

# Public Goods

Theories and Evidence

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# Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1	A Classification .....	2
1.2	Summary of the Book .....	4
1.3	New Areas.....	8
1.4	A Last Word .....	8
<b>2</b>	<b>First-Best Public Provision of Pure Public Goods .....</b>	<b>9</b>
2.1	Efficient Provision of a Pure Public Good.....	10
2.1.1	Samuelson's Classic Rule for Providing a Pure Public Good .....	10
2.1.2	The Lindahl Financing Mechanism.....	13
2.1.3	The Free Rider Incentive Problem.....	14
2.2	Examples .....	17
2.2.1	A Static Model with Labor .....	17
2.2.2	Heterogeneity.....	18
2.2.3	A Simple Dynamic Model.....	19
2.2.4	Public Goods in an Overlapping Generations Economy .....	20
2.3	Financing Public Goods.....	21
2.3.1	First-Best Decentralization: Person-Specific Taxes .....	22
2.3.2	Non Person-Specific Taxes .....	23
2.3.3	Pre-Existing Distortions .....	24
2.3.4	The Economy's Expansion Path .....	24
2.4	Conclusion.....	26

Appendix: Lump Sum Taxes .....	27
<b>3 Second-Best Public Provision of Pure Public Goods .....</b>	<b>29</b>
3.1 Second-Best Provision: Distorting Commodity Taxation.....	30
3.2 Extensions .....	34
3.2.1 Heterogeneity in the Second-Best: Commodity Taxation ....	34
3.2.2 A Reform Analysis .....	35
3.2.3 Labor Income Taxes .....	36
3.3 Level Comparisons.....	38
3.3.1 Identical Agents .....	38
3.3.2 Alternative Formulation .....	39
3.4 Public Goods in the Overlapping Generations Model.....	40
3.4.1 The Optimal Second-Best Rule .....	40
3.4.2 Level Comparisons .....	42
3.4.3 Self-Selection and Heterogeneity .....	43
3.5 The Marginal Cost of Funds (MCF).....	43
3.5.1 Labor Income Taxation and the MCF .....	44
3.5.2 Capital Income Taxation and the Marginal Cost of Funds...	45
3.5.3 Empirical Calculations of the MCF .....	46
3.6 Conclusion.....	47
Appendix A: Samuelson's Rule in the Static Model with Heterogeneity.....	48
Appendix B: A Reform Analysis.....	48
Appendix C: Labor Income Taxation .....	49
Appendix D: Samuelson's Rule in the OG Model .....	49

<b>4 Determining Demand for Public Goods:</b>	
Voting and Mechanisms.....	53
4.1 Voting Models.....	54
4.1.1 The Median Voter Hypothesis.....	54
4.1.2 Problems With the Median Voter Hypothesis .....	57
4.1.3 Extensions of the Median Voter Model.....	61
4.2 Mechanism Design with Public Goods .....	62
4.2.1 The Clarke Mechanism.....	62
4.2.2 The Groves - Ledyard Mechanism .....	66
4.2.3 Multi-Stage Games .....	68
4.2.4 Problems with Mechanism Design .....	69
4.2.5 Mechanisms and Social Weighting .....	72
4.3 Conclusion.....	73
<b>5 Determining the Demand for Public Goods:</b>	
Surveys and Indirect Estimation.....	77
5.1 Bohm's Survey .....	77
5.2 Contingent Valuation (CV) .....	79
5.2.1 The Basic Method.....	79
5.2.2 Common Problems .....	81
5.2.3 An Example of Contingent Valuation: Valuing Commuting Time.....	81
5.2.4 A Unified Approach to Contingent Valuation.....	82
5.3 A Critique of the Contingent Valuation Approach.....	84
5.4 Indirect Estimation: Weak Complementarity (WC).....	87
5.4.1 The Basic Method.....	87
5.4.2 Problems .....	91
5.4.3 Indirect Estimation as a Mechanism.....	92
5.5 Conclusion.....	93

<b>6    Privately Provided Public Goods .....</b>	<b>99</b>
6.1    The Subscriptions Model .....	101
6.2    The Warm Glow Model .....	104
6.3    Criticism of the Models.....	106
6.4    Imperfect Altruism Models .....	108
6.5    Hybrid Models .....	110
6.6    Fundraising Costs.....	112
6.7    Conclusion.....	113
<b>7    Extensions.....</b>	<b>115</b>
7.1    Charities .....	116
7.1.1    Fundraising Under Competition .....	116
7.1.2    Status Effects and Charities .....	118
7.1.3    "Seed" Money.....	121
7.2    Sequential Contributions and Strategic Behavior .....	122
7.2.1    A Two Period Model.....	122
7.2.2    Warm Glow Giving .....	124
7.2.3    Mechanisms.....	126
7.3    A Simple Dynamic Model of a Privately Provided Public Good.....	129
7.3.1    Privately Provided Public Goods in the OG Model.....	129
7.3.2    Optimality of Donations in the OG Model.....	132
7.4    Conclusion.....	133
<b>8    Neutrality Results .....</b>	<b>135</b>
8.1    Neutrality Propositions.....	136
8.1.1    Redistribution .....	136
8.1.2    Supplemental Government Provision.....	137
8.2    The Failure of Neutrality .....	138

8.2.1	Non-Neutrality: Non-Participants.....	138
8.2.2	Differences in Marginal Cost .....	138
8.2.3	Imperfect Altruism: Contributions as Imperfect Substitutes.....	139
8.2.4	Imperfect Altruism: The Warm Glow Model .....	140
8.2.5	Distorting Taxes and Transfers.....	141
8.2.6	Sophisticated and Unsophisticated Agents.....	145
8.2.7	Local Market Power Versus National Policies .....	146
8.2.8	Fundraising .....	148
8.3	Neutrality and Donated Labor .....	148
8.3.1	Donated Labor .....	148
8.3.2	Donated Labor and Cash Contributions .....	149
8.4	Conclusion .....	150
	Appendix A: Neutrality Results.....	151
	Appendix B: Non-Neutrality Results.....	151
<b>9</b>	<b>Empirical Evidence on Charitable Contributions .....</b>	<b>155</b>
9.1	Empirical Research on Charity.....	156
9.1.1	Econometric Problems.....	156
9.1.2	Data Sources .....	158
9.2	Static Models.....	159
9.2.1	Modelling Contributions in a Static Models.....	159
9.2.2	Empirical Results.....	161
9.3	Dynamic Models .....	168
9.3.1	Modeling Contributions in a Dynamic Model.....	168
9.3.2	Empirical Results.....	172
9.4	Conclusion.....	177

<b>10    Further Evidence on Privately Provided Public Goods .....</b>	<b>181</b>
10.1    Volunteer Labor.....	182
10.1.1    Modeling Volunteer Labor .....	182
10.1.2    Evidence .....	184
10.2    Charitable Bequests .....	189
10.2.1    Modeling Charitable Bequests.....	189
10.2.2    Empirical Results.....	191
10.3    Testing for Externalities and the Crowding Out Hypothesis...	193
10.4    Conclusion .....	202
<b>11    Experimental Evidence on the Free Rider Problem.....</b>	<b>205</b>
11.1    How Are Experiments Designed? .....	206
11.2    Early Studies of the Free Rider Hypothesis.....	208
11.3    An Early Response to the Early Results .....	211
11.4    Underlying Influences .....	214
11.4.1    Marginal Returns.....	214
11.4.2    Group Size Effects.....	215
11.4.3    Communication .....	215
11.4.4    Learning .....	216
11.5    Altruism, Warm Glow, or Noise?.....	218
11.5.1    Separating Kindness from Confusion.....	219
11.5.2    Altruism, Warm Glow, or Noise?.....	221
11.5.3    Revealed Preference and Altruism .....	224
11.6    Framing.....	225
11.7    Eliciting the WTP Function .....	227
11.8    Conclusion .....	228

<b>12 The Effect of Public Inputs on the Economy</b>	
<b>in Static Models.....</b>	<b>233</b>
12.1 The Effect of Public Capital on the Firm.....	234
12.2 A Static Open Economy Model of Public Inputs .....	235
12.3 Optimal Provision of a Public Input in the Small Open Economy .....	238
12.4 A Generalization.....	240
12.5 A General Equilibrium Model of Public Infrastructure.....	241
12.6 A Model with Rents.....	243
12.7 Conclusion .....	245
Appendix A: Comparative Statics in the Static, General Equilibrium Model .....	246
Appendix B: Derivation of (12.10) when $n < m$ .....	248
Appendix C: Derivation of (12.11).....	248
<b>13 The Effects of Public Capital in Dynamic Models.....</b>	<b>251</b>
13.1 Production Efficiency .....	253
13.1.1 The Basic Result on Production Efficiency.....	253
13.1.2 Imperfect Control .....	254
13.1.3 Heterogeneity .....	255
13.2 Public Investment in the Overlapping Generations Model....	256
13.2.1 Socially Optimal Public Investment in the Neoclassical OG Model .....	257
13.2.2 Decentralized Government Policy.....	258
13.3 Public Investment in a Model of Long Run Growth .....	261
13.3.1 Public Capital as a Source of Economic Growth .....	261
13.3.2 Congestion.....	265
13.4 Conclusion .....	267
Appendix A: Derivation of the Weighted Average Formula (13.3)...	267

Appendix B: The Weighted Average Formula with Heterogeneity ...	268
Appendix C: Endogenous Growth and Congestion - The Planner's Problem.....	269
<b>14    Empirical Work on the Public Capital Hypothesis .....</b>	<b>271</b>
14.1    Early Results.....	272
14.2    Criticism of the Early Work .....	275
14.3    Studies Using Disaggregated U.S. Data .....	276
14.3.1    Regional and State Studies .....	276
14.3.2    Industry Studies.....	282
14.4    Additional Time Series Evidence .....	283
14.5    International Evidence .....	286
14.6    Optimality .....	292
14.7    Conclusion.....	295
<b>15    Local Public Goods, Club Goods, and the Tiebout Hypothesis .....</b>	<b>299</b>
15.1    Club Goods.....	300
15.1.1    The Benchmark Club Good Model .....	300
15.1.2    Endogenous Classification .....	304
15.1.3    Intensity of Use .....	305
15.1.4    Quality Versus Quantity .....	306
15.1.5    Optimal Sorting with Heterogeneous Agents.....	307
15.2    Local Public Goods and the Tiebout Hypothesis.....	310
15.2.1    A Model of an LPG .....	311
15.2.2    A Model with Housing .....	312
15.2.3    Property Taxation .....	315
15.2.4    Tiebout Without Political Institutions .....	318

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15.3	Criticism of the Tiebout Hypothesis.....	320
15.4	Conclusion .....	322
<b>16</b>	<b>Fiscal Competition.....</b>	<b>327</b>
16.1	Tax Competition .....	328
16.1.1	Taxing Mobile Capital.....	330
16.1.2	Productive Public Investments .....	332
16.1.3	Tax Exporting and Commodity Tax Competition.....	334
16.1.4	Bidding for the Tax Base.....	335
16.1.5	Tiebout and Tax Competition.....	336
16.2	Extensions.....	338
16.2.1	Composition of Spending .....	338
16.2.2	Residence-Based Capital Income Taxes .....	339
16.2.3	The Time Consistency of Tax Policy .....	340
16.3	Imperfect Mobility.....	342
16.4	Fiscal Federalism .....	345
16.4.1	Mobility and Pareto Optimality.....	345
16.4.2	Vertical Fiscal Competition.....	347
16.5	Conclusion .....	349
	Appendix .....	350
<b>17</b>	<b>Empirical Testing with Local Public Goods.....</b>	<b>353</b>
17.1	Testing the Tiebout Hypothesis .....	354
17.1.1	A Model of Capitalization .....	354
17.1.2	Testing the Capitalization Hypothesis.....	356
17.1.3	Testing Leviathan .....	357
17.2	Estimating the Demand for LPGs: Politics and the Tiebout Hypothesis .....	358

17.3    Strategic Government Behavior .....	362
17.3.1    Models of Government Interaction .....	362
17.3.2    An Example: Horizontal Tax Competition.....	365
17.3.3    An Example: Vertical Tax Competition.....	365
17.3.4    Some Empirical Results .....	366
17.4    Conclusion .....	368
References.....	371
Index .....	407
Author Index .....	415