination of employees' actions in relation	
		to internal technological spillovers under each type	
		of responsibility	100
	D	Summary of demands for information and	
		implications for the dispersion of information	• • • •
		within the organization	108

vii



Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-06909-0 - Economic Behavior within Organizations Stephen A. Hoenack Table of Contents More information

	~
V111	Contents

5	Short-run resource allocation in response to demand: the cases of an employee, a private corporation, and a		
	private nonprofit organization A Costs to the employer and to the employee employee's delivered output and simplifying		
	assumptions about these costs	113	
	B Short-run resource allocation when an empression by a managing employee's deman		
	C Short-run price, income, and output of the corporation		
	D Short-run resource allocation of the private nonprofit organization		
6	Legislative demand and short-run price and or	itput of	
	the public organization	140	
	A Economic behavior within a legislature tha		
	underlies legislative demand	141	
	B Legislative demand as a function of price	155	
	C The legislature as the funding authority of	a public	
	organization and the public organization's	105	
	short-run price, income, and output	165	
7	Employees' investment behavior and implications for		
	suborganization	173	
	A Returns to employees and employers from		
	investments of the organization's resources	$\begin{array}{ccc} & & 174 \\ & & 178 \end{array}$	
	B The employee as an investorC The nature of investments to facilitate the	170	
	coordinated activities of employees	191	
	D A simplified analysis of price and output	131	
	determination under voluntary coordination	nn and	
	under delegation of authority	198	
	E A note on employees' investment behavior		
	multidivisional suborganization	202	
	F Employees' investments and external cons	tituencies 206	
	G The funding authority's responses to empl	loyees'	
	investment behavior	208	
8	Equilibrium behavior of public and private		
Ü	organizations in the first long run		
	A Funding limits on employees' resource div	ersions	
	in each type of organization	210	
	B Price, income, and output determination i		
	first long run	217	



Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-06909-0 - Economic Behavior within Organizations Stephen A. Hoenack Table of Contents More information

		Contents	ix
9	The demand and supply of nonmarket resource		
	allocation		230
	Α	Mergers and acquisitions of private corporations	231
	В	A legislature's choice of type of organization to	
		produce a subsidized good or service and	
		determination of the size of each public	
		organization	234
	C	Public capital financing of private corporations	238
	Ď	Public financing of private nonprofit organizations	240
	Ē	Summary of basic hypotheses about employees'	
	_	economic behavior in the second long run	241
	F	Comparative economic systems	243
10	A brief summary and proposed directions for further		
• 0	WO		248
	A	Some issues on possible contributions of positive	41 0
	2 k	theory to normative analysis	252
	В	Some possible data requirements for hypothesis	232
	D	testing	254
		testing	434
	No	tes	257
	Re	ferences	272
		re definitions	281
	Inc		284