

Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-10793-8 - Evidence and Assurance N. M. L. Nathan Table of Contents More information

Contents

In	troduction	J
I	The nature of radical assurance (1) Consequentially rational belief	8
	(2) Assurance of truth	16
	(3) Evidence and evidential assurance	22
	(4) Radical assurance	33
	(5) Self-evidence and intuitive assurance	42
2	The limits of radical assurance	50
	(1) Determinism	50
	(2) A disjunction about α-assurance	55
3	On wanting radical assurance	66
	(1) Desiderata for a belief-system	66
	(2) Sources of knowledge	72
	(a) Evidence and experience	74
	(b) Restatement of the argument	82
4	Infinite justificatory regression: some pseudo-solutions	89
	(1) Needing and wanting assurance	90
	(2) Self-justification and justification by experience	96
	(3) Foundationalism and coherence	100
	(4) Critical rationalism	108
5	Self-evidence and self-defeat	115
	(1) Verificationism and the idea of a predicate	117
	(2) Ostensive definition	I 22
	(3) Private languages	I 2 4
6	Induction	133
	(1) The autonomy of Humean scepticism	137
	(2) The feasibility of Humean scepticism	143
	(a) Moore's method	144
	(b) Overriding inductive evidence	148
	(3) A non-Humean inductive scepticism	151



Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-10793-8 - Evidence and Assurance N. M. L. Nathan Table of Contents More information

vi	Contents	
7	Moral scepticism	155
	(1) Anti-realism	156
	(2) Inferential justification	161
	(3) Deductive naturalism	166
8	On being without radical assurance	173
	(1) Wanting and believing	174
	(2) Other consolations	183
	Works cited	189
	Index	103