

Public Goods

Theories and Evidence

Bearbeitet von
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1. Auflage 2005. Buch. xvi, 422 S. Hardcover

ISBN 978 3 540 24174 4

Format (B x L): 15,5 x 23,5 cm

Gewicht: 1750 g

Wirtschaft > Wirtschaftspolitik, Öffentliche Wirtschaftsbereiche > Öffentliche
Finanzwirtschaft, Besteuerung

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